

THE POSTWAR SEA FORCES OF MARITIME
JAPAN, 1945-1971.

Vol. I

James E. Auer

THE POSTWAR SEA FORCES OF MARITIME JAPAN

1945-1971.

[v-1]

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty

of the

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

by

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JAMES E. AUER, U.S. NAVY

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree Doctor of Philosophy

July 31, 1971

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ABSTRACT

This monograph attempts a study of the history and problems of Japan's postwar naval forces drawing largely on the living participants in the activities and events making up that history, a subject area largely neglected to date.

The study concludes that despite the ideals and directives of the Occupation, Japan was never fully stripped of naval forces following the Second World War. More important, some people were not fully convinced of the possibility and desirability of perpetual disarmament. Plans for eventual rearmament began to be formulated even before the almost complete disarmament was achieved. In fact, specific rearmament studies and plans were being made by the very persons who were exempt from Occupation purge directives in order to work in the government on disarmament. Rather than trying to effect any type of conspiracy, these persons were, instead, acting sincerely for what they thought best for their country and were at least sympathetically encouraged throughout much of the Occupation by important

Japanese political figures and influential U.S. naval officers.

Although Article 9 of the Japanese postwar Constitution called for a ban on war as a sovereign right of the nation and on maintaining land, sea, and air forces, an idea that may have been originated by Japanese Prime Minister Shidehara, it was an idea that did not appear in other drafts of the new Constitution and it was opposed from the outset by some conservative politicians and former military leaders who thought it dangerous for Japan's security. General Douglas MacArthur who was responsible for the inclusion of the article in the Constitution, if not its authorship, maintained that he never meant for the provision to ban armed self-defense measures; and it appears that the man immediately responsible for the drafting, General Courtney Whitney, understood the amendments to Article 9 as proposed by Dr. Ashida Hitoshi, who was advised that the Americans might interpret the changes to allow rearmament for self-defense in the future, to mean exactly that. In any event, such allowance for future armed self-defense was not explained to the Japanese Diet reviewing the Constitution in 1946; and the government's official explanation,

which has always maintained that regular armed forces, war potential, and the right of belligerency, a term found to have no meaning in international law, were forbidden, has led to efforts to live within the confines of Article 9 and still have armed forces only for self-defense, to maintain special civilians in military uniforms conducting military activities, and by ever-changing, increasing estimates of what constitutes self-defense and what is not war potential to give opposition parties the opportunity to argue credibly that the entire idea of armed self-defense has from the beginning been unconstitutional.

Less than one year after the new Constitution went into effect, a new organization conducting naval activities under the advice and actual participation of former naval personnel was formed with little opposition other than from a few American Occupation officials and Soviet representatives on various Allied postwar commissions; although the Maritime Safety Agency was called a non-military force, its activities were from the outset, though limited, military in nature. In October, 1950, when the world thought Japan had no naval forces, 46 of its ships deployed into combat, the only such action in the nation's postwar history to date.

Since recovering independence, the Japanese formed a National Safety Agency in 1952, incorporating a police reserve force founded after the outbreak of the Korean War because of the removal of American ground units and a naval guard unit formed within the Maritime Safety Agency. In 1954 the name of the Safety Agency was changed to the Defense Agency; the explicit mission of defending the country against external aggression was added. Also, a third unit with an air defense role was added so that the three forces resembled the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, which provided their Japanese counterparts with equipment and training. The National Defense Council, to be the Prime Minister's top advisory body on national security matters was constituted in 1956; and a year later a basic national defense policy, unchanged to the present, was adopted after Council and Cabinet approval. A very small percentage of the gross national product and a usually declining portion of the national budget, although gradually increasing in absolute amount, has been annually allotted to defense since 1952, but little more than a training capability has ever been achieved. Especially taking into account advancements made by other countries and because of the greatly increasing

tempo of its commercial maritime activities, Japan may be relatively less able at present to provide for its naval defense than before. Never given the power to conscript and with postwar military activity constitutionally doubtful and unpopular, the ability to attract and hold young recruits has dwindled under conditions of advanced economic prosperity, including nearly full employment with attendant categorial shortages, in the postwar era. A small portion of the modest defense budget has been annually earmarked for research and development with the result that Japan's forces have so far been dependent on sometimes outmoded foreign technology or ideas of interest and benefit to domestic industry for weaponry. Adequate stockpiles of fuel and ammunition or logistic support for any type of sustained defense capability have never been accumulated or maintained so that claims of autonomous or even considerable defense capability seem quite weak from a military point of view.

This monograph challenges many of the basic popular assumptions concerning the disarmament of Japan, the timing and causes of its rearmament, and the character of its actual postwar forces. Specific assumptions challenged

include those maintaining: that sea forces were never maintained from 1945-1952; that no military organization was allowed to exist during the pre-Korean War period of demilitarization; that Japanese and American planning for rearmament came only after the outbreak of the Korean War; that rearmament was forced on the Japanese by the United States government, particularly in the person of special envoy John Foster Dulles; that Japan has really wanted to provide itself only internal security, the U.S. guaranteeing external security, an unchanged Japanese policy which has finally won out over American changing attitudes; that the Self-Defense Forces in general and the Maritime Self-Defense Force in particular do not rely on the traditions of the Imperial Forces and are in fact basically new although hybrid organizations; that the Self-Defense Forces are now more powerful than the prewar forces and are capable of providing for the autonomous defense of Japan; and that militarism might be returning to Japan as partially manifested in bigger defense spending and an emergent military-industrial complex.

VITA

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To Dad

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ACRONYMS

ADM	admiral; also VADM - vice admiral, RADM - rear admiral
ASW	anti-submarine warfare
CAPT	naval rank of captain
CDR	commander
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief Pacific (USA)
COMINPAC	Commander Mine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
COMNAVFE	Commander Naval Forces Far East (USA)
COMNAVJAP	Commander Naval Forces Japan (USA)
CSF	Coastal Security Force (<u>Kaijo Keibitai</u>) of the Ministry of Transportation (Japan)
GHQ	General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers
FMS	Foreign Military Sales Program (USA)
GNP	gross national product
GOJ	government of Japan
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JSP	Japan Socialist Party

LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
LLO	Local Liaison Office of the Defense Agency (Japan)
LSSL	large support landing ship
MAAG-J	Military Assistance and Advisory Group-- Japan (USA)
MAP	Military Assistance Program (USA)
MDAO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office (USA)
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
MSB(A)	Maritime Safety Board (Agency) of the Ministry of Transportation (Japan)
MSF	Maritime Safety Force (<u>Keibitai</u>) of the Safety Agency (Japan)
MSO	Maritime Staff Office of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
NPR	National Police Reserve (<u>Keisatsu Yobitai</u>) (Japan)
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OSP	Offshore Procurement Program (USA)
PF	patrol frigate
SCAJAP	Naval Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (USA)
SCAP	Supreme Commander for Allied Powers

SDF Self-Defense Forces (Jieitai); also JSDF -
 Japan Self-Defense Forces, (J)ASDF - (Japan)
 Air Self-Defense Force, (J)GSDF - (Japan)
 Ground Self-Defense Force, (J)MSDF - (Japan)
 Maritime Self-Defense Force (Kaijo Jieitai)

SRF Ship Repair Facility

TRDI Technical Research and Development Institute
 of the Defense Agency (Japan)

USN United States Navy

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INTRODUCTION

On September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered to the United States on board a U.S. Navy battleship in Tokyo Bay beginning a new era in Japanese history. For almost seven years, until April 28, 1952, Japan lived under an Occupation largely directed by the United States although under circumstances considered to be rather mild for a defeated nation; on the date of independence, however, another era in Japanese history, one still marked by manifold dependence on and friendship with the United States, was initiated. On November 21, 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and United States President Richard Nixon signed a communiqué declaring that the Ryukyu Islands would be returned to Japan in 1972 pending the conclusion of negotiations between the two countries; observers have pointed out that the reversion signifies the beginning of still another era in the history of postwar Japan, all major problems remaining from the war finally settled and truly complete sovereignty with territorial, economic, and

psychological recovery finally achieved.¹

Japan was disarmed by the occupying powers at the end of World War II and was rearmed only as the Korean War escalated, and even then in a way mainly to preserve internal security. Because of the complete failure of military policies which had become dominant in the 1930's and which had resulted in national defeat, the Japanese people gladly cooperated with the physical disarmament of the Occupation and at the urging of their conquerors were, further, psychologically disarmed as well. The most obvious expression of total disarmament was Article 9 of the postwar Constitution which renounced war as a policy option and stated that land, sea, and air forces would never be maintained.

Denied in their request for a centralized police force to maintain internal security with a U.S. guarantee of external protection in 1947, only following the outbreak of the Korean conflict were the Japanese allowed a

¹Following currently accepted patterns of style, Japanese names used in this monograph are listed with family names first. Long vowels, formerly marked by a macron in romanized Japanese words, are not so designated here, following the recent practices of Japanese scholars writing in English.

centralized security force, considerably greater in fire-power than under their earlier plan. A small marine guard force was decided upon in late 1951 and founded in April, 1952. In 1954 the police reserve force and marine guard were renamed the Ground and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, respectively; and an Air Self-Defense Force was initiated, creating for Japan, in effect, nuclei of army, navy, and air forces. Despite constitutional problems, such development was necessary to win a peace treaty from the United States and to gain military aid from the U.S. once a limited capability was decided upon.

Since the formal founding of these forces in 1954, greater absolute amounts of money have been appropriated annually for defense; three buildup programs have been planned and almost completely executed; a fourth and more ambitious program is presently on the drawing board. As a result, capability has been built up and United States military presence has been reduced. In the 1970's as the reversion of Okinawa, the de-escalation of the Vietnam War, and the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine approach and become facts, Japan will assume responsibility for its conventional, autonomous defense.

While the above three paragraphs represent a typical appraisal of military events in postwar Japan, they do not, it is believed, accurately express the true situation. This monograph, in tracing the historical background, development, and problems of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), will challenge many of the basic popular assumptions concerning the disarmament of Japan, the timing and causes of its rearmament, and the character of its actual postwar forces. Furthermore, it will be held that any truth to these challenges does not result from any military or political conspiracy on the part of the Japanese or American government or military establishment heretofore unknown. On the contrary, it will hopefully be demonstrated that the pattern of disarmament described above was simply not compatible with the maritime nature of an island nation in a less than stable international environment, and that the lack of any firm naval policy of rearmament in an economically viable Japan since the recovery of sovereignty has not made the Maritime Self-Defense Force nearly capable of performing an autonomous defense mission.

Specific popular assumptions to be challenged and respective findings of this study include:

a. concerning disarmament:

1. the assumption that sea forces were never maintained from 1945-1952; it will be argued, instead, that uniformed, armed forces paid for by the Japanese government conducting limited naval operations with Imperial Navy personnel, exempt from purge directives and continued in service on Imperial Navy ships, existed throughout the period under centralized authority;

2. the assumption that no military organization was allowed to exist during the pre-Korean War period of demilitarization; the origin and development of the Maritime Safety Agency will be examined with respect to its similarity to a military organization, and with respect to its operations which included the deployment of a small naval unit into combat, the only overseas dispatch of Japanese armed forces since the war;

b. concerning rearmament:

1. the assumption that Japanese and American planning for rearmament came only after the outbreak of the Korean War; this study will point out in contrast: the almost immediate beginning of naval rearmament planning by former Japanese naval officers exempt from purge

restrictions, the sentiment shown toward eventual rearmament by important U.S. Navy and Japanese political leaders, particularly to the person of former Admiral/Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburo, and the quiet pre-Korean War activities of some United States officials following the National Security Council decision of 1948 to encourage paramilitary activity in Japan;

2. the assumption that rearmament was forced on the Japanese by the United States government, particularly by special envoy John Foster Dulles; this monograph will argue that the request for protection which led to the Maritime Safety Agency was specifically a Japanese idea and that, in addition to people such as Admiral Nomura and Dr. Ashida Hitoshi who opposed total disarmament, even Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, despite primary economic priorities, desired naval rearmament although he desired it be paid for by the United States;

3. the assumption that Japan has really wanted only internal security by its own means and a U.S. guarantee of external security, an unchanged Japanese policy which has finally won out over changing American attitudes; this study will try to show that the first military

organization, the Maritime Safety Agency, was specifically directed against external threats; that the Self-Defense Forces, while incapable of providing considerable security against either internal or external threats to the nation, are outwardly as well as if not more than inwardly oriented; and that neither the United States nor Japan has been known to have a consistent policy concerning the latter's defense in the postwar period;

c. concerning the Self-Defense Forces in general and the Maritime Self-Defense Force in particular:

1. the assumption that they do not rely on the traditions of the Imperial forces and are in fact basically new although hybrid organizations; this monograph will point out the direct linkages of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Imperial Navy through activities, organizational continuity, present customs and symbols, personnel, and engineering techniques;

2. the assumption that the Self-Defense Forces do not deploy overseas; this study will detail the peaceful, regular overseas training activities, the potential for participation in United Nations' peacekeeping activities overseas based on a relatively unknown postwar precedent in

Japan, the annual deployment of an Antarctic service expedition, and other training activities abroad;

3. the assumption that they are now more powerful than prewar forces and are capable of providing for the autonomous defense of Japan; this monograph will attempt to show the lack of a clear role with resultant inability to implement a definitive maritime strategy or to achieve any kind of real capability outside of training and mine-sweeping; the inherent limitations of personnel shortages, small research and development spending, and poor logistics will be shown to make the Maritime Self-Defense Force a midget when compared with modern sea forces or even with the World War II Imperial Navy;

4. the assumption that militarism might be returning to Japan as partially manifested in bigger defense spending and an emergent military-industrial complex; factors to be pointed out as arguing against such a rebirth include: the very small rate of defense spending, severe limitations in capability, almost total anonymity and lack of influence of postwar military leaders, and overwhelming subordination of military considerations to political and industrial concerns.

Research for this monograph has emphasized interviews with Japanese civilian and military persons knowledgeable of and involved in postwar naval activities. Although these led to the challenges that are listed above and are later explained, no still-classified information has been utilized. Basically, because of the small nature of and incorrect assumptions concerning postwar military activities, there has been little detailed, historical study of their content and nature. Declassified U.S. Occupation military documents have been surveyed and several of the key U.S. naval personnel with important roles in postwar Japanese naval rearmament have been interviewed. Documents provided by the Japan Defense Agency, other civilian agencies, and both American and Japanese press sources were also utilized. In almost every case details of historical incidents were cross-checked with direct participants, other knowledgeable sources, and direct documentation. The testimony of no one person is believed key to any fact reported in the monograph; most informants were most cooperative in directing the writer to other sources, even though those interviewed frequently knew that in some cases the other persons might not be in

complete agreement as to opinions and interpretations. No one interviewed made a recognizable attempt to present only favorable information toward his role or interest.

The need and possible value of this study is believed to be especially great if indeed another era in Japan's history is drawing to a close. Japanese military activities are almost routinely and carelessly excluded from studies of the pre-Korean War Occupation era and are frequently inaccurate and overstated for the first twenty years of existence of the Self-Defense Forces. If real military forces in the sense of other nations' services are to appear in Japan in the next era or one that then ensues, their influence from the unique type of forces that have been maintained since the war, as well as any carryover of influence from the Imperial forces, which have been studied elsewhere in more detail, will be informative. Even if no substantial change in the nature of the present Self-Defense Forces is forthcoming, their immediate background and history through the first quarter century following the war, during which military events have been unpopular in Japan, are believed worthy of deeper study. Finally, problems such as an unpopular military, an all volunteer force, and

the problem of defense spending among pressing public needs-- questions many modern nations are beginning to face in the 1970's--have been characteristic of Japan's postwar forces during the last two decades. Japanese experience, therefore, may have some relevance to what other nations might experience in the future.

PART I

THE BACKGROUND

CHAPTER I

PREWAR MARITIME JAPAN AND ITS NAVAL FORCES

Never was so much false arithmetic employed on any subject, as that which has been employed to persuade nations that it is in their interest to go to war. . . . And perhaps, to remove as much as possible the occasions of making war, it might be better for us to abandon the ocean altogether, that being the element whereon we shall be principally exposed to jostle with other nations: to leave to others to bring what we shall want, and to carry what we can spare. . . . It might be time enough to seek employment for them at sea, when the land no longer offers it.

Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. . . . As long, therefore, as they can find employment in this line, I would not convert them into mariners, artisans, or anything else. . . . Our people are decided in the opinion that it is necessary for us to take a share in the occupation of the ocean, and their established habits induce them to require that the sea be kept open to them. . . . I think it a duty in those entrusted with the administration of their affairs to conform themselves to the decided choice of their constituents; and that, therefore, we should in every instance preserve an equality of right to them in the transportation of commodities, in the right of fishing, and in the other uses of the sea.

But what will be the consequence? Frequent wars without a doubt. Their property will be violated on the sea, and in foreign ports, their persons will be insulted, imprisoned, etc. for pretended debts, contracts, crimes, contraband, etc. . . . This reasoning

leads to the necessity of some naval force. . . . If war with England should take place, it seems to me that the first thing necessary would be a resolution to abandon the carrying trade because we cannot protect it. Foreign nations must in that case be invited to bring us what we want and to take our productions in their own bottoms. . . . Indeed I look forward with horror to the very possible case of war with an European power, and think there is no protection against them but from the possession of some force on the sea.¹

The great American statesman and President, Thomas Jefferson, saw the possibility of his potentially maritime nation remaining clear of international conflicts by employing its citizens as cultivators of the earth and leaving to others to bring necessities from outside.

In slightly more than 25 years since World War II, the archipelago of Japan has engaged in all the activities warned about by Jefferson, built a strong and vibrant economy based on its maritime activities, and yet has avoided completely the wars he cautioned would be frequent. Furthermore Japan has existed with only a very small naval force, an organization which, in 1971, is lesser in aggregate tonnage than one of the nation's many large merchant vessels. Japanese politicians, scholars, and

¹Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia (1782); "Letter to John Jay," August 23, 1785.

businessmen have made statements to the effect that good relations must be maintained with all nations of the world, while every day the maritime activities of the country are expanded in territories including some where the greatest tensions of the international community are focused.

Have the postwar Japanese proved the statements of Jefferson to be incorrect? Or has Japan experienced success only because of the protection of the powerful United States Seventh Fleet which has operated out of its ports the entire period? Or has the horror of the nuclear age made war obsolete, Japan providing an example of the fact that a nation may economically prosper despite engaging in international financial ventures without a powerful military establishment? Only the future may reveal the answers to these questions, but the pre-World War II history of maritime Japan does not seriously challenge the assertions offered by Jefferson.

Although Japanese maritime activities and naval forces date back more than 1000 years, this preliminary discussion will cover briefly only the most recent half of this prewar period. This treatment is in no way intended to portray a detailed history or analysis of the period in question but will discuss the commercial maritime

activities, pre-formal-establishment naval activities, the development of the Imperial Navy, its personnel problems, relation to defense industry, and logistic support situation in order to parallel the postwar discussion to be treated in detail in the remainder of the monograph.

A. MARITIME ACTIVITIES

In 1636 the Tokugawa Shogunate declared that henceforth no Japanese citizen would be allowed to travel abroad and no such person already abroad could return to Japan. This was followed by a decree in 1638 banning the construction of large merchant vessels thereby limiting the country to a coastal merchant marine. For over 200 years Japan was cut off from the outside world except for very limited contacts allowed to continue in Nagasaki with the Dutch and Chinese. During this period, following the precepts to be uttered by Jefferson during its course, Japan experienced extended political stability and no war by employing its citizens as cultivators of the earth.

The citizens of United States did not follow this recommended role as completely as did the Tokugawa Japanese, and in the 1850's American maritime activities provided the

occasion for the end of Japanese isolation. U.S. merchant and fishing vessels using sea lanes and operating areas proximate to Japan were desirous of entry to Japanese ports to take on water and fuel. Shipwrecked seamen who happened on to Japanese territory were either executed or tortured, treatment that was not considered civilized by the new American republic. In 1853 a U.S. naval steamer with Commodore Matthew C. Perry embarked entered Japanese waters and in the name of the President of the United States demanded commercial relations. A year later, when Perry returned for an answer, the Japanese consented to a treaty; and a maritime status, soon-to-be increased in strength with the introduction of Western industrialized technology, was resumed.

New technology demanded increasing percentages of outside resources, domestic supplies of most minerals other than coal being rather minimal. Abundant water for irrigation provided rich agricultural yields; but other than water's eventual use for hydroelectric power, industrial modernization meant a need for outside mineral and energy sources. By the mid 1930's Japan imported the following percentages of raw materials:²

²Statistics furnished by Research Division, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College, Tokyo.

<u>Product</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Wheat	17.1
Barley	1.9
Sugar	87.5
Bean	69.0
Gum (natural)	100.0
Phosphate	100.0
Bauxite	100.0
Coal	12.2
Oil	79.1
Wool	100.0
Cotton	100.0
Timber	6.8
Pulp	26.2
Salt	66.2

To transport these commodities an ocean-going merchant marine was again developed. Starting with virtually nothing, by the mid 1930's Japan possessed the third largest merchant fleet in the world, smaller only than those of Great Britain and the United States. Japanese-owned vessels carried a greater percentage of exports and imports than did foreign bottoms, transporting almost twice the relative amount they did in 1970 when the Japanese merchant marine was in actuality the largest in the world. Some indication of the size of prewar merchant ship strength can be gained from the following figures:³

³Statistics furnished by Japan Ministry of Transportation; Lloyd's Register of Shipping.

Year	Cargo Ships	Semi- cargo Ships	Passenger Ships	Tankers	Total Merchant Fleet	Total Tonnage (1,000 G/T)
1935	924	319	73	39	2146	4086

Prewar Japan's diet included a great amount of fish and its fleet of fishing vessels was overwhelmingly the largest in the world, surpassing its closest rival, the United States, by over 49 per cent in the mid-1930's. Although coastal fishing provided a greater percentage of the catches than it does at the present time, ocean going fishing vessels and whaling ships ventured far from local waters. Japanese whalers accounted for over ten per cent of the world's catch of whales in the mid-1930's, allowing the nation to produce a similar percentage of the global supply of whale oil.⁴

In its swift drive to modernization, however, problems arose for the new maritime power. Industrialization resulted in the production of more finished goods than could be consumed domestically and also drew more people from the rural countryside into the cities, people who had

⁴Information furnished by Japan Whaling Association.

to be fed with imported foodstuffs. The nation became more and more dependent on regular and uninterrupted overseas trade. World War I's demands on shipping and resultant sharp rise in freight rates swiftly caused severe rice riots in Japan. Rapid population increase was also problematic. Continental Asia was already densely populated, and its living standard was lower than Japan's. As a result, Japanese laborers could not compete with Chinese or Korean coolies; on the other hand, Americans, Canadians, and Australians could not compete with the Japanese and thus excluded them. Increasingly the Japanese could not earn a living where they were free to go and were excluded from countries where they could hope to better themselves.⁵ Since Japan's "new rich" in Kansai made much money during World War I, and the country was guided through part of the 1920's by moderate statesmen such as the first commoner Prime Minister, Hara Kei, and Admiral Kato Tomosaburo, real resentment of the increasing dual problems did not express itself in international dissatisfaction until the London

⁵ Arthur Bullard, The ABC's of Disarmament and the Pacific Problems, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921, pp. 54-57.

Naval Conference in 1930. Increasingly after that, however, Japan turned from its role as an ocean nation to one as a continental power. Hoping to conquer areas capable of supplying the needed resources and of providing space for its people to live, the continental-oriented nation experienced conflict and defeat. Only after surrender and occupation would Japan again become a maritime nation.⁶

B. TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN IMPERIAL NAVY

Just imagine it! A three-masted schooner corvette, of only 400 tons, with a sun flag atop the stern pole. Nearly 100 officers and men, all clad in Happi-like coats and cotton trousers, all with quaint hairdos and wearing straw sandals. Also on board a team of 11 American naval officers and men, headed by a young, full-bearded captain. All but one of the Japanese can't speak English, and orders are given in Dutch! To add to this, on deck are two hogs, 60 chickens and 20 ducks.

This is not the filming of another movie about Townsend Harris.⁷

⁶Interview with Speaker of the House of Representatives Funada Naka, January 23, 1971. Speaker Funada was Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary in 1924, a private secretary to Prime Minister Kato Tomosaburo, and a member of the Diet as early as 1930. His insights into Japan's past and present policy actions were invaluable to my understanding.

⁷Chihaya Masataka, "The 'Kanrin Maru' Goes Across the Pacific," US Japan Centennial Special Edition, Shipping and Trade News, 1960, p. 4. I am indebted to former IJN Commander Chihaya, now managing editor of Shipping and Trade

What it was, instead, was the first overseas cruise of the young Japanese Navy just established by the Tokugawa Shogunate. This cruise of 1860 accompanied the first Japanese Embassy to the United States coming to ratify the commercial treaty signed by the two countries in 1858.

The ban on building of non-coastal shipping had been lifted in 1853 in order to allow Japan to acquire a naval force to prevent more humiliations such as Perry's visit of that year. A powerful navy was felt necessary to preserve peace and isolation, but in fact Jefferson's feeling proved to be more accurate. The Dutch were rather reluctant at first, to give up their exclusive Western access to Japan; but in 1855 they yielded and presented the Shogunate with a paddlewheel steamer and agreed to build two corvettes for Japan, one of which was the KANRIN MARU.

The gift of a steamer necessitated maritime training for the prospective members of the new Navy since two centuries of isolation had weakened maritime skills. The first officer candidates came from Tokugawa samurai, and

News, for providing this article, another manuscript mentioned below, and his profound insights into the Imperial Japanese Navy.

the first sailors were recruited from the boatmen of Shiakujima in the Inland Sea. Dutch naval officers served as faculty for primitive training held in Nagasaki just as American officers would do almost 100 years later when the United States government's gift of ships would occasion elementary training for the beginning of a new naval force.⁸

In addition to a trans-Pacific crossing, Japanese naval forces participated in a modern sea battle before the establishment of its Imperial Navy. The Satsuma daimyo, whose samurai were to found and dominate the national sea force of the future, had founded their own autonomous naval force with advice and help from the British. In 1866 this relatively modern force defeated the two ship Tokugawa fleet; and a young impatient Satsuma officer named Togo Heihachiro, later to command the victorious Japanese fleet in one of the greatest naval battles of all time in 1905 at Tsushima, fired the first shot. Again almost a century later, an autonomous maritime force would go into battle prior to the formal establishment of a postwar Japanese

⁸Ibid.

navy, and its officers would go on to position of high responsibility in the later Maritime Self-Defense Force.

C. THE ROLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY


The Emperor Meiji reviewed the fleet near Osaka in the first year of his reign and the Imperial Navy was born. From humble beginnings of less than 2000 men and four ships aggregating 3416 tons, it was to grow during the Second World War to a nearly two-million-man force with 538 ships of 899,000 tons and 1480 aircraft.

1. Organization

The fleet belonged to the Emperor who was its Supreme Commander. The Navy Minister was a member of the Cabinet; however, because of a 1900 ordinance giving the Army and the Navy the option of providing ministers, without which a Cabinet could not be formed, the military's control by the Prime Minister was never firm. In addition to the Navy Ministry, responsible for administration of naval affairs and maritime safety, the Navy General Staff (Gun Rei Bu) also belonged directly to the Emperor. The General Staff issued operating orders to the Emperor's Combined

Fleet in wartime. The new force's tradition soon developed as "Silent Navy," i.e., involved in politics only in the Cabinet as proper in the person of the minister. As a result, initially the General Staff was not an overly important body in contrast to the case of the Imperial Army. In 1933, however, the rules of the General Staff were revised more in line with the Army pattern. The new rules established the supremacy of the General Staff over the ministry and greatly reduced the power of the minister over the Navy. The Chief of the General Staff obtained control over the fleet, even in peacetime, and gained the power to determine the size of the Navy in manpower and ships. In 1937 the powers of the Navy Minister were again severely reduced when the minister and his staff were placed together in the Navy Department of the Imperial General Headquarters (Dai Hon Ei) as subordinates to the Chief of the General Staff. A simplified representation of this eventual command organization might be depicted as follows:⁹

⁹Information on the history and organization of the Imperial Japanese Navy was obtained through long hours of patient instruction kindly provided by Professor Tsunoda Jun of the National Diet Library, general editor of Road to the Pacific War and Taoka Shunji, military affairs correspondent of the Asahi Shimbun.



2. Mission

The mission of the Imperial Navy soon became the control of the seas of the Western Pacific; and after convincing victories over the Chinese fleet in the Sino-Japanese War and Russian Asiatic and Baltic fleets in the Russo-Japanese War, control was nearly absolute. Friendly relations with Britain, France, and the United States meant no threats from those countries. The German Navy was bottled up by the British, and the only formidable Asian navies had been annihilated. A fleet of moderate size might have now been sufficient, but the Japanese Navy desired otherwise.

Coordination between the Army and Navy had been poor in the Russo-Japanese War, and in 1906 the Army proposed that Japan adopt an integrated defense policy based on a common list of hypothetical enemies with a general agreement between the two services on a common strategy. Navy Minister Yamamoto Gombei and the now famous Togo opposed this policy, the latter even refusing to consult with the Army on the conduct of land-sea operations. Instead of the single hypothetical enemy of Russia, the Navy wanted a listing of three: Russia, the United States, and France. It was not important that these last two were not unfriendly to Japan; the Navy wanted to use their strength as a minimum standard for the Japanese Navy by regarding those countries as hypothetical enemies. This meaning of the term "hypothetical enemy" which had been popularized in the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, translated and widely read in Japan, triumphed when the Emperor Meiji ruled that the dual defense policy structure would remain. The Japanese Navy thus justified a larger budget than it otherwise might have had; it was often at parity with the Army which was much larger in personnel. Shortly after this early Imperial ruling, the Navy War College was established in Tokyo. From 1907

both that body and its U.S. Navy counterpart in Newport, Rhode Island, conducted war games with each other designated as foe. In 1918 the revised Japanese defense policy designated the United States as number two on the list of hypothetical enemies; and in 1923 a further revision designated U.S. as number one for at least theoretical purposes. Recently some scholars have reasoned that the causes of the Pacific War have been too casually attributed to the difficulties of international politics between Japan and the United States; the effect of the writings of Mahan on some Japanese and American naval planners might have also played an important role.¹⁰

Initially stimulated to build up the fleet which triumphed in the wars with China and Russia by the visit of Perry in 1853 and reinforced in this intention by the sight of Chinese men-of-war in the port of Nagasaki in 1881, the Japanese government, by an Imperial ruling of 1907, granted

¹⁰For example Professor Tsunoda's Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi (Road to the Pacific War), Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1963. This seven volume work is so far available only in Japanese but is in the process of translation into English at this time by a group of American scholars specialized in modern Japanese foreign policy and is to be published by Columbia University Press.

the Navy authority to build eight modern battleships, eight new cruisers, and necessary auxiliary vessels to support the combatants. The Navy planned to reorganize eight older battleships into a third fleet, and the entire program became known as the 8-8-8 Plan. Budget considerations, however, delayed the start of even one battleship until 1910; three battle-cruisers were authorized in 1913. The Navy pressured the government by refusing to provide a minister to the Cabinet and incurred the wrath of the elder statesmen who dominated the political scene in Meiji Japan. Even a decree from the Emperor in the government's behalf did not succeed, however, until the Navy was promised three new battleships. Before the end of the 8-8-8 program was in sight, naval expenditures had reached 30 per cent of the national budget and Japan's far-sighted naval statesman, Kato Tomosaburo, then Navy Minister and formerly Togo's chief of staff at Tsushima, astonished the Washington Conference in 1921 by accepting the establishment of a five to three American-Japanese ratio in capital ships. Kato reasoned that such a ratio was more limiting to the United States than it was to Japan, arguing that if Japan would carry out the 8-8-8 plan despite the economic difficulties

involved, the U.S. would only build more ships and Japan would not be able to match this further increase in American superiority. Admiral Kato's policy of no war with America, although fully supported by future moderate leaders of the Imperial Navy such as Ministers Yonai Mitsumasa and Yoshida Zengo and other well known admirals such as Yamanashi Katsunoshin, Yamamoto Isoroku, Nomura Kichisaburo, and Inoue Shigemi, was sabotaged by more shortsighted officers led by another Kato, Admiral Kato Kanji, and his followers who insisted that Japan must maintain 70 per cent of America's naval strength. This latter group succeeded by weakening the Navy Ministry where many of the foreign-educated moderates were powerful, by assuming that someday there would be an inevitable Pacific clash, and by abandoning the up-to-that-time rational and scientific approach to naval planning for a ideological approach that believed Japanese moral superiority could triumph over America's physical superiority. Many middle and low rankings officers were indoctrinated step-by-step in an even more fanatical version of such a policy; the disarmament agreements of Washington and London were allowed to expire; Japan began again building warships in earnest; the final

result was the Pacific War. The ideas of Kato Tomosaburo did not completely die out in Japanese naval thinking, however. When it came time to establish a postwar navy, retired admirals Nomura and Yamanashi would play major roles and a handpicked appointee of the moderate and influential Yonai would be delegated by the government to plan the new force.

D. THE PERSONNEL SITUATION OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY

To serve in the Imperial Navy was directly to serve the Emperor and despite discipline which at times became rigid and severe, morale remained extremely high. "The spirit of the Imperial Navy," one of its former officers explained, "can be stated in one word: Shintoism."¹¹ Although this explanation might seem too simple, naval service was a religious exercise, although religious in the sense of the Shinto concept. The Emperor and his subjects who died in naval battle were deified but in the

¹¹Interview with Lieutenant Commander Hino Torao, IJN (Ret.), September 17, 1970. Good pay and numerous fringe benefits including high social prestige were, of course, among other factors influencing morale.

Western sense perhaps in a way more akin to veneration than adoration. Bushido or the way of the warrior was the ethical code; service to the master was service to the Imperial Navy. The greater the personal sacrifice the more fully honor was attained. Retired Captain Fuchida Mitsuo who as a commander led the attack on Pearl Harbor states that he sincerely believed in the Imperial Way (kodo), the ideological movement which in the 1920's and 1930's intensified Navy spirit, particularly that of middle level officers, and challenged the more scientific orientation of the past. He believed that conquering Hawaii and perhaps part of the west coast of the United States was in the best interests not only of Japan but of all men of that region. Although his forces destroyed the fourteen American aircraft which came up to challenge the attack, the bravery of those outnumbered pilots was greatly admired; and the Japanese fliers tried to confirm among themselves how many parachutes were sighted with the hope that those noble fighting brothers were spared.¹² Although this more passionate mood resulted

¹²Interview with Captain Fuchida, December 5, 1970. Fuchida reconsidered his belief in kodo after seeing the Southeast Asian hatred of the Japanese following the war. He presently is still working for the brotherhood of all men as a Christian lay missionary.

in some severe treatment, e.g., junior officers and seamen were sometimes struck by their immediate seniors, the better-known gentlemanly moderation of the Navy was still the rule in public.¹³

Social status was high for an Imperial Navy man and financial compensations were also very adequate. Although a midshipman graduating from the Naval Academy may have had an initial salary slightly below that of a university graduate, he soon caught up with his contemporaries from the national universities. All officers of flag rank had salaries at least equivalent to college professors, vice admirals and above exceeding the pay of the top professor of a national university. Enlisted men were also adequately compensated, a chief petty officer drawing a salary equivalent to that of a university graduate.¹⁴ Senior officers

¹³Navy men were always known for their courtesy in public, particularly as compared with the Army's military police, often mistaken as infantrymen and known to strike civilians. In the early days of the Imperial Navy very friendly relations between officers and enlisted men were reported, even in the heat of battle. See for example Nihon Kai Kaisen (Battle of Tsushima) Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1936, pp. 84-85, 142, 169-170.

¹⁴Interview with retired Professor Emeritus Taoka Ryoichi, Kyoto University, November 13, 1970. Salary data

had liberal expense accounts for entertainment, and retirements were comfortable for all career men. A chief petty officer could retire in his 50's with adequate money to purchase a home and live comfortably as an honorable and respected member of his community.

Regular line officers were usually graduates of the Naval Academy at Etajima near Kure. Engineering specialists were trained at Maizuru and paymasters in Tokyo. Reserve officers were obtained from graduates of the best universities. Competition was always keen for naval schools, and education at Etajima was considered a good way for an intelligent son of a low-income family to increase his social status. Particularly in World War II, even some wealthy boys sought education at the Naval Academy in order to complete university education without being conscripted for military service. Universal conscription had been introduced in Japan in 1873; but, except for World War II, even most enlisted men in the Navy were volunteers.

Etajima's education was considered equivalent to that of the best national university; and because of the

for Imperial Navy personnel provided by Personnel Section, Administration Division, Maritime Staff Office, Tokyo.

insistence of its moderate President, Vice Admiral Inoue Shigemi, it was the only university in Japan to continue teaching English during the war. Etajima sought to impart knowledge rather than skills, which were thought to be the jobs of petty officers; future officers studied there four years, cut off from the rest of society on an island, to be spiritually trained above all, with intensive schooling in military subjects, technology, and the liberal arts. Although regimented training and memory work is reputed to have been increasingly typical after 1917, Admiral Inoue described the lowest aim of the academy as producing a military man capable of serving as an ensign with a potential to grow like a young tree. He rejected the training of an apprentice with skills in only one field.¹⁵ Maizuru's engineers and the graduates of Tokyo University and other prestige graduate schools gave the Navy the most advanced technology in Japan. Selected officers were dispatched

¹⁵Ikura Takeaki, "Boeidaigakko to Kaigunheigakko" (The Defense Academy and the Naval Academy), Gunji Kenkyu (The Military Review), December, 1970, pp. 70-80; memorandum for the record (unpublished) of Admiral Inoue Shigemi, IJN (Ret.). Mr. Shinohara Hiroshi of Asahi Shimbun kindly offered the use of his manuscript taken from Admiral Inoue in late 1970.

abroad to the best graduate schools, e.g., Yamamoto Isoroku to Harvard, Hoshina Zenshiro to Yale, and Nakayama Sadayoshi to Princeton. Enlisted men were also well trained, and it is often said that the Imperial Navy survived on its petty officers. These men often handled the ships at the breathtakingly close intervals at which Japanese men-of-war often operated in conditions of darkness without modern electronic aids such as radar and sonar. It was the petty officers who were skilled as masters of their specialties in contrast to the more generally-educated officers.¹⁶

Although officially denied as non-existent, the Imperial Navy did seemingly contain an informal, noninstitutionalized elite consisting of the top graduates of the Navy Academy. Many of this group, particularly those

¹⁶In the postwar literature there has been criticism of Imperial Navy officers as "too generally uniform" and as conforming to the Japanese seniority system and to the gentlemanly style of officer life they learned from the Royal Navy without realizing that beneath the veneer the British officers were specialized combat leaders. One former naval officer candidly states that on the most senior level in the Navy were "many bright and likable flag officers but few real leaders and fighting commanders." Okumia Masatake, Commander IJN, in Okumia and Fuchida Mitsuo, Midway, The Battle that Doomed Japan, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1955. Interview with now retired Lieutenant General Okumia, JASDF, December 8, 1970.

educated abroad and/or specialized in political-military affairs, tended to dominate the Navy Ministry up until the 1930's. In contrast to this administrative elite was a command group which dominated the General Staff. Although interchange of the two groups was not unheard of, it was not common; and it was the staff group which arose in discontent to reduce the power of the ministry so as to resume full-scale naval rearmament.¹⁷

Graduates of the Navy War College in Tokyo were less of an elite although most ambitious young officers aspired to go there. The establishment of this Navy school in 1907 had been preceded by the founding of the Army equivalent which had become strongly influenced by machtpolitik through the advice of a German Army major engaged as an advisor. Then Commander Kato Kanji was warned by an Army officer to avoid this tendency in the foundation of the school. Kato and the Navy followed this advice,

¹⁷ An example of the denial of an elitism can be found in Rear Admiral Tomioka Sadatoshi, Kaisen to Shusen: Hito to Kiko to Keikaku (The Starting and Ending of the War: Men Organization and Planning), Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1968, p. 152. A more critical view can be found in Admiral Toyoda Soemu, Saigo no Taikoku Kaigun (The Last of the Imperial Navy), Tokyo: Sekai no Nihonsha, 1950, pp. 55-56.

kept away from politics, and studied only naval affairs. Unfortunately, however, the Navy War College made a different mistake and, drawing from the spectacular victories against the Chinese and Russians, rigidly studied all future wars, including the one with America, as consisting of one grand fleet encounter. Routine and less spectacular operations such as convoy and scouting were not emphasized, and optimistic assumptions about Japanese superiority and American inferiority became routinely accepted. Innovation from and criticism of this strategy were not tolerated, and belief that the U.S. could be defeated in this manner was a strong factor in the desire of many Japanese naval officers to go to war.¹⁸

E. DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPERIAL NAVY

The industrial capability of the Japanese Navy can be seen throughout its history and even after its existence.

¹⁸A brilliant and moving detailed analysis of the downfall of the Japanese Navy and the role of the Navy War College in that happening is contained in an unpublished English manuscript written six months after the war by Commander Chihaya; see above, note 7.

After sending representatives to study abroad and the early purchase of warships from European naval powers, Japan began its own military industry, and developed a base of industrial talent in the Navy alone which postwar shipbuilding, optical, electronic and chemical industries were able to call upon to help build the economic miracle of the 1960's and beyond.

Naval research centers were to develop the biggest battleships, the fastest torpedoes, the most sophisticated optical equipment, and plans for the most advanced fighter aircraft of their times in the world. The Navy's largest budget and highly schooled officer personnel helped to stimulate a successful research and development program. Great shipyards at Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo built the first two ships of every new class, after which time civilian shipyards might mass produce succeeding units. Navy repair facilities could drydock the largest vessels and perform overhauls and voyage repairs to all classes of ships. The "Zero" fighter which was felt so good that it equalled ten American fighters was built with almost no self-defense capability, i.e. armor plating, etc., so confident were its planners of its success. The U.S. Navy took possession of the latest models of Japanese flying

boat and midget submarine at the end of the war in order to study their construction and design. A recent study has pointed out the previously little-known Japanese atomic weapons research of 1941 in which naval planners participated.¹⁹

F. LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN THE IMPERIAL NAVY

The same technological prowess which built and designed advanced ships and aircraft for the Japanese Navy provided it with superior ammunition. So advanced were the Japanese oxygen torpedoes that official claims that they were ten knots slower than was actually the case were believed since the resultant speed still appeared respectable in comparison with the rest of the world's torpedoes.

The Navy's big shortcoming in the field of logistics was in the supply of ammunition and fuel which was available; the aforementioned belief in the quick victory of a decisive fleet encounter contributed to the lack of preparation for adequate, sustained support. At the time of

¹⁹Thomas M. Coffey, Imperial Tragedy, Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1970.

Japan's entry into World War II, the Navy had six million tons of fuel, theoretically enough to last for two years if it could retain all stockpiles for itself; calculations that other users would draw on Navy sources were not considered seriously. One modest estimate of the initial shortage of oil at the beginning of the war put the figure at eight million tons. Japanese planners similarly did not worry too much about cruising radius when planning operations. Lack of confidence in fuel supply plagued all ships involved in the Pearl Harbor attack. Shortly after the war began, naval ordnance depots at Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo ran out of 25-millimeter machine gun bullets and experienced continuing shortages throughout the war. By 1943 the average naval anti-aircraft battery could muster only 100 rounds of ammunition, and a machine gun battery could similarly rely on only about 1000 rounds, giving units about ten minutes average operating time, after which they were easily overpowered by U.S. air attacks.²⁰ Yale-educated Hoshina, a rear admiral and head of the Naval Ordnance Bureau, frankly warned at a prewar conference

²⁰Chihaya, unpublished manuscript, pp. 20-22.

that adequate logistics for a war with the United States were impossible; but several middle level officers finally pressured him into reversing his statement.²¹ Adequate convoy ships were never initially planned or provided, with the result that American submarines virtually destroyed the entire Japanese merchant fleet, perhaps the greatest single factor in American victory. Finally, desperate Japanese tactics even reduced the supply of a human resource, regular officers. Over half of all Etajima graduates of classes graduating from 1933 to 1943, 1913 out of 3453, were killed in combat, many as members of the "Special Attack Corps." Regular commissions were even given to non-Naval Academy graduates and Etajima's enrollment expanded from less than 1000 in 1937 to over 15,000 in 1945.²² A 12,000-man Japanese naval force on a south sea island in 1944 mustered only fifteen Naval Academy graduates and only two of these were below the rank of lieutenant, so low had the suicide missions reduced the strength of junior

²¹Interview with Vice Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro, IJN (Ret.), November 30, 1970. Hoshina's warnings are documented in war history archives.

²²Statistics provided by War History Office, Japan Defense Agency. Increased enrollments became marked in 1942.

officer numbers.²³

Its officers and men dead or demobilized, its ships and aircraft destroyed or destined to be given away, the Imperial Navy went out of existence on December 1, 1945 with the abolition of the Navy Ministry. No naval force was to be intentionally formed in Japan again until April 26, 1952.

²³Chihaya, unpublished manuscript, p. 23.

CHAPTER II

POSTWAR MARITIME JAPAN

Defeated as a continental imperialist power, Japan lay in ruins in 1945. Allied Occupation forces under the command of United States Army General Douglas MacArthur arrived to supervise a supposed reformation of the national character. Military and civilian members of the occupying forces, some with very liberal views on how any government should be structured, had an apparent opportunity to exercise wideranging authority that could substantially determine the future destiny of the entire nation. But right from the start they decided that Japan would not abandon the ocean, even though they tried to prevent any armed Japanese sea force.

The great economic combines, the zaibatsu, were ordered to be broken up by the Occupation, and initially even the large companies which were resultant were ordered to be further split. Changing international political

conditions in the late 1940's, however, and stagnation in the Japanese economy changed the orientation of the Occupation considerably. Only a fraction of the more than 300 companies scheduled to be broken up were actually reduced further in size. Rampant inflation was attacked; a special economic mission to Japan was dispatched from the United States; and leftist elements, particularly in labor, were no longer given the wide latitudes they had been provided earlier in the reformist experience. Progress was slow; but started back on a sound economic track in accordance with proposals of the Dodge Mission of 1949 and stimulated by the American demand for goods and services following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the Japanese economy started rolling again. Friendly relations with the United States and failure to sign a peace treaty with continental China were significant events influencing economic development. The former resulted in a massive input of modern Western technology to which Japan had not been exposed since the late 1930's. In addition the U.S. provided large-scale credits to Japanese banks which were short of capital to loan and purchased considerable amounts of Japanese securities. Having no relations with continental

Asia meant Japan's return to international markets to obtain the resources with which to fuel and otherwise supply the industrial sector. With the powerful Seventh Fleet operating from bases in Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan experienced a peaceful Pacific over which to bring uninterrupted supplies of raw materials. Later, the building of large tankers to carry oil from the Middle East greatly increased the energy producing capability which had been largely limited to what could be obtained from hydroelectric plants and from not overabundant supplies of coal.

In 1970 Japan was importing resources in greater percentages from more countries than ever before in its history. Comparing the figures on page 18 with a recent postwar summary shows the increase of the usage of outside resources. (See page 47.) Already the largest importer of natural resources in the world, Japan's need for raw materials is predicted to increase even allowing for only conservative gains in the economy through 1975. If Japan's needs and the level of world trade continue along the lines of moderate estimates, by 1975 the ratio of Japan's imports to world trade will rise from the present seven per cent to nine per cent. This prospect has caused some Japanese

TABLE II-1

DEPENDENCE OF JAPAN ON IMPORTED RESOURCES

Product	1935 Per Cent	1968 Per Cent
Wheat	17.1	79.8
Barley	1.9	54.8
Sugar	87.5	84.2
Bean	69.0	93.5
Leather	74.0
Gum (natural)	100.0	100.0
(synthetic)	13.8
Phosphate	100.0	100.0
Bauxite	100.0	100.0
Iron	93.8
Scrap	12.5
Coal	12.2	42.4
Oil	79.1	99.4
Wool	100.0	100.0
Cotton	100.0	100.0
Timber	6.8	40.7
Pulp	26.2	10.3
Salt	66.2	84.6

Source: Research Division, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College, Tokyo.

businessmen to wonder if secure stable overseas supply sources commensurate with the Japanese demand can be found and to designate the possibly great impact on global trade patterns as the biggest problem of the 1970's. The only solution some of these men see as possible to overcome the

increasing need is for Japan "to undertake the development of overseas resources vigorously without fearing risks."¹

But just what kind of risks will Japan take to seek out new resources? A glance at almost any recent Japanese daily newspaper brings information on current projects. When a Socialist Diet member objected that a joint U.S.-Japanese oil development project off the coast of South Vietnam was unwise due to American involvement in the Vietnam War, Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi replied that, in view of the recent moves of the petroleum-exporting countries to raise prices, Japan should engage in the development of oil resources in active cooperation with other countries.² Joint resource-development projects with Taiwan and South Korea were planned at meetings of representatives of the three countries held in Tokyo in December, 1970.³ Plans for a 300-million-dollar port at Wrangel and

¹Echigo Masakazu, President, C. Itoh & Co., Ltd., "Japan has International Responsibility to Carry Out Equitable Development of Natural Resources," The Japan Times, January 18, 1971.

²The Japan Times, March 12, 1971.

³Mainichi Daily News, December 22, 1970.

a 177-million-dollar natural gas pipeline from Sakhalin to Hokkaido have already been discussed by the Soviet Union and Japan; it is reported that Moscow hopes to obtain further Japanese support in four large projects costing 4.5 billion dollars. Japan is eager to exploit Siberian resources, but the area of interest has been the subject to sizeable Chinese territorial claims.⁴

Exploitation of the seabed for resources will give the sea a third major use that may well challenge the two previously economically important uses as an economical method of transport and as an abundant source of fish. Japan Science and Technology Agency officials warn of the nation's lag in successful experiments with seabed habitats; a nearly one-million-dollar submarine habitat with operating capital of nearly ten million dollars for fiscal 1971 was scheduled to be completed in February.⁵ The Japan Maritime Safety Agency recently announced plans to speed up charting of the seabed around Japan "to meet the demands of maritime researchers"; the agency expects significant resource

⁴Selig S. Harrison, "Japanese to Help Siberia Develop," The Washington Post, February 28, 1971.

⁵The Japan Times, January 2, 1971.

discoveries in 1971 in the seas of Abashiri and Wakkanai, both in Hokkaido.⁶

Exploitation of underseas resources could considerably rearrange trading patterns, increase the power of certain fortunate states, and similarly provide ready grounds for future international conflicts. A glance at the map on the following page shows areas of the continental shelf which are of obvious interest to Japan; it is not hard to imagine that there will be jealousy about the possession of resources found in these areas and it is not hard to notice that the areas: are unevenly distributed, include under-developed countries increasingly dominated economically by Japan, and are not infrequently bounded by a number of contiguous states.

The merchant marine has been one of the most obvious examples of the economic miracle of postwar Japan. At the end of the war prospects were dim, for Japan in particular, but also for worldwide maritime commerce in general. Japan's situation was particularly critical because, unlike some countries where shipping was just one

⁶Ibid., January 3, 1971.



The world (Miller projection), showing coastal shelf to 200 metres (red shaded area).

independent business, or where adequate supplies from the outside could be obtained by rail or foreign delivery, a native merchant marine was important to the entire nation as a means of obtaining resources and carrying on foreign trade.

World War II cost Japan 8,897,000 gross tons of merchant shipping; a total of only 1,300,000 tons of standard wartime and superannuated vessels remained. Remnant ships were placed under the jurisdiction of the United States Naval Shipping Control Authority for the Japanese Merchant Marine (SCAJAP) which was required by Occupation directives to make maximum use of these vessels for repatriating the six million Japanese forces still overseas; however, 317 steel hulled vessels of 338,600 tons and 455 wooden vessels of 77,000 tons were allowed to resume coastal and nearby cargo and passenger operations.⁷ Trade was limited to the coasts of Japan and Korea, China, and Taiwan. Construction of new vessels was also severely restricted, ocean-going ships not becoming authorized until 1949. In April of 1950, management of merchant ships was

⁷G-3 Division, GHQ SCAP, Report on Mass Repatriation in the Western Pacific, April, 1947, p. 4.

returned to Japanese civilian companies, and in August of the same year trade areas were expanded so that maritime commercial relations were permitted with 28 countries. The Far Eastern Commission's informal ruling that no new ship could be constructed in excess of 5000 tons in weight and with speed capability in excess of fifteen knots was also removed in 1950 to allow full-scale ship construction. Even removal of these restrictions did not, however, mean immediate recovery for Japanese shipping companies. Only with the recovery of global maritime trade in 1954 did the Japanese trade picture become bright again. By 1956 the merchant marine's number of ships, aggregate tonnage, and amount of cargo moved exceeded the respective totals of prewar Japan's third-ranked fleet. In 1968 Japan ranked second in the world in merchant strength, trailing only Liberia, many of whose vessels are so-called "flags of convenience" and actually belong to shipowners in the United States and Greece. Table II-2 charts the growth of Japan's maritime commerce. As spectacular as is the rise of the industry to the present time, estimates of immediate future growth are even more impressive. Cargo movement to and from Japan which now account for

TABLE II-2

JAPAN'S MERCHANT MARINE (1935-1968)

Year	Ocean Going Vessels (Steel Vessels over 100 GT)	Aggregate Tonnage (1000 T)	Trade Volume (1000 MT) (Japanese Vessels)	Percentage of Trade in Japanese Vessels	
				Exports	Imports
1935	1698	4,030	27,735	65.0	55.0
1939	2337	5,630	34,146	72.0*	65.0*
1945	796	1,344	...		
1946	813	1,385	1,464	93.6	20.2
1947	869	1,468	1,962	81.7	8.1
1948	1204	1,024	2,773	69.2	8.4
1949	1121	1,564	2,690	33.8	11.4
1950	1499	1,871	4,292	17.3	26.8
1951	1529	2,182	10,075	26.6	32.6
1952	1587	2,787	15,224	31.6	45.5
1953	1669	3,250	19,013	37.8	43.0
1954	1727	3,578	22,539	43.3	46.5
1955	1770	3,735	28,281	43.6	52.1
1956	1891	4,076	34,396	44.8	47.5
1957	2032	4,415	38,267	49.2	41.2
1958	2413	5,465	43,261	56.6	57.4
1959	2775	6,277	51,353	54.8	53.8
1960	3124	6,931	61,120	52.4	47.5
1961	3733	7,954	71,277	53.7	41.3
1962	4372	8,870	81,195	52.4	45.6
1963	4819	9,997	96,476	44.6	45.7
1964	5401	10,813	110,944	47.4	46.5
1965	5836	11,971	103,806	42.0	45.3
1966	6105	14,723	128,717	42.7	48.1
1967	6409	16,883	154,409	45.1	49.9
1968	6877	19,587	183,401	40.7	51.3
1969	7665	23,987	212,185	44.7	52.4
1970	8402	27,004			

*1940

Sources: The Japan Shipowner's Association; 1945-47 ship figures from Ministry of Transportation, 1948-1970 from Lloyd's Register of Shipping; Japan Statistical Yearbook, Tokyo: Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister; Economic Statistics, Economic Planning Agency, Japan government.

approximately seventeen per cent of the world total are anticipated to rise to about 30 per cent under the new socio-economic development program; to accommodate this forecast a plan has recently been adopted to increase Japan's merchant marine by approximately twenty million gross tons in the 1971-1974 period.⁸ This anticipated increase is larger than the entire merchant fleet of 1968 and larger than the combined fleets of the British Commonwealth countries in World War II.

Along with the volume of trade, the countries who are Japan's trading partners have expanded on a continuing and interesting basis. Initially restricted to local areas, permission to send ships to the United States was granted in 1950. Britain and Australia refused trade privileges into the 1950's; but not only were these restrictions subsequently lifted, Japan also secured commercial relations

⁸Fukuda Hisao, President, Japan Shipowners Association, "Freight Conference Setup Needs Restudy," The Japan Times, January 18, 1971. That Mr. Fukuda's estimate is, as he states, a conservative one, is indicated by statements of Japanese government leaders and Liberal Democratic Party members that the projected increase should be changed from twenty to 28 million tons of shipping, ibid., November 19, 1970.

with the Soviet Union as a result of a separate government to government understanding in 1956 and with Mainland China through a so-called "private agreement" in 1961 which is renewed every year and which allows Japan to collect immediate cash payment in exchange for goods, a sum which in 1970 reached 825 million dollars.

The deep engagement of Japan in Asia is not often appreciated. Japan ranks as the first or second trading partner of all but one non-communist nation in the area (it is third with Cambodia) as of 1968. The author of a recent study from which Table II-3 is reproduced makes interesting observations. Japan has surpassed the United States as largest supplier to the area and overwhelms the third largest supplier, West Germany, 28.9 per cent to 4.9 per cent. Since there is very little trade among the under-developed nations of the area themselves, Japan is the primary beneficiary of further trade expansion and increased capital investments in the region. Since it is not economically necessary for Japan to trade in Asia, however, Hellman argues that any special priority given this area by Japan must be essentially for political reasons. More important than the percentage of the total

TABLE II-3

TRADE OF EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES WITH JAPAN
AS A PERCENTAGE OF THEIR TOTAL TRADE (1967)

Country	Exports		Imports		Total		Rank
	Amount	Per Cent	Amount	Per Cent	Amount	Per Cent	
Burma	12.4	6.5	36.6	23.9	49.0	14.3	2*
Cambodia	4.9	7.3	15.2	13.7	20.1	11.3	3*
Mainland China	269.5	26.7	288.3	21.7	557.8	23.9	1
Nationalist China	112.1	17.3	326.9	40.8	439.0	30.6	1
Indonesia	195.0	35.3	155.2	19.7	350.2	26.1	1
South Korea	84.7	26.1	443.0	45.5	527.7	40.1	1
North Korea	29.6	86.6	8.2	26.0	37.8	57.5	1**
Malaysia	270.6	27.7	104.0	14.2	374.6	21.9	1*
Philippines	274.0	33.9	329.4	28.0	603.4	31.4	2
Singapore	44.2	19.4	151.6	21.0	195.8	20.7	1
Thailand	160.0	38.4	341.0	38.5	501.0	38.9	1
South Vietnam	2.3	14.3	139.5	25.9	141.8	25.2	2
North Vietnam	1.8	22.5	6.7	77.0	8.5	50.9	1**

As printed in Donald C. Hellmann, "The Emergence of an East Asian International Subsystem," International Studies Quarterly, Volume 13, Number 4, December, 1969, pp. 430.

* 1966 figures;

** Trading partners mainly communist countries but reliable figures not available and not included.

Sources: International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade: A Supplement to the International Financial Statistics.

area's trade conducted with Japan is the sizeable and growing dependence of individual countries on their source; any severe alteration in these trade relationships could result in considerable economic dislocations. Such trade dominance, particularly because Japan itself has no economic necessity to trade with these countries, provides the opportunity for international influence extending beyond the economic realm.⁹ The world-wide scope of Japan's trade and lesser relative dependence of East Asia for survival can be gauged by comparing Table II-3 with Table II-4 on the next page. Of the ten products heading Japan's import list, five are purchased in East Asian countries but in each case only on partial bases.¹⁰

Like its merchant marine, Japan's fishing industry also advanced from very modest wartime levels back to and in excess of its former strength. Placed under the authority of the United States Fifth Fleet, initially only small-size wooden fishing boats were allowed to resume operations,

⁹ Hellmann, "The Emergence of an East Asian International Subsystem," pp. 430-31.

¹⁰ Anzen Hosho Kenkyu Kai, Kaiyokoku Nihon no Shorai (The Future of Japan as a Maritime Nation), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1970, pp. 294-95.

TABLE II-4
JAPAN'S FOREIGN TRADE IN 1969
(U.S. \$ Million)

Exports (f.o.b.)*	Value	Per Cent	Imports (f.o.b.)*	Value	Per Cent
	15,728	100		11,976	100
<u>By Country</u>					
1. U.S.A.	4,958	31.5	1. U.S.A.	3,260	27.2
2. Republic of Korea	767	4.9	2. Australia	991	8.3
3. Hong Kong	615	3.9	3. Iran	652	5.4
4. Republic of China	606	3.9	4. Canada	534	4.5
5. Liberia	482	3.1	5. Philippines	373	3.1
6. Canada	481	3.1	6. U.S.S.R.	368	3.1
7. Philippines	476	3.0	7. West Germany	355	3.0
8. Australia	476	3.0	8. Saudi Arabia	331	2.8
9. Thailand	434	2.8	9. Malaysia	324	2.7
10. West Germany	393	2.5	10. Indonesia	317	2.6
<u>By Area*</u>					
North America	5,805	36.9	North America	4,116	34.4
West Europe	2,025	12.9	West Europe	1,189	9.9
Oceania	621	3.9	Oceania	1,184	9.9
South America	473	3.0	South America	605	5.1
Middle East	617	3.9	Middle East	1,585	13.2
Southeast Asia	4,375	27.8	Southeast Asia	1,898	15.8
Africa**	1,053	6.7	Africa**	723	6.0
Communist bloc	751	4.8	Communist bloc	676	5.6

TABLE II-4--Continued

Exports (f.o.b.)*		Value	Per Cent	Imports (f.o.b.)*		Value	Per Cent
		15,728	100			11,976	100
By Commodity (Customs Clearance Basis--Exports (f.o.b.); Imports (c.i.f.))							
1. Iron & steel prod.	2,165	13.5	1. Crude oil	1,907	12.7		
2. Vessels	1,137	7.1	2. Logs	1,275	8.5		
3. Motor vehicles	984	6.2	3. Iron ore	969	6.4		
4. Metal products	585	3.7	4. Non-ferrous metals	917	6.1		
5. Radio receivers	580	3.6	5. Non-ferrous metal ore	728	4.8		
6. Synthetic fabrics	518	3.2	6. Coal	675	4.5		
7. Clothing	451	2.8	7. Raw cotton	424	2.8		
8. Scientific/optical equipment	439	2.7	8. Raw wool	392	2.6		
9. Tape recorders	400	2.5	9. Petroleum products	391	2.6		
10. TV receivers	354	2.2	10. Wheat	297	2.0		

* Estimated on an IMF basis.

** North Africa included in Middle East.

Source: U.S. Embassy Tokyo.

and then only to a distance of twelve miles from the coastline. The geographic limitation was extended somewhat in late September, 1945; and on January 26 of the following year, the so-called MacArthur Line was drawn marking a boundary for fishing operations. Some whaling off the Bonin Islands had been authorized in late 1945, and in 1946 limited operations were authorized in the Antarctic region. Because of the restriction in space, local fishing grounds were severely exploited and the 1948 catch still only matched 60 per cent of the average prewar level. A scarcity of ropes and nets following the war resulted in special government aid in 1948; extension of the MacArthur Line to the International Date Line in 1949 also helped to ease the problems somewhat. The specific lineal restriction was lifted three days before the Peace Treaty went into effect, but Article 9 of the treaty stated that Japan would enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers for bilateral and multilateral agreements on fishing. These agreements and others were successfully negotiated, in some cases even before diplomatic and/or commercial trade relations were established, with the Allied nations and with the two large communist countries that did not sign the

Peace Treaty: with Mainland China in 1955 and with the Soviet Union in 1956. Japan quickly regained its position as the world's largest catcher of fish but lost first rank to Peru in 1963. Peru's total, however, is inflated by its catch of anchovies which are obtained in great quantities off its coastal waters; Japan's catch, on the other hand, consists of many varieties, and its growth has been aided by the development of 4000-ton trawlers capable of catching fish living in waters several hundred meters deep and by the discovery of new fishing grounds in northern seas. Table II-5 indicates the growth of the industry and the emergence of larger ships with greater capacities. The supply of whales has already become critical; and, in addition to a treaty allotting strict quotas to participating countries in Antarctic waters, a similar arrangement from the northern Pacific is now being sought.

Decreasing supplies of other species promise problems for the future. Mainland China in late 1970 gave indications it might claim a 200-mile territorial limit for purposes of excluding other nations from fishing off its shores. Controversies over fishing rights have always been a part of Japan's postwar relations with Korea and the

TABLE II-5
JAPAN'S FISHING INDUSTRY (1935-1968)

Year	Total Vessels	Powered Vessels	Tonnage	Non-powered Vessels	Tonnage	Catch (1000T)	Whales (Number)
1935	366,019	57,478		309,461		4,038	
1941	326,959	71,975		254,984		4,108	2,349
1945	279,292	60,613		228,679		1,825	531
1950	446,652	127,556	909,470	319,086	300,113	3,374	5,332
1955	415,588					4,908	11,866
1958	398,911	164,717	1,397,123	234,194	218,383	4,951	
1960	380,728					6,193	19,649
1965	403,250					6,908	26,986
1966	399,561					7,103	22,784
1967	398,002					7,851	21,088
1968	397,279	253,544	2,315,130	143,735	100,290	8,670	21,586

Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook; The Japan Yearbook 1946-1948, Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan.

Soviet Union. Negotiations with the latter are still tense in this regard. Since Moscow's unilateral declaration of February 26, 1946 that the Japanese islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Habomai, and Shikotan are a part of Soviet territory, 1336 Japanese fishing boats and 11,316 fishermen have been arrested in the area; of those: 22 boats have

been sunk and 32 fisherman have been killed.¹¹

What then does the future hold for Japan as a modern maritime nation? It has actively engaged in all the activities that Thomas Jefferson warned would bring frequent wars to the United States, and past history contains evidence that the statements apply to Japan in the time prior to 1945. Jefferson said protection of sea-going activities would require a naval force, but postwar Japan's military activities have lagged well behind its economic ventures. One question of significant importance seems to be: will economic interests and the changing international environment post 1972 cause Japan to put more emphasis on a naval force as Jefferson suggested an involved maritime nation might do?

The remainder of this monograph will trace what has been done about building a postwar naval force up to the present time using the traditions of the past, the technology, and the wealth that have once again made Japan a maritime nation.

¹¹The Japan Times, January 16, 1971. Personal letter from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, March 13, 1951, contained in Commander Naval Forces Far East, chronological file, 1950-1951.

PART II

THE INTERIM: NAVAL ACTIVITIES 1945-1952

Japan's surrender and occupation did not mean the end of its commercial activities on the sea; but, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, use of the ocean for economic purposes was allowed from the earliest days of the Occupation. If, however, a typical historical account of the period were to be consulted concerning military forces, it is likely that statements similar to the following would appear: after the war Japan's military forces were demobilized and all munitions industries were closed down; in May, 1947, a new Constitution went into effect containing a provision that war is "forever" renounced and that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained"; because of the pullout of American military forces following the outbreak of the Korean War, a National Police Reserve was authorized and not too long thereafter a coastal guard force was established; these

embryonic, quasi-military organizations were the forerunners of limited rearmament which Japan pursued after regaining independence.

To limit discussion of military activities during the Occupation to a treatment such as that just presented could easily lead to the assumption that, despite increasing commercial maritime activities, no Japanese, organized sea force existed prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. Further it would not be too unreasonable to believe: first, that not even naval activities took place on the part of the Japanese after demobilization was completed; second, that no navy was ever planned or even desired prior to the change of political climate in Asia and/or the unexpected and sudden conflict in Korea; and third, that possibly, if it had not been for Korea, the Constitution would have been rigidly adhered to and no military, and thus no naval force, would have been inaugurated, at least as quickly as it was.

Part II will discuss events during the period, trying to demonstrate that naval activities by Japanese took place throughout the Occupation; that a uniformed, organized naval force, first a remnant body but later an entirely new organization, which testified to its character by

deploying into combat, existed prior to the Korean War; and that the events of Korea, rather than triggering the first steps of rearmament, at least as far as a navy is concerned, merely demonstrated to the Occupation and to Japanese authorities that a strengthened, more professional naval organization was necessary. Hopefully it will be made clear that the arguments put forth are not merely technicalities to appear controversial or revisionist; nor do they suggest that a conspiratorial plot on the part of Japanese or American civilian or military authorities is here being exposed for purposes of spectacle. Instead, hopefully, it will be made clear that many Occupation and Japanese government leaders saw a need for at least some naval forces for a commercially-engaged maritime nation.

The maritime-naval events of this period have been poorly reported, at least partially because of the great unpopularity of anything military following the psychological disarmament of many Japanese people following the physical demobilization of the country's armed forces. Most of the principal characters involved in the activities to be described are still living in advanced age and are now willing to talk about what happened on the Japanese

side, with or without the Occupation's knowledge or approval. This presentation will be made by dividing the events under the three headings of demobilization and continuation, maritime safety, and rearmament rather than by attempting to consider the period in a straight chronological manner.

CHAPTER III

DEMOBILIZATION AND CONTINUATION


A. DEMOBILIZATION, PART I

As was mentioned in Chapter I, two moderate Imperial Navy admirals who were direct descendants of the no war with America policy of Admiral and Prime Minister Kato Tomosaburo were Yonai Mitsumasa and Nomura Kichisaburo. As Navy Minister from 1937-1939, Yonai unsuccessfully opposed the more aggressive and powerful voices of the General Staff arguing for war; Nomura, who was close to many U.S. Navy admirals from the time of his active duty and was Ambassador to the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor, had sentiments similar to Yonai's. Yonai served as Prime Minister briefly in 1940, but his Cabinet soon failed. With the accession of General Tojo as Prime Minister in October, 1941, Admiral Shimada Shigetaro became Navy Minister; and even that position was then held by a man who declared he was

"determined" for war. By 1943 Japan was obviously losing the war, and there was a feeling among moderates in the Navy that Shimada should be replaced in order to help bring peace. At that time the personnel situation in the Navy Ministry and its most influential division, the Military Affairs Bureau, was partially as follows:

CHART III-1

NAVY MINISTRY IN 1944



* Former duty assignments listed below individual names.

Commander Nakayama Sadayoshi approached Admiral Nomura to discuss possible courses of action. A plan developed to try

to separate Admiral Shimada, who was also Chief of the General Staff, from his job as minister and to replace him in that position with Admiral Yonai; that would require a special act by the Emperor since Yonai had been retired. Nakayama's position gave him access to people and information at the working level, and Nomura with his prestige as a retired admiral, foreign minister, ambassador, and President of the Peers College could directly approach Shimada as well as other high officials of the government and the Imperial Household. With the Koiso Cabinet of July, 1944, Yonai was called out of retirement and was once again made Navy Minister.¹

¹Interview with Admiral Nakayama Sadayoshi, MSDF (Ret.), January 27, 1971. Then Commander Nakayama on his way to Princeton was the only other Navy officer on the ship carrying Ambassador Nomura to Washington in 1941. They had many discussions during their two week trip from Yokohama to San Francisco and during school vacations which Nakayama spent in Washington. A close association continued after their departure from the United States. Whether or not any efforts by Admiral Nomura had any effect on the Imperial court or on the elder statesmen who induced the Cabinet change is not a point of issue here (Admiral Shimada tried in vain to remain as minister); but the facts are mentioned to show the viewpoints of naval officers later influential in naval rearmament.

Yonai strongly supported efforts for peace. Before the end of the war Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, head of the Military Affairs Section, prepared and submitted to the minister a memorandum concerning disarmament. Yamamoto argued that Japan's Army must be abolished but that the Navy must also cease. He argued that the military was like a four-wheeled cart, and thus all four wheels rather than just two would have to be removed in order to stop the movement. After ten years or so a new military organization might be needed in Japan; but whenever that time arrived, the new military should be modeled to conform with Japan at that time rather than on the old Imperial Army or Navy models as they existed at the time of dissolution. Vice Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro, Chief of the Bureau and Yamamoto's senior, argued for the good traditions of the Imperial Navy. He proposed that a small naval force, perhaps similar in size to that following the Russo-Japanese War, should be maintained, both because the Navy was essentially good and because without any military force in Japan and with the situation in China still chaotic, there would likely be a power vacuum in Asia dangerous to Japan's security. Admiral Yonai came out for Yamamoto's position and put him in charge

of the Military Affairs Bureau when surrender came.

Hoshina moved out of the Navy Ministry to another position; and Yonai remained as Navy Minister, constantly on guard for any resistance to peace and disarmament within the Navy, until replaced by Prime Minister Shidehara, who assumed the position as a collateral duty on November 13, 1945.²

Regardless of any Japanese feeling, disarmament was not a subject for debate. The Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945 stated in part that:

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world. . . . The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes

²Interviews with Vice Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro, IJN (Ret.), November 4, 1970; Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, IJN (Ret.), December 28, 1970; Rear Admiral Akishige Jitsue, IJN (Ret.), January 24, 1971; Captain Sanematsu Jyo, IJN (Ret.), January 28, 1971. The discussions in the Navy Ministry concerning disarmament were very secret and informal. Neither Admiral Yamamoto nor the War History Office of the Japan Defense Agency has a copy of the Yamamoto memorandum. Captain Sanematsu, a leading authority on and biographer of Yonai also did not have a copy but confirmed the sentiments of Yonai for peace and disarmament.

with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.³

This was followed on August 29, by the United States Initial Post Surrender Policy in which President Truman directed General MacArthur specifically that:

Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political economic, and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed. . . .

Disarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. . . .

Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. Japan's ground, air, and naval forces shall be disarmed and disbanded and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff and all secret police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval material, military and navy vessels and military and naval installations, and military and civilian aircraft shall be surrendered and shall be disposed of as required by the Supreme Commander.⁴

The discussions preliminary to the Occupation, which were held in Manila in August, 1945, left no doubt in the minds of the Japanese participants that disarmament was to be

³Articles 6 and 9, as quoted in Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960, pp. 671-72.

⁴Subparagraph (b) part I and paragraph 1 part III, ibid., pp. 755-56.

complete. Although some members of the delegation had ideas for possible suggestion to American authorities, the discussions regarding military forces were strictly technical. SCAP Directive Number One concerning military and naval disarmament had already been prepared; the Japanese were ordered to remove obstacles to a speedy demobilization and not to worry about anything such as a power vacuum in Asia.⁵ SCAP Directive Numbers One and Two were formally issued on September 2, 1945, providing explicit instructions for carrying out disarmament and demobilization. From a strength of 1,693,223 men as of August 15, 1945, by October 15, 1946, naval forces were reduced to 57,523, mostly overseas awaiting repatriation.⁶

A final plea for naval personnel was made by Vice Admiral Hoshina in September, 1945. He was then Navy representative on a Cabinet committee overseeing demobilization

⁵Interview with Vice Admiral Terai Yoshimori, JMSDF (Ret.), November 26, 1970. Then Commander Terai, IJN, was a member of the Japanese delegation to Manila.

⁶Ibid., pp. 79-80. Detailed description of personnel demobilization can be found in GHQ SCAP, Final Report, Progress of Demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces, 31 December 1946 (unpublished) and in James E. Auer, "The Continuation: A Study of Naval Activities in Behalf of Japan from 1945-1952" (unpublished master's thesis) Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1970), pp. 3-7.

and expressed a fear that the quick unemployment of over five million Japanese military forces could create a problem and produce rioting if jobs were not made available. He favored the formation of a civilian construction corps, cooperatively organized and managed but financed by the central government. Yoshida Shigeru, who was also a member of the committee, preferred not to discuss such an idea with the American military authorities but agreed to allow Hoshina to make an initiative. The latter contacted Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, who politely received the idea. Finally, however, as at Manila, the Japanese were told not to worry about any security problems; no action was taken on the request.⁷

Japanese naval vessels were scrapped or sunk, given to Allied navies, or put under the control of SCAJAP. A total of seven carriers/escort carriers, three battleships, twelve cruisers, and three auxiliaries were reduced by scrapping; almost all submarines and aircraft were sunk or destroyed.⁸

⁷Interview with Hoshina, November 30, 1970.

⁸Commander Naval Activities Japan, Command Narrative, 21 January 1946 to 1 October 1946, p. 17; GHQ SCAP,

More than six million Japanese forces remained separated from their homeland on the islands throughout the western Pacific and on the mainland of Asia at the time of surrender. The Navy/Second Demobilization Ministry supervised repatriation. Because of the paucity of Japanese naval and merchant shipping capable of being demilitarized and made fit for repatriation, Allied vessels were authorized to participate in the program beginning in October, 1945. By January 1, 1947, 5,103,323 persons had been returned to Japan and 1,340,232 had been evacuated to their native countries. There still remained 1,600,000 to be brought home, but almost all of these were in Soviet-influenced areas. Repatriation then became more of a political problem than a transportation matter, the Soviets commencing and terminating repatriation from time to

Final Report, Progress of Demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces, p. 88. Details of the destruction and disposal of naval units can be found in U.S. Department of the Army, General Douglas MacArthur's Historical Report on Allied Operations in Southwest Pacific Area, Volume I (Supplement) "MacArthur in Japan, The Occupation," September, 1945 to December, 1948, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961; allocation of 135 ships among Allied navies listed in Raymond V. B. Blackman, editor, Jane's Fighting Ships 1946-47, New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1946.

time.⁹

Munitions industries were closed down or converted to other purposes. Naval research centers and base facilities were similarly closed or converted unless they were to be used by U.S. forces. The principal locations taken over by the U.S. Navy were the bases and shipyards at Yokosuka and Sasebo and the naval air station at Atsugi. As the histories continue to report, Japan was disarmed.

B. DEMOBILIZATION, PART 2: RENUNCIATION OF ARMED FORCE "FOREVER"

And there was movement even before demobilization was complete to insure that Japan would never arm again. This action supposedly would finalize disarmament and hopefully provide an example for the rest of the world that nations could live without arms. The action, a more

⁹G-3 GHQ SCAP and Far East Command, Status of Repatriation Report, March 4, 1949. Additional details of this period concerning repatriation can be found in Commander Naval Activities Japan Command Narratives, Commander Naval Forces Far East Summaries and Command Narratives, and Auer, "The Continuation: A Study of Naval Activities in Behalf of Japan from 1945-1952," pp. 11-23. The most complete work on the repatriation effort is Kikiage-Engo-no Kiroku (The Record of Demobilization) Tokyo: Hikiage Engo-cho, 1950.

determined effort to accomplish in one country what the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928 had tried unsuccessfully to accomplish in many, took the form of a constitutional provision forever renouncing war.¹⁰

¹⁰The most complete work on the Constitution is the report of a governmental investigation commission which met from 1957-1964 and which returned a report of over 40,000 pages in almost 500 volumes plus an additional 100 volumes of reference material, Commission on the Constitution, Kempo Chosakai Hokokusho Fugoku Bunisho (Report of the Commission on the Constitution), Tokyo: 1958-1964. SCAP's official account is contained in Government Section, GHQ, SCAP, The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. Other English sources are: Sato Tatsuo, "The Origin and Development of the Draft Constitution of Japan," Contemporary Japan, Volume 34, Numbers 4-6 and 7-9. Sato was a member of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau during the drafting of the Constitution; Robert E. Ward, "The Commission on the Constitution and Prospects for Constitutional Change in Japan," and John M. Maki, "The Documents of Japan's Commission on the Constitution," both in Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 34, Number 3, May, 1965; Ward and Maki were American scholars working with the commission. Also valuable is Dan Fenno Henderson, editor, The Constitution of Japan Its First Twenty Years, 1947-1967, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1968. An excellent English language work on Article 9 is Theodore S. McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," Political Science Quarterly, Volume 78, Number 3, September, 1962.

The Japanese government had been led to believe that revision of the Meiji Constitution was a matter under its own cognizance, coordinated, of course, with SCAP authorities if accomplished during the Occupation. General MacArthur himself initially took little active interest other than pointing out the need of reform to Prince Konoye on October 4, 1945, when he was Minister without Portfolio in the Higashi-Kuni Cabinet, and to Prime Minister Shidehara on October 11, 1945, two days after his new Cabinet had been inaugurated. The new Cabinet resolved to make a study of the Constitution and organized a committee under Dr. Matsumoto Joji, also Minister without Portfolio, to investigate the necessity of revision. The committee consisted of scholarly advisors, leading professors of Tokyo University and other universities, a group of officials from the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, and other concerned government officials. Outside groups also prepared drafts; but the committee itself came up with two plans, a relatively conservative draft by Matsumoto himself, known as Draft "A," and a more liberal draft of the committee, known as Draft "B." Both were based on the basic principles of the Meiji Constitution and were designed to prevent future

misuse by amending some articles. With regard to armed forces, Draft "A" stated, "The system of armed forces is retained. The supreme command of the armed forces may not be exercised independently, except with the advice of the Ministers of State." Draft "B" deleted the articles concerning military forces although it did not appear that this deletion prohibited the use of such forces.¹¹

By Cabinet agreement Draft "A" was submitted to SCAP's General Headquarters (GHQ) in early February, 1946, and was criticized as being "far behind even the most conservative of the unofficial drafts."¹² MacArthur decided to reject the Matsumoto draft entirely; and in order to instruct the Japanese government on the nature of those principles he considered basic to a revised Constitution, he ordered Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, chief of the Government Section, to prepare a draft to serve as a guide.¹³ Although Whitney's section was to have direction

¹¹Sato, "The Origin and Development of the Draft Constitution of Japan, pp. 3-8.

¹²Government Section, GHQ SCAP, The Political Re-orientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, p. 99.

¹³MacArthur's reason for taking over the drafting at the particular time he did is controversial. Some claim

in its drafting, three major points were to be incorporated.

The second of these points read:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for its defense and its protection.

he became aware of a statement in the Potsdam Proclamation of December, 1945, which stated that a Far Eastern Commission would be set up "to oversee the Occupational administration" and that any directives dealing with the fundamental structure of the Japanese government including the Constitution were to be "issued only following consultation and the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission." Knowing that the commission would be meeting soon (it met first in Washington on February 24, 1946), MacArthur hurried to beat its chance to restrict him, particularly since he feared the commission might not allow retention of the Emperor. Interview with retired Career Minister John K. Emmerson, October 14, 1970. Minister Emerson was a member of the Diplomatic Section and worked with the early Japanese constitutional study efforts. MacArthur in his memoirs stated that he was forced to act because of the upcoming election in April which had been decided as a plebescite on the new Constitution before the Matsumoto draft was submitted. Since the draft was not much different from the old Constitution, there would have been little choice. Since the first unsatisfactory effort had taken so long, MacArthur decided to provide guidelines. He later stated, however, that the Far Eastern Commission would have most likely blocked free choice by the Japanese people due to Soviet veto power. "The choice was alien military government or autonomous civil government." General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964, pp. 299-302.

No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerence will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force.¹⁴

The authorship of this idea which became Article 9 of the revised Constitution is disputed. General MacArthur claimed that it was suggested to him by Prime Minister Shidehara while Yoshida Shigeru, then Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, claimed the idea was most likely suggested by MacArthur to Baron Shidehara who readily agreed.¹⁵ Dr. Takayanagi Kenzo, chairman of the committee which investigated the Constitution from 1957-1964 and a believer in MacArthur's authorship and "imposition" of Article 9 before his research began, eventually came to support the general:

Article 9 had its origin in Tokyo, not in Washington. The idea was first suggested by Prime Minister Shidehara, not by General MacArthur. . . .

No one else was present at the interview which continued for some three hours. Shidehara astonished the General with a proposal for the insertion of a renunciation-of-war and disarmament clause into the new Constitution. Apparently the General hesitated at first because of the possible deleterious effects on United States foreign policy in Eastern Asia, if the proposal were approved. The

¹⁴Ibid., p. 102, italics mine.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 299; Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs The Story of Japan in Crisis, London: Heinemann, 1961, p. 137.

Prime Minister, however, succeeded in persuading the General that in the atomic age the survival of mankind should precede all national strategies, that if an atomic war should break out, America herself might be destroyed; that other nations must follow the same principle of renouncing war if they themselves were to survive. MacArthur was deeply impressed by this part of Shidehara's argument. Before the SCAP draft and the Japanese Government Bill were drawn, the General and the Prime Minister agreed to insert such a clause in the new Constitution.¹⁶

In less than a week Whitney's section turned out a draft which was submitted to a shocked Japanese government on February 13. MacArthur's statement on the renunciation of war had been modified slightly. Originally-numbered Article 8 of the draft read:

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means for settling disputes with any other nation.

No army, navy, air force, or other war potential will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the state.¹⁷

The specific prohibition against wars of self-preservation had been deleted.

¹⁶Dr. Takayanagi Kenzo, "Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution," in Henderson, The Constitution of Japan Its First Twenty Years, 1947-1967, pp. 79, 86.

¹⁷Quoted in Sato, "The Origin and Development of the Draft Constitution of Japan," p. 32.

Regardless, the Japanese were shocked by the draft in general and by the renunciation of war among particulars. Giving further credibility to MacArthur's statement that the idea was Shidehara's, Dr. Takayanagi later stated:

Before Shidehara talked with MacArthur on January 24, 1946, he had not consulted with anyone, including his Foreign Minister, Shigeru Yoshida. At a Cabinet meeting on February 22, reporting the results of his interview with MacArthur on the previous day, Shidehara behaved as if Article 9 were proposed by MacArthur, although he never clearly said so. If he had said that the proposal was his and not MacArthur's, it might have been rejected by the Cabinet. Shidehara was diplomatic enough to know this. So Cabinet members who attended the meeting, including Yoshida and Ashida, thought the proposal was made by MacArthur and not by Shidehara. After the meeting Shidehara told a number of his close friends that "Article 9 did not come from abroad" and that it was his own proposal. Neither Yoshida nor Ashida was aware that the original proposal was made by Shidehara. They thought, as I did at the time, that it was "imposed" by the Allied Powers. These events account for the difference between Ashida's public statement at the plenary session and his private opinion in his pamphlet, and Yoshida's written memorandum sent to the Commission on the Constitution which denied that the Article's was Shidehara's.¹⁸

MacArthur stated that he held from the outset that the renunciation of war did not prevent "any and all necessary steps for the preservation of the nation," and that if

¹⁸Takayanagi, "Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution," p. 87.

attacked Japan would defend herself.¹⁹ Takayanagi surmised that Dr. Kanamori Tokujiro who replaced Matsumoto as Minister of State in charge of revision did not correctly explain the intended interpretation when he brought the draft before the Diet:

. . . SCAP's failure to inform the Japanese Government that the article did not preclude armed forces for defensive purposes led Dr. Kanamori, deputed by the Cabinet to explain the draft Constitution to both Houses of the Diet, to misinterpret the article and thus to arouse opposition from conservative members and provide plausible ground for later Socialist intransigence toward evasion, amendment or repeal of the article.²⁰

Although Yoshida claimed in his memoirs to have agreed with the provision from the outset in order to dispel fears of Japanese militarism, other conservatives did not feel such a statement belonged in the Constitution.²¹

The draft was first submitted to the Privy Council where then designated Article 9 was attacked by Nomura Kichisaburo who served as one of the examiners. He

¹⁹MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 304.

²⁰Takayanagi, quoted in Howard S. Quigley, "Revising the Japanese Constitution," Foreign Affairs, Volume 38, Number 1, October, 1959, p. 14.

²¹Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs The Story of Japan in Crisis, p. 137.

expressed his doubts about the renunciation of war as a limit to self-defense at a meeting held in the presence of the Emperor:

Nomura: I insist on deleting the second section of Article 9. What do we do if China, Korea or the Philippines invades?

Yoshida: Article 9 is the outcome of American apprehension about Japanese rearmament. Consequently it is difficult to revise it. Maintenance of security has to be through the Occupation Army even when attacked since we are not allowed armament, e.g., even against the Soviet Union we have to rely on the United States and Britain.

Nomura: Absolute submission to the Potsdam Declaration requires the disarmament of the Japanese military but does not require renunciation of armament forever. Even absolutely neutral countries like Switzerland have military forces and against Korea we will need armament of some sort. At the present time we are weaker than Korea. Do you intend to revise this later or will Japanese be forced to wear American uniforms? I do not insist you answer this, but this is my apprehension.²²

The appeal was to no avail as the Emperor had already consented to the principles of the draft.

The draft Constitution was submitted to the House of Representatives when it convened on June 20, 1946. A Constitutional Amendment Committee of 72 members chaired

²²Commission on the Constitution, Reference Document Number 46, July, 1960. I am indebted to Mr. Sato Tatsuo, now President of the National Personnel Authority, for providing me with this document.

by Dr. Ashida Hitoshi was organized to examine the draft article by article. With regard to Article 9, two amendments were introduced upon suggestions by Dr. Ashida and several other members. The phrase "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order" was added to the beginning of the first clause; and the phrase "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph" was placed before the second clause. The explanation offered was that these phrases would indicate in a more emphatic way Japan's sincere wish for peace by using independent judgment in the expression of the provision. GHQ raised no objection to the amendments, and only a few years later did Ashida announce that these provisions were designed with rearmament for self-defense in mind.²³

Mr. Sato Tatsuo, who was division chief of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, helped present the draft to the House of Representatives. Sato also later wrote the report for the investigation committee on Article 9's origin; he reported, that in addition to the formal committee, whose deliberations were open and observed by Occupation authorities, a subcommittee of thirteen members of various

²³Sato, "The Origin and Development of the Draft Constitution of Japan," pp. 25-26.

parties, also headed by Ashida, was formed very secretly to study the draft more privately. According to Sato, it was at this subcommittee level where the two amendments were put forward by Ashida. As legal advisor to the subcommittee, Sato advised Ashida that he understood GHQ authorities to be very rigid on wording of this article and that they might feel that these words would be used to justify rearmament for self-defense. Ashida made no explanation of his reasoning, but the amendments were taken to the committee as a whole and adopted.²⁴

²⁴Interview with Sato Tatsuo, January 11, 1971. Sato told me this only after I had pressed him due to the advice of Captain Oi Atsushi, IJN (Ret.) who had told me that an early article by Sato mentioned General Whitney's statement that these words would allow Japan to rearm in self-defense someday, while later, more detailed articles by Sato did not mention this. Sato said he told me this as a possible clarification which he feels can appropriately be told now. The proceedings of the secret subcommittee were not published in the investigation committee reports nor were they made available to other members of the House of Representatives or the whole Constitutional Amendment Committee itself at the time it was meeting. The proceedings of the subcommittee were stenographically recorded only and are still kept secret in the House of Representatives' files. As to Captain Oi's point, the investigation commission reported that Dr. Cyrus Peake, a China expert in the Government Section, reported Ashida's amendments to General Whitney and pointed out that they might allow Japan to maintain an armed force for self-defense. Whitney, however, did not veto the amendments. I am indebted to

During deliberations on the draft Constitution in the House of Peers, GHQ requested an amendment providing the inclusion of an additional provision requiring civilian status for Cabinet members; this had been requested before, when the draft was still in the Lower House, but had been ignored by the Japanese who felt it unnecessary because of Article 9. Furthermore, there was no Japanese word for civilian; one was either military (guntai): Army (rikugun) or Navy (kaigun), or he wan't. Regardless, GHQ stated that the amendment was necessary because of an urgent request of the Far Eastern Commission. Sato as legislative vice-chief visited Colonel Charles Kades of the Government Section in order to talk about the written form:

. . . While we were talking I happened to say that this request did not seem to go along with Article 9. He said, "As a result of revisions made to Article 9 in the House of Representatives, the apprehension on the part of the Allied Nations that there might be military in Japan in the future might have come forth and have resulted in the present request. In other words, in the second part of Article 9 the insertion of "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding

Captain Oi for the original direction, to Mr. Sato for his confidence, and to Mr. Aso Shigeru of the National Diet Library for confirming the findings of the investigation committee report for me.

paragraph" might have led to the misunderstanding that Japan might have armament for purposes other than those of the preceding paragraph, i.e., for defense."

This might have been Colonel Kades' spontaneous, offhand remark; but being the ones concerned with the matter at the time the amendments were passed, it seemed strange that the American GHQ authorities did not raise any objection to the revision of Article 9 despite the fact they had this fear. At that time I did not know anything about the original draft of MacArthur, but today when it has been made public and I know it stated, "An important article will be Japan renounces armament even for its own security," there²⁵ can be no doubt as to the attitude of the Americans.

If MacArthur was correct that it was his idea from the start that Japan could defend itself from attack by armed force, this idea was not well communicated to the Japanese. The Constitution was passed by Privy Council, House of Representatives, and House of Peers, granted sanction by the Emperor, and promulgated on November 3, 1946, with the provision that it would come into effect six months later. The final English statement of Article 9

²⁵Sato, "Kempo Daikyujo no Seiritsu Katei," (The Process through which Article 9 was Formulated), Commission on the Constitution, Investigative Legislative Bureau Document Number 92, 1960. Article provided by Sato. Italicized portion of quote is the only part which is a direct quotation of MacArthur. As a result of the GHQ request a new word for civilian (bunmin) was coined from two Chinese characters. For an English description of the civilian ministers episode see McNelly, "The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution," pp. 372-74.

read:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The official Japanese government interpretation, which had become communis opinio doctorum and which was taught in university law schools and even in junior and senior high schools was that, "Japan retained a right of national self-defense in international law but by virtue of the second paragraph--she could neither wage nor maintain an armed force--even for purposes of national self-defense."²⁶

²⁶Takayanagi, "Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution," p. 86. One prominent spokesman for this opinion was Yoshida who said that, if attacked, Japan would have to rely on the help of other nations. Dr. Takayanagi at the time personally called this communis error doctorum. Two others who didn't go along were Ashida who wrote an entirely different interpretation along the lines of the Kellogg Briand Pact allowing each nation to provide for its own national self-defense, Shin kempo no kaishaku (Interpretation of the Constitution), as early as October, 1946, and Dr. Taoka Ryoichi of Kyoto University who criticized the official interpretation as excessively rigid from the standards of international law and criticized Japanese intellectuals and journalists for their continuing tendency to bend with the popular wind of the time, with the

The effects of Article 9 on rearmament later in the Occupation period, on the nature of the Self-Defense Forces created in 1954, and on the morale of those forces ever since will be treated in later portions of this monograph.

C. THE CONTINUATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES

Despite demobilization and the new Constitution, only if the ocean were to be abandoned for any purpose might it have been possible to allow over 100,000 U.S. and Japanese-planted acoustic, magnetic, and moored mines to remain scattered about Japan upon completion of the war. Such an alternative, if discussed at all, was not seriously considered; the Japanese were directed at Manila to remove all mines from coastal waters. Sweeping operations took place until September 1, 1945, at which time they temporarily ceased until coordinated plans involving U.S. naval units could be drawn up. Upon arrival off Yokosuka enroute

the rightists in the immediate prewar years and with the leftists in the immediate postwar times. Interview with retired Professor Emeritus Taoka, November 13, 1970.

to surrender ceremonies in Tokyo Bay, American naval authorities reprimanded Japanese officers for not finishing all minesweeping as had been directed.²⁷

The highest leaders of the United States Navy's forces who participated in the Occupation typified the same leaders of that service as a whole in their misunderstanding and underestimating of the complexity and time-consuming nature of mine-warfare operations, particularly minesweeping. Since overly optimistic estimates of when operations would be completed were repeated year by year, no new civilian personnel were trained in the task, leaving Japanese naval forces as the only ones skilled enough to perform the duty. After Allied force reductions, by 1949 the Japanese minesweeping force was the largest and most capable in the western Pacific, expert in the ability to handle complex, modern mines.

Japanese minesweepers were controlled domestically by the Navy/Second Demobilization Ministry. By May 1, 1946, all U.S. minesweepers were withdrawn, and minesweeping

²⁷ Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: Report of Surrender and Occupation of Japan, dated February 11, 1946, p. 10.

became an all-Japanese evolution as far as execution was concerned. The Demobilization Ministry was organized in some ways similar to the Navy Ministry; the Military Affairs Bureau became the General Affairs Bureau and remained the most important organ. The organization as it partially existed at its outset on December 1, 1945 was as indicated in Chart III-2. Initially directed by Admiral Yamamoto, the man trusted and selected by Yonai, Captain Tamura Kyuzo began sweeping with an Imperial Navy force of 350 small ships, 773 officers, and 9227 enlisted men. Although his numbers became progressively reduced in all categories, his forces continued operating in uniforms stripped of rank insignia but with the same command organization, each year exempted from purge restrictions, and always slightly armed due to the necessities and hazards of mine-clearance operations. Almost reminiscent of the Tokugawa period, when all outside contacts were supposedly shut off but limited outside relations were permitted to continue in Nagasaki, so in the Occupation period prior to the Korean War, when all military activities were theoretically ended, was a small force allowed to continue to open up Japan's sea lanes.

CHART III-2

INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF SECOND DEMOBILIZATION MINISTRY

Minister (Prime Minister Shidehara)

Vice Minister

<u>Bureau Level</u>		General Affairs (RADM YAMAMOTO)	
<u>Section Level</u>	General Affairs	Repatriation Ops	Minesweeping (CAPT TAMURA)
	(CAPT NAGASAWA)	Ship Maintenance (CAPT WATANABE)	

Source: Hikiage-Engo-no Kiroku (The Record of Demobilization), pp. 154-55.

The minesweeping effort's scope is indicated by the map on the following page taken from a U.S. Navy theater report prepared at the end of 1945. When the deadline for completion of operations was not met, another was set by the on scene naval commander.:

COMNAVJAP approved the following policy: all minesweeping must be completed by 31 November 1947. . . . Reasons for adopting this policy are: frequent and recurring requests for additional minesweeping are believed to be motivated by ex-naval officers who wish to prolong the tasks unnecessarily in order to retain their positions.²⁸

Tamura was always allowed to continue, however, and allusion to stalling did not appear in future reports. During the period 1945-1952, 937 influence mines were swept at a cost of 19 ships sunk and 77 lives lost.²⁹ In 1952, Coastal Security Senior Officer First Class (Itto-Keibi-sei, equivalent rank of captain) Tamura, 91 other officers, and 1324 enlisted men would enter the Maritime Safety Force

²⁸COMNAVFE, Command Narrative, Naval Forces Far East for the period 1 October 1946-31 March 1947, p. 21.

²⁹The operational details of minesweeping can be found in Commander Naval Forces Far East, Command Narratives, also in Auer, "The Continuation: A Study of Naval Activities in Behalf of Japan from 1945-1952, pp. 24-32. Detailed technical as well as operational details are contained in Koro Keika Shi (History of Navigational Clearance), Tokyo: Operations Division, Maritime Staff Office, 1961.


JAPAN

1
10,000,000

MINEFIELDS

■ CLOSED TO SHIPS

December 30, 1945



(Keibitai) and later the Maritime Self-Defense Force from which Tamura would finally retire as a vice admiral. The minesweeping effort, estimated to be completed in 1946, continues in 1971, 2000 some-odd influence mines still remaining to be deactivated in extremely shallow waters. The activities of the minesweepers played a significant role in stimulating naval rearmament in 1950, but this discussion belongs more properly to the next two chapters.

CHAPTER IV

MARITIME SAFETY IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

Before and during the war Japan had no one instrument or agency responsible for the numerous facets of maritime safety and law enforcement. The duties ordinarily assigned to a modern maritime law enforcement agency, namely, the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of a sovereign state with regard to the high seas, harbors, bays, and like bodies of water along the coasts; the rendering of assistance to mariners in distress; and the protection of life and property were performed by various, unrelated agencies. The Japanese Navy provided assistance on the high seas, in hydrographic requirements, and other supplementary activities, but only reluctantly, since it considered the duty strictly collateral. No Japanese "coast guard" as such existed; and the nearest approach to any duty usually assigned to a coast guard was possibly the Imperial Lifesaving Institute (Japanese Lifeboat

Association) which was founded in 1889 by Kotooka Hirotsune, the chief priest of Kotchira Shrine, widely known as the shrine of the guardian god of sailors, who "desired to establish a public organ looking to the rescue of persons imperiled by maritime casualties, thinking that it would never be proper to rely upon the help of God without doing any effort whatever." The maritime and port regulations of no two Japanese prefectures were alike, nor were their pilot regulations. The Japanese shipwreck rate, always the highest in the world, was an indication of the inefficiency of this system.¹

At the time of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Okubo Takeo was the chief of the prefectural maritime bureau. In December, 1945, Okubo, who only narrowly escaped death in the bombing, succeeded Imperial Navy Vice Admiral Shiraishi Banyru as head of the Sailors Bureau (Senin Kyoku) of the then Transportation-Communications Ministry (Unyu-Tsushiu-Sho).²

¹Information furnished by Captain Frank M. Meals, USCG (Ret.), January 15, 1971. For Captain Meals' qualifications, see below.

²Interview with Okubo Takeo, member of the House of Representatives, December 17, 1970. Okubo, Gekiro

Faced with increasing captures of Japanese fishing boats by the Soviet Union, China, and Korea in waters of the Korean Sea, East China Sea, and off Hokkaido, Okubo appealed to the Public Safety Division of SCAP to allow the Japanese to protect threatened vessels or to provide U.S. protection. Since the Navy was being disbanded, one suggestion he made was a strengthening of the water police (suijo keisatsu) whose duty was to insure harbor safety but whose personnel were now poorly trained and equipped to do even that task well. Okubo was told to wait and discuss the matter with a United States Coast Guard captain who was coming to Japan to study the situation relative to maritime safety and to make recommendations concerning the problem.³

On March 9, 1946, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard ordered Captain Frank M. Meals to report to SCAP for the purpose of "making a survey and study of existing

Nijunen (The Twenty Years of Tribulation), Tokyo: Kempo Kenkyukai, 1968, Chapter 2. I am indebted to Mr. Okubo's secretary of over twenty years, Mr. Shiyoma Kunizo, who kept meticulous records used in the preparation of Okubo's book and who provided names and dates of specific persons and events listed here and below.

³Ibid.

Japanese coast guard and harbor police." Upon reporting the same month Captain Meals was directed:

. . . to survey such existing coast guard and harbor police facilities and as a result thereof submit plans, organization (to include numbers of personnel and equipment) and recommendations for this force as follows:

1. (a) for the main island group of Japan.
(b) any remarks of recommendations concerning water police forces in general that appear advisable.
2. The above is not intended to limit in any way the scope of activities that may be pursued in arriving at your decisions or formulating plans and recommendations on this subject.

Preliminary to undertaking this survey and study, Meals was also officially informed that "any organization projected as a result of this survey and study should be within the scope of the existing Japanese economy and utilize only such equipment as the Japanese already have or could themselves make available."⁴

An outbreak of cholera in Korea in the early summer of 1946 complicated the coastal defense problem. The conclusion of the war ended Japanese sovereignty over Korea and ended the legal classification of Koreans as Japanese while making them citizens of their own newly independent

⁴Letter to this writer from Captain Frank M. Meals, January 15, 1971.

country. Koreans in Japan thus were not subject to some of the restrictions placed on natives. Many Koreans in Japan did not desire to be repatriated, and many in Korea, particularly after the cholera outbreak, desired to come to Japan. Over 200,000 Koreans were estimated to have entered Japan from 1946-1950. Illegal entry of possible cholera carriers thus became an immediate problem which could not await the study being conducted by Captain Meals.⁵

Illegal entry led to another problem that was virtually unknown in Japan prior to the war, smuggling. Since Koreans illegally entering the country were not entitled to rations, they were often forced into the black market, smuggling, and other illegal activities. Smuggled goods, while constituting a very small part of total trade, put a drain on an already shaky economy and were very difficult to control since very small vessels were employed and thus were literally needles in a haystack along Japan's 16,470-mile coastline.⁶

⁵U.S. Navy Department declassified document dated April, 1952, pp. 161-162.

⁶Ibid.

To try to deal with the immediate problem, on June 12, 1946, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to set up an emergency Illegal Entry Control Center (IECC); this was done on June 20 within Mr. Okubo's bureau. A special center was set up in Kyushu where the problem was most serious in order to attempt more stringent control of critical areas. A plan was worked out whereby illegally entering ships were turned over to American forces ashore; but the Japanese forces to implement this concept consisted of only three ships and thirteen smaller vessels and were rendered almost completely ineffective by a shortage of money, communications equipment, and lack of any weapons or ammunition. The Japanese government asked for permission to use ships held in custody by the then Second Bureau, Demobilization Board under SCAJAP control but was refused. Despite continuing efforts to deal with the problem with the scant forces available, no further action was to be taken by the American side until Captain Meals made his recommendations.⁷

Since there was no Japanese "coast guard" as such, Meals tried to discover "who was doing what and why he was

⁷Information provided by Japan Maritime Safety Agency.

doing it." He had a great concern for the habits and customs of the Japanese people whose language he did not know, and he began to teach Mr. Okubo about the history of United States maritime development. Through Captain Meals, Okubo learned of the customs issues and involvement of fishermen in the American Revolutionary War as encouraged by Alexander Hamilton and of the first act of the first Congress of the United States in 1789, a protective tariff "to regulate the collection of duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United States." One section of the act called for a customs surveyor at each port and "the employment of boats which may be provided for the securing the collection of the revenue." The "boats" were designated as "Revenue Cutters," and the men in charge of them were to be known as "Officers of the Customs." This was the beginning of the United States Coast Guard, the Navy being established later in 1798 under the central figure of John Paul Jones. Hearing this, Okubo felt that if Japan could have a coast guard under the Occupation, it might be able to have a navy when it again became independent.⁸

⁸Letter from Captain Meals, January 15, 1971; interview with Okubo, December 17, 1970; Okubo, Gekiro

Okubo dates Japanese rearmament from 1947, since that date marks the start of a new military organization, while all activities up to that time were carried out only as part of the liquidation of the old system. Based on Captain Meals' recommendation that a centralized organization "for the purpose of protecting life and property and preventing, detecting, and suppressing violation of law at sea" be set up, 28 former Japanese Navy auxiliary subchasers were transferred from the Second Bureau, Demobilization Board to the Ministry of Transportation for use as coastal patrol ships on August 28, 1947; on May 1, 1948, Diet legislation creating the Maritime Safety Board as an autonomous organization within the Transportation Ministry would go into effect to make these 28 ships the nucleus of a Japanese "Coast Guard."⁹

Captain Meals stated that, "At no time did I look upon the Maritime Safety Agency as the start of another Japanese navy"; but the organization he designed used the

Nijunen. Mr. Okubo still likes to think of himself as Japan's Alexander Hamilton and sought out Hamilton's memorabilia when he visited the United States for the first time in 1951.

⁹ Ibid.

U.S. Coast Guard as a model. The latter body was not initially designated a military force in 1789 but later became so:

Pursuant to the act of January 28, 1915 (38 statute 800, 14 U.S.C.), as amended, the Coast Guard is constituted as a military service and at all times constitutes a branch of the land and naval forces of the United States, operating under the Treasury Department in time of peace and as a part of the Navy in time of war, or whenever the President shall so direct.¹⁰

Mr. Okubo stated and Captain Meals concurred that the original organization planned was wider in scope than it is today and was wider than a coast guard in that it incorporated a minesweeping force and planned for large, heavily-armed vessels. Captain Meals thought these requirements were necessary due to the job that had to be done; Okubo concurred but additionally felt such a broader organization could provide the basis for the navy Japan would need after independence.¹¹

Okubo requested and received permission from SCAP to employ 3000 ex-naval personnel including officers who

¹⁰Letter to this writer from Captain Meals, January 17, 1971. U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1949, italics mine.

¹¹Letters from Meals January 15 and 17, 1971; interview with Okubo, December 17, 1971.

were thus exempt from purge restrictions as a basis on which to build expertise; Captain Meals concurred with the use of these qualified, trained officers in order to start the organization. As his chief advisor, Okubo chose ex-Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio who moved over from his position as head of the General Affairs Division of the Demobilization Bureau. To run minesweeping came Captain Tamura Kyuzo, and as custodian of patrol ships came Captain Watanabe Yasuji.¹² Referring back to Chart III-2, it can be seen that the personnel chosen as moderates to demobilize the Navy were now being called upon to activate its coast guard.

The proposed organization had no limits on number of personnel, armament of shipping, or number and speed of ships. The force was to organize around the 28 ships transferred from the Demobilization Bureau while the necessary legislation was being cleared through GHQ and Japan's Diet. Its functions were to include protection of the coasts of Japan, enforcement of regulations concerning the safety of ships, establishment of standards of maritime safety, rescue of persons and salvage of cargoes, patrols of

¹²Ibid.

coastal and adjacent waters, prevention and suppression of smuggling, clearance of marine obstacles including mines, etc. The new organization had to be "non-military" despite the use of the U.S. Coast Guard model, the employment of ex-naval personnel, and the wide range of tasks, all of which were felt logical or necessary due to the serious problems facing an island nation with a long and dangerous coast line in general but now having no navy or coast guard organization and beset with hostile, heavily-armed smugglers and pirates in addition. It was intended that such be the case by GHQ and by Captain Meals; and clearly to state the case an article of the founding law was to declare that, "Nothing contained in this Law shall be construed to permit the Maritime Safety Board or its personnel to be trained or organized as a military establishment or to function as such."¹³

¹³Ibid., U.S. Navy Department document of April, 1952, p. 162; Article 25, Maritime Safety Board Law (Law No. 28 of April 27, 1948), Official Gazette, Tokyo: Office of the Prime Minister, 1948. The same article remained in the law even after 1954 when, again following the U.S. model, it was legislated that in time of emergency the Maritime Safety Agency would come under control of the Defense Agency for operations.

This assurance did not satisfy some officials of SCAP, some members of the Allied Council for Japan, or the Far Eastern Commission.

Early in October, 1947, the Japanese government presented for the approval of the Supreme Commander a draft bill for the establishment of a maritime safety authority of the nature recommended by Captain Meals and approved by SCAP's Public Safety Division. All interested SCAP staff departments except the Government Section concurred with regard to the need of an organization of the type recommended; the latter was opposed to the particular bill submitted, principally because it authorized:

a. The establishment of an organized, trained, uniformed, armed force possibly forming the nucleus of a navy, without limitation as to size. (U.S. Post-Surrender Policy for Japan authorized adequate civilian police forces but prohibited "the restoration even in a disguised form of any anti-democratic and militaristic activities.")

b. Use of ships up to 1500 tons displacement without limitation as to speed or armament and with authority to operate on the high seas.¹⁴

To resolve these objections joint discussions were held between members of the Public Safety Division and Government

¹⁴SCAP document, "Maritime Safety Authorities Law," provided by Captain Meals.

Section in late 1947. Further, Captain Meals advised the Japanese who had written the law that, "The United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia - Russia above all - were not going to blindly approve any Japanese law effecting a proposed sea force that did not include specifics." Noting that they would be starting with a very meager force he added:

We ended up with 28 small patrol type vessels I would hesitate to go to sea in. . . . I did, however, advise the Japanese to get the MSA established by laws of Japan, accept the poor 28 boats we had as a starter. Having the basic law establishing the MSA on the books they could then, in the coming years after they were free to act by themselves, take steps under their law to correct any deficiency in the equipment or operations of an already legally approved organization. The main thing was to get started and improve as you go!¹⁵

Taking these considerations into account the Japanese accepted changes in original proposals resulting in limitations on:

- a. total number of personnel which were not to exceed 10,000;
- b. total number of vessels which was not to exceed 125 and total tonnage which was not to exceed 50,000 gross tons;

¹⁵Letter from Captain Meals, January 15, 1971.

- c. speed of vessels which was not to exceed fifteen knots;
- d. armament which was limited to small arms for maritime safety officials;
- 4. operating area which was limited to the high seas adjacent to Japan.¹⁶

The final draft was approved by the Ashida Cabinet in March, 1948 and was passed with little discussion by the Diet on April 15, 1948.

On April 28, however, the Maritime Safety Board, which was to come into being two days later, caused a considerable stir in the Allied Council for Japan. It was the first item to appear on the agenda for several months, the most recent preceding meetings having lasted less than one minute. In the words of a SCAP official:

¹⁶Also, due to American insistence the proposed English name of the organization was changed to Maritime Safety "Board" (MSB) vice "Agency," which the Japanese "cho" would ordinarily be translated as, since some people felt a board sounded smaller and thus would be less controversial than an agency. The English title has shifted back and forth several times between MSB and MSA; the Japanese version has always remained Kaijowancho. Interview with Mr. Ohno Yasuchika, Foreign Liaison Officer, Maritime Safety Agency, November 13, 1970. Ohno served as interpreter for Mr. Okubo in the early days of the MSA.

For an hour and ten minutes your [Captain Meals'] law was lambasted by both the British and the Russians, the United Kingdom representative initiating the inquisition by a statement that such an important matter should have been first discussed with either the Allied Council or the Far Eastern Commission prior to headquarters approval. They were very gentlemanly, however, in their criticism. I won't even attempt to tell you about all the bad things the Russians had to say. The Chinese representative supported the headquarters but cautioned that we should be on the alert to prevent the Japanese from abusing the authority contained in the law.

The Soviet request that the effectiveness of the law be suspended until approved by the Far Eastern Commission will, of course, be ignored as the Supreme Commander acted within the scope of his authority in the absence of any policy decision on the matter by the Far Eastern Commission. The law will be enforced from May 1st.¹⁷

The U.S. representative on the council, William J. Sebald, displayed photographs of the vessels to be used in coastal patrol, claimed that they were very slow, had no armament, and thus were a threat to no one; Sebald said the entire law would be submitted to the Far Eastern Commission as a matter of routine policy.

In the Far Eastern Commission, representatives of China and the Soviet Union protested the establishment of a coast guard. The Soviet delegate charged that the

¹⁷Letter to Captain Meals from SCAP legal officer Frank E. Hays, dated April 19, 1948; letter provided by Captain Meals.

Maritime Safety Board was in fact a disguised restoration of the Japanese Navy and a contradiction of directives of the Occupation for the disarmament of Japan. He said the personnel would be armed and would constitute a training cadre for naval expansion. The U.S. delegate denied the charges and insisted on approval of the bill.¹⁸

One recent study of Japan's postwar defense suggests that a fundamental policy of Japan providing its own internal security through the formation of a strengthened and centralized police force while relying on the U.S. for external protection was formulated in 1947. The study maintains that this policy has persisted relatively unchanged

¹⁸U.S. Department of State, The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in International Cooperation, 1945-1952, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953; U.S. Navy Department document, April, 1952, p. 162. Others also saw the new force as a restored navy. Jane's Fighting Ships 1947-1948 editorialized that, "The Japanese fleet is about to rise like a phoenix from its ashes. Though its present material is limited to 50,000 tons, with no single vessel displacing more than 1500 tons, this may well prove to be the nucleus of a new navy. One has only to recall the renaissance of the German fleet which followed the period of comparative quiescence during which (on paper) the tonnage restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles were observed." Mr. Ohno, see note 16 above, unsuccessfully tried to persuade the editors of Jane's to stop referring to the MSB as a navy nucleus in further editions for which he sent pictures of MSB ships; interview with Ohno, November 13, 1970.

to the present day, the Self-Defense Forces only raising the threshold of external attack, i.e., Japan will handle a small-scale invasion but in an attack of any magnitude the United States is still expected to defend Japan.

Written statements of this policy were prepared as memorandums by Ashida Hitoshi, then Foreign Minister of the Katayama Cabinet, between June and September, 1947. The study maintains that although the fundamental purpose was not achieved at the time the memorandums were written, the policy continued, found partial success with the first Security Treaty of 1952, and was essentially fulfilled with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960, when the U.S. formally guaranteed Japan's external security for a pledge of Japan to assume a greater role in its self-defense. The assessment is offered that Japan's postwar defense policy was formulated early, has not changed substantially, was not derived from U.S. Far Eastern Security Policy as is often claimed, but is rather a Japanese-authored policy--based on a realistic assessment of international politics--which has proved successful by means of patient and persistent Japanese diplomacy.¹⁹

¹⁹Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy 1947-1968, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

It is interesting to view the origin of the Maritime Safety Board in view of the above thesis. The MSB was declared non-military in its charter. Former Japanese Navy personnel eager to build an autonomous maritime force in 1951 also branded it non-military and strictly a police force. If it was a police force planned in 1947, was it the first successful expression of the policy expressed by Ashida and continued by conservative Japanese prime ministers? First, it should be noted that the request for maritime protection from U.S. or Japanese resources came in early 1946 and was a request for protection against external irritations. Second, the solution of solving the problem by strengthening of the water police, as suggested as one possible alternative by Mr. Okubo, was rejected. It was decided instead, that a new Japanese organization would be created with a wide range of duties from operations on the high seas and minesweeping to coastal operations coordinated with local police. The organization was designed to deal with protection against any internal security violations committed on the sea but was designed primarily to deal with external security threats from foreign countries to Japanese fishermen, from foreign smugglers of foreign contraband, from illegal

foreign entrants, against the mining of key waterways, etc.

Third, the MSB did not replace the water police. Prior to the formal inauguration of MSB, a vice minister's conference was held to arrange for "coordination of activities of the Government agencies concerned, incidental to the establishment of the Maritime Safety Board (Agency)."

The resolution of that conference stated that the primary responsibilities to perform policing duties in ports, harbors, straits and at sea rested with MSB but specifically precluded the exercise of policing authority over the sea area considered as "area of influence of the Police." The resolution went on to call for exchange of information, mutual assistance, joint operations in time of emergency, and boarding of police officials on an MSB patrol vessel to discharge his duties "under the direction and supervision of the Commanding Officer of the patrol vessel or craft."²⁰

The water police are still organized in appropriate prefectures at the present time. Fourth, the efforts which

²⁰From (Extracts of) "Resolution of the Vice Ministers' Conference held on 18 March 1948 as regards Coordination of activities of the Government agencies concerned, incidental to the establishment of the Maritime Safety Board (Agency)." I am indebted to Mr. Ohno Yasuchika, MSA, for providing a copy of the resolution.

resulted in the formation of the Maritime Safety Board were mutual rather than a unilateral program of the United States or Japan. Mr. Okubo and Captain Meals were representatives of an agreement subsequently approved by Japan's Diet and SCAP, respectively.

In considering the fact that the Maritime Safety Board was declared to be non-military, it can be noted that the present-day Self-Defense Forces with nuclear depth-bomb launchers, supersonic jet aircraft, and guided missiles are still legally non-military. Examination of the operations and historical progress of the Maritime Safety Board will be made in order to judge its character.

The immediate problem of smuggling, illegal entry, and mines, particularly the influence type activated by the sound, magnetic signature, or pressure of large ships, were a large part of the operations. Since smugglers and pirates were subject to no restrictions on speed or armament of their vessels as was the Maritime Safety Board, patrol ships often found themselves too slow or outgunned. If they could catch a vessel engaged in illegal activity, their most effective tactic was often to ram it.

Since MSB vessels were authorized to conduct operations on the high seas "adjacent to Japan," they were

pretty well restricted from dealing with seizures of fishing vessels by the Koreans or the Chinese; and there were not enough patrol ships to protect the number of vessels fishing near the Soviet-held islands to the north. The Patrol and Rescue Division of the Maritime Safety Agency did cope with this latter problem by becoming a "nucleus of intelligence" for the U.S. of Soviet activity in the area. Tasks such as passing close to and photographing a Soviet warship fleet operating off Sakhalin and interrogating fishermen who had been detained as to the locations of gunsights on Soviet-controlled islands were assigned to MSA beginning in late 1948 and were carried out by patrol ships operating out of Hokkaido.²¹

The outbreak of the Korean War also lends an insight to the American view of the MSB. On July 8, 1950, General MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida authorizing the creation of a 75,000-man National Police Reserve. This act is often heralded as the beginning of

²¹Interview with U.S. Naval Intelligence official and Mr. Mita Kazuya, chief of Patrol and Rescue Division, MSB, 1949-1950, December 7, 1970. While neither man was at liberty to discuss the detailed nature of these operations, the Navy official indicated it was quite common knowledge among U.S. and Japanese officials that a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency worked closely with MSA on Hokkaido operations.

postwar rearmament, the first violation of the spirit of Article 9 of the Constitution, etc. Close examination of the letter and knowledge of the history of the Maritime Safety Board do not lead to the same conclusions. The 75,000-man "Police Reserve" was described by Colonel Frank Kowalski, U.S. Army (Ret.), Chief of Staff to Major General Winfield Shepard who was assigned to organize the force, as a mere disguise for the organization of a new Japanese army made necessary by the transfer of Occupation forces to the Korean battlefield.²²

Since the pullout of the U.S. Army units from Japan resulted in the authorization of a "disguised Japanese army," it might be expected that the U.S. Navy units' withdrawal would have resulted in a similar authorization for a disguised Japanese navy. However, the MacArthur letter stated:

Insofar as maritime safety in the harbors and coastal waters of Japan is concerned, the Maritime Safety Board has achieved highly satisfactory results, but events disclose that safeguard of the long Japanese coast line against unlawful immigration and smuggling activity requires the employment of a larger force under this agency than is presently provided for by law.

²²Frank Kowalski, Nihon Saigumbi (The Rearmament of Japan), Tokyo: Simultrans, 1969.

Accordingly, I authorize your government to take the necessary measures . . . to expand the existing authorized strength of personnel serving under the Maritime Safety Board by an additional 8000.²³

Just as Japanese personnel assigned to form the National Police Reserve did not really know the nature of the force from the outset, initially thinking it was merely a strengthening of the police, so Director General Okubo at first did not understand what the additional 8000 personnel meant. He wondered if this was to be the navy he felt would someday come out of a Japanese coast guard; but to make sure of the intention of the U.S. authorities, he asked immediately upon receiving the letter.²⁴ Okubo was told that no new organization was contemplated. The additional personnel represented a strengthening of the force in order more effectively to carry out its mission.²⁵ In

²³From the letter from General MacArthur to Prime Minister Yoshida, July 8, 1950, as contained in U.S. Navy Department historical files.

²⁴Mr. Ohno received a copy of the letter from Mr. G. H. Rettew, chief of the maritime branch of the Public Safety Division, G-2, GHQ, and hand-carried the letter to and translated it for Okubo. Ohno then accompanied Okubo back to see Rettew to ask him just what the implications of the letter were. Interview with Ohno, November 13, 1970; interview with Okubo, December 17, 1970.

²⁵Ibid.

a formal written statement of July 13, 1950, GHQ's maritime representative wrote:

Preservation of life and property at sea and enforcement of Japanese laws in the waters adjacent to Japan are your functions and which functions the MSA must at all times endeavor to accomplish to the maximum extent possible within limitations.

Admittedly the present Agency fleet is deficient numerically and as to the types of vessels. Numerical deficiency above can be overcome by chartering of vessels but it is not thought that proper types are available from Japanese sources. New construction can overcome the entire deficiency.

.
Patrol of Japanese territorial waters for detection and prevention of an aggressive amphibious movement directed against Japanese shores is most certainly a matter of grave concern to the Japanese Government and the MSA. However, such patrol would be of military nature and vessels required for effectiveness of the Armed naval type and, since the Japanese Government has as yet been given no responsibility or authorized armed naval type vessels it would appear futile to charter or build vessels for this purpose . . .

Against any contingency there is certainly no harm in having complete plans reach for if and when [sic], however, to implement a plan for something which is not at present a Japanese function could only be contrary to Japanese and SCAP interests.²⁶

The MSB, while judged weak in execution, at the time was felt to be the appropriate organization for providing for Japanese maritime security. It seems not unreasonable to

²⁶Quoted from letter from Rettew to Okubo, July 13, 1950. I am indebted to Mr. Ohno of MSA who supplied a copy of the letter.

say that the MSB was thought to be as adequate a security organization for the sea as the National Police Reserve would be on the ground. Can it then be said that rearmament began in 1950? Or is Okubo's statement that it began in 1947 closer to reality?

One dramatic demonstration in support of his contention occurred with the events of October to December, 1950. After receipt of Rettew's letter clarifying the meaning of the MacArthur letter, the MSA prepared a written request for information with an attached annex containing an outline of a draft Cabinet order regarding strengthening of the agency. The draft called for amendments to the basic law to increase the number of personnel from 10,000 to 18,000, to increase the maximum number of ships and total tonnage from 50,000 to 75,000 tons, and to remove restrictions on speed and armament.²⁷ But before the

²⁷Annex 2 to MSA letter to Public Safety Division, GHQ. The letter, which requested advice on the draft amendment, was never answered; but a Cabinet order was approved by GHQ and went into effect on October 23, 1950, allowing the increase of personnel as requested and the increase in number of ships from 125 to 200 and total tonnage from 50,000 to 80,000. No mention was made of speed and armament in the Cabinet order. Mr. Ohno kindly provided a copy of the MSA request; the final version of the Cabinet order is listed in Official Gazette, October, 1950.

draft could be acted upon and any change to the basic MSA law could be effected, i.e., when the organization was still in the original status as planned in 1947, the U.S. Navy got into serious trouble in Korea.

Following the surprising and successful amphibious landing at Inchon on the west coast of Korea in September, General MacArthur scheduled another amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast, the first penetration into North Korea, which had been authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 27, "D-day" being targeted for October 20. It happened that the waters off the east coast were ideal for mining because of current patterns and depth of the water. In 1946, U.S. minesweepers stationed in Japan had been withdrawn to California; by 1947 the Pacific fleet command responsible for the function, Commander Mine Force Pacific Fleet (COMINPAC), was abolished by Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations; and minesweeping was relegated to a collateral duty of the logistics and destroyer forces. At the time of the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. Navy's mine-sweeping force in the western Pacific consisted of ten ships: four 180-foot steel vessels, three of which were

laid up in caretaker status, and six wooden auxiliary minesweepers; the entire navy's minesweeping force was not any more impressive, consisting of two divisions of steel (and therefore magnetic) destroyer minesweepers, two divisions of 180-foot steel vessels, 21 wooden auxiliaries, and two smaller wooden minesweeping craft. In August, 1950, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, COMNAVFE, had asked the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, who was visiting the combat theater at the time, about the possibility of increasing the minesweeping forces. Admiral Sherman said there could be no increase because of other priorities. The U.S. Navy opposed the idea of a landing at Wonsan because of limited amphibious and support shipping. Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, formally the Deputy Chief of Staff under Vice Admiral Joy but actually the personal troubleshooter of Admiral Sherman, termed the landing "unnecessary" and favored instead an overland entrance into Wonsan by the Army. By MacArthur's order the amphibious landing was on.²⁸

²⁸Commanders Malcom W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, U.S. Navy, The Sea War in Korea, Annapolis: U.S. Naval

Admiral Burke knew that the U.S. Navy did not have the minesweeping forces capable of handling significant opposition, particularly if the advance into North Korea meant the possibility of encountering sophisticated Soviet influence mines. There was only one expertly trained and large minesweeping force in the world qualified to do the job, the forces of the Maritime Safety Agency, still sweeping the Japanese coastal approaches and Inland Sea area. After the landing was definitely decided on, Burke called Okubo into the operations center of COMNAVFE, explained to him the necessity of U.N. Forces conducting an amphibious operation off Wonsan, and told him of his fear of Soviet mines in the area. Okubo understood the importance of the landing and the fact that the Japanese minesweepers were the most experienced in the art of sweeping influence mines. Burke asked him to assemble all

Institute, 1951, pp. 125-26. This volume was a Navy Department project and the authors were assigned on the scene to interview all unit and ship commanders and to screen all relevant telegraphic communications.

Japanese minesweepers in the Tsushima Straits area and to help in sweeping at Wonsan and in residual work at Inchon. Okubo stated that the decision was too important to be made by the Director General of MSA but that he would approach Prime Minister Yoshida for a decision. Yoshida was reluctant since there was no contract to allow minesweeping as there was for the convoying of troops and cargo.²⁹ Furthermore minesweeping was a combat operation, and Article 25 of the MSA law made it very clear that this was a non-military force; for Japanese former naval personnel to risk their lives in combat in support of Americans would be very hard to explain. Still Japan was under Occupation and subject to SCAP authorities. Yoshida told Okubo to send MSA sweepers as desired by the U.S. Navy.³⁰

²⁹ SCAJAP Contract #N61736s-1 negotiated by Commander J. F. Witherow, U.S. Navy and Mr. Yoshiya Ariyoshi for the Japanese government called for U.S. appropriated funds to finance transport services. Operational details are contained in COMNAVFE Command and Historical Reports, 1950-1951.

³⁰ Interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, U.S. Navy (Ret.), February 19, 1971. Interview with Okubo, December 17, 1970. The Japanese public is still relatively unaware such operations ever took place. Okubo felt it too sensitive to mention it in his book on MSA in 1968 but consented to discussion of it now. U.S. Naval Command Histories and several American historical accounts of Korea

Captain Tamura, then chief of the Fairway Safety Office, MSA, organized his forces on October 2, 1950. There was hesitancy among some personnel, but after being given a promise of double pay and some strong words of encouragement by Tamura, Burke, and Mita, then Deputy Director General of MSA for operations, there was no final refusal to go.³¹ On October 6, 1950, Admiral Joy sent official SCAP authorization to the Ministry of Transportation authorizing the use of twenty ships, ordering the Japanese government to assemble them for orders as would be issued by COMNAVFE, instructing the ships to fly only the "International Easy" ("E") flag while in Korea,

refer to partial activities but have not accurately known the details as to number of ships involved, circumstances of employment (most accounts claim the ships were contracted, whereas compensation to the Japanese government was negotiated later), personnel casualties, and losses of ships. Because of the secrecy of the incident at the time and since, it is possible that full details are known only by the late Prime Minister Yoshida, Burke, Okubo, Tamura, and Mita. An article describing some details of the operations appeared in an Asahi Shimbun article on my research on March 30, 1971. No immediate adverse reaction in Japan was noted.

³¹ Interview with Vice Admiral Tamura Kyuzo, JMSDF (Ret.), December 28, 1970. Interviews with Burke, February 17, 1971; Okubo, December 17, 1971, and Mita, December 7, 1970.

and directing the double pay.³²

Admiral Burke's fears turned out to be more than justified. On October 10, Task Group 95.5 under the command of Captain R. T. Spofford arrived off Wonsan; under his command were twelve American minesweepers and eight Japanese ships, the latter also under the command of Captain Tamura.³³ On October 12, two sweepers, USS PIRATE and USS PLEDGE, were sunk by mine explosions; but the full extent of the threat was still unknown. In actuality a network of magnetic and contact mines were spread over a 400-square-mile-area. The presence of magnetic mines was

³²Letter from Vice Admiral C. T. Joy to Ministry of Transportation, Japanese government. I am indebted to Admiral Tamura for providing a copy of the letter. The National Personnel Authority was mystified as to why and how to pay "certain members of MSA double pay for special operations." A special provision enacted by Cabinet order had to be incorporated into the law to authorize such a payment; interview with Mr. Yasuda Hiroshi, Secretariat, Japan Defense Agency, then a member of the NPA, January 15, 1971. A COMNAVFE letter on November 14, 1950, to Pacific Far East Command Headquarters (also headed by General MacArthur) asked for funds for the double pay, stores, material, etc. The request was approved on November 20, 1950. A joint conference between SCAP maintenance and logistics officials and MSA counterparts in early 1951 worked out details of the payment; COMNAVFE, Command and Historical Report, December, 1950-March, 1951, p. 40.

³³Interviews with Admirals Burke, February 17, 1971, and Tamura, December 28, 1970.

confirmed on October 18 and resulted in one of the most amazing messages being sent to the Pentagon since Pearl Harbor. Rear Admiral Allan E. "Hoke" Smith, the immediate senior of Captain Spofford, informed the Chief of Naval Operations that, "THE U.S. NAVY HAS LOST COMMAND OF THE SEA IN KOREAN WATERS . . ."³⁴ The official U.S. Navy account of the incident reported:

The Navy able to sink an enemy fleet, to defeat aircraft and submarines, to do precision bombing, rocket attack, and gunnery, to support troops ashore and blockade, met a massive 3000 mine field laid off Wonsan by the Soviet naval experts. . . . the strongest Navy in the world had to remain in the Sea of Japan while a few minesweepers struggled to clear Wonsan.

Vice Admiral Joy and Admiral Sherman concurred with Admiral Smith. Admiral Sherman stated:

Hoke's right; when you can't go where you want to, when you want to, you haven't got command of the sea. . . . We've been plenty submarine-conscious and air-conscious. Now we're going to start getting mine-conscious--beginning last week.³⁵

But the immediate problem wouldn't be helped by determination alone. The landing had to be postponed until

³⁴The opening of the original message as quoted in Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, p. 142.

³⁵Ibid.

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³⁵Ibid.

October 25, but Wonsan was finally cleared.

The Japanese minesweepers' experience paid big dividends. Tamura's ships were often called upon to lead American ships through the mine fields. No area swept by the Japanese ships ever had to be reswept by other units although the same could not be said for less experienced United Nations' ships. Between October 2, and December 12, 1950, 46 Japanese minesweepers, one large "guinea pig" vessel used for activating pressure mines, and 1200 former naval personnel were employed in operations at Wonsan, Kunsan, Inchon, Haiju, and Chinampo. Japanese forces swept 327 kilometers of channels and anchorages extending 607 square miles. Two ships were sunk, one exploding after activating a mine off Wonsan and one grounding off Kunsan; one Japanese sailor was killed and eight were injured in the sinkings.³⁶

³⁶Interviews with Tamura, December 28, 1970; Okubo, December 17, 1970; Burke, February 17, 1971; and Mita, December 7, 1970. In contrast to the early statements by U.S. naval commands that minesweeping would be completed in 1946, 1947, it is interesting to note the comment of a government sponsored historical account of the Korean incident: "Still, there did exist one ray of sunshine from an outside source. The mining of Japanese home waters, so successful as to keep the Japanese sweeping ever since,

Okubo briefed Prime Minister Yoshida in privacy almost every day while the Japanese ships were in Korea. Since the Japanese had no law providing for compensation for people killed or injured in combat, Yoshida and Okubo were worried should there be any Japanese casualties.³⁷

Okubo spoke to Admiral Burke, and when the one Japanese sailor was killed, an official of the Public Safety Division of SCAP visited the home of the deceased and financially compensated the sailor's father.³⁸

With a lessening of the war tempo in December, 1950, the Japanese minesweepers were detached one by one and the Korean organization was formally disbanded in Japan on December 15, 1950. Vice Admiral Joy wrote Mr. Okubo on December 7:

1. I have just received word from my forces afloat that the check sweeping at Haiju has been

now paid an unexpected dividend as COMNAVFE obtained authority. . . to employ 20 Japanese sweepers for work in Korea. . . ." James A. Field, Jr., History of United States Naval Operations KOREA, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 232. All talk of sweeping being motivated by former naval officers trying merely to retain their positions seemed forgotten.

³⁷ Interview with Okubo, December 17, 1970.

³⁸ Ibid., interview with Mita, December 7, 1970.

completed and that all remaining units of the Japanese minesweeping groups are now enroute to Japan.

2. It is sincerely regretted that MS 4 met with misfortune at Wonsan and the loss of their shipmate . . . must sadden the otherwise joyous homecoming of your gallant little ships and their faithful crews.

3. The rapidity with which your forces responded to the request to do minesweeping in Korea, the quality of their work, and their spirit of cooperativeness have given me great pleasure. It is recognized that they had many difficulties with weather, language and supplies, but by perseverance, and working under the efficient supervision of Mr. K. Tamura, Chief of the Fairway Safety Office, they overcame them all.

4. With pleasure, I ask you to transmit to all hands concerned, "Well Done." C.T. JOY³⁹

³⁹Letter from Joy to Okubo, December 7, 1950, COMNAVFE chronological files. Upon reaching the age of 70, retired VADM Tamura was awarded the Second Order of the Rising Sun, the highest award given to a Japanese "military" man for performance of duty since the war. Mr. Okubo testified in behalf of Tamura's award; interview with Okubo, December 17, 1970. It is interesting to note VADM Joy's later remark that, "The main lesson of the Wonsan operation is that no so-called subsidiary branch of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be neglected or relegated to a minor role in the future. Wonsan also taught us that we can be denied freedom of movement to any enemy objective through the intelligent use of mines by an alert force." As in 1946 and 1947, from 1968-1971, U.S. minesweepers based in Japan were withdrawn to California, COMINPAC was again abolished, and the total number of minesweepers in the Pacific has been greatly reduced. The U.S. Navy's minesweeping strength has again fallen victim to economy measures. The biggest and best minesweeping force in the western Pacific, if not in the world, belongs now to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Whose ships would be used for minesweeping if another conflict broke out in Korea?

What then of Okubo's claim that the Maritime Safety Board was the beginning of Japanese rearmament? Was the MSB/MSA a military force? Some observations on the questions are offered. First, the original U.S. intention was that the force not constitute rearmament nor have a military nature. In 1946 when the movement began, the U.S. Occupation authorities were firmly committed to disarmament and were still to demonstrate their resolve with the writing of the Constitution. The sincerity of Captain Meals in trying to observe the intentions of the SCAP disarmament program are not doubted. Hostile Soviet fleet movements off Hokkaido and a Soviet-laid minefield off Korea were not anticipated at the time nor was the fact that Japanese minesweepers would still be active four years later. Second, the tasks that needed to be dealt with were almost impossible to perform without specially-trained personnel; to be effectively accomplished, these tasks required that the personnel employed be armed. Third, some officials of the Japanese and U.S. governments, and particularly the fishermen who were being harassed and captured were not as committed to and/or convinced of the certainty that Japan could live "forever" or even then without a naval force as

were some wishful thinkers in the Occupation hierarchy. Fourth, in order to cope with the difficulty of the tasks involved, SCAP allowed some former naval personnel to be exempt from purge restrictions and permitted the organization that was formed to be lightly armed. Since they were interested primarily in solving problems, the majority of Japanese legislators, to the extent they were free to object, did not. Fifth, the fundamental objections to the MSB of the Government Section of SCAP and of the Soviet delegate to the Far Eastern Commission were never removed; they were acted upon only by attaching restrictions which made the organization weaker and less able to do what it was assigned to do or by pointing out how weak it would be due to a lack of good equipment. In fact, as charged, from the start, the MSB was an organized, trained, uniformed, armed force and did provide a training cadre for later naval expansion; further, although uncharged: it was, from the outset, under Japanese centralized authority; it was paid for by the Japanese government; and it participated in naval operations. But there is almost no other way it could have done its job-- unless Japan were to abandon the sea or unless the United

States would have done the tasks with its Navy. Sixth, once the organization was founded, it became more and more tempting not to use its capabilities. Communism was feared to be expanding globally, particularly in Asia. Soviet naval units were operating off Hokkaido; Japanese fishermen were being captured and held in Soviet territory. Seventh, even though it was intended to remove all former naval personnel, it was never done. Admiral Yamamoto did leave in 1950, and there was an effort by the Government Section of GHQ as late as November, 1950, right in the middle of the Korean minesweeping, to purge the remaining officers, including Captain Tamura, who had been continually exempted.⁴⁰ Eighth, from October-December, 1950, Japanese ships were made integral elements of United Nations/United States Navy task organizations and deployed overseas in combat operations.⁴¹ Like the Maritime Self-Defense Force in 1971, the Maritime Safety Agency in 1950

⁴⁰In a letter of November 8, 1950, to SCAP, VADM Joy asked to retain the 92 officers at least through March, 1951. Although he promised to try to train replacements as soon as possible, he noted that minesweeping was "a highly developed science that takes many years to develop"; letter quoted from COMNAVFE chronological files.

⁴¹To show the dangers of an absolute generalization, without implying any Japanese resolve to project military

had many military characteristics.

Shortly after he initially arrived in Japan in September, 1950, Admiral Burke discussed with Mr. Okubo the possibility of MSA's acquiring some American frigates which had been returned from Soviet-received lend-lease following the war. Burke had already become intimate with Admiral Nomura, and after the Korean incident the two men began talking in earnest about formal naval re-armament. But planning for that happening had begun long before.

power, it is interesting to note the opening statement of a recent U.S. Embassy Tokyo cable to the Department of State and American embassies around the world on the subject of "Japanese Defense." "Japanese defense policy and the defense of Japan are directed at the defense of Japan against conventional attack. Government policy and public opinion deny the extension of Japanese military power overseas, and present capabilities prohibit it, at least through the 1970's" (*italics mine*); U.S. Embassy Tokyo A-1158 of December 11, 1970; copy provided by U.S. Embassy Tokyo. When asked later, the drafter of the message acknowledged he did not realize Japanese units had deployed in 1950. As of the present moment the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has a larger and more modern minesweeping force than in 1950; and a similar deployment, as in 1950, in conjunction with U.S. Forces in a movement to Korea or Taiwan would not appear beyond capability. A unilateral move by Japan to conquer a foreign territory would indeed appear impossible with just SDF units. To move enough troops and logistic supplies would necessitate using the Japanese merchant fleet.

CHAPTER V

NAVAL REARMAMENT PLANNING 1945-1952

In the early months of the Occupation although Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa and his Military Affairs Bureau Chief, Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, were convinced of and dedicated to the necessity of disarmament, there was legitimate concern for Japanese security at some future time. When the Occupation began, no one could say how long it would last; and at that time the prospect of the United States providing the naval protection of Japan for the next 25 years by security treaties and through the stationing of the Seventh Fleet in certain Japanese ports was not in sight.

As a result there was casual morning discussion within the Demobilization Ministry as to whether planning for a new navy at some future date should be carried on. Opinion was divided, some strong voices being heard that such planning certainly would not be authorized by SCAP

authorities or Japanese government officials, while others maintained that not to plan anything could result in the Occupation ending with Japan being irresponsibly defenseless. Even the latter group admitted that a navy might not be required for many years, depending on the length of the Occupation and the willingness of the United States to provide for Japan. Early in 1946 a conclusion for action was finally reached since discussions up to that time had been merely speculative and often almost jocular. The decision was made:

For the present time, let us not worry about when any particular plan is to be implemented. But in order to remain flexible and to deal with any situation that might come up, let us make the documents division of the Second Demobilization Ministry a core, for carrying out very confidential studies (without admitting publicly that they are going on).¹

The head of the Documents Division in the Liquidation Bureau of the ministry was Captain Yoshida Eizo, who, along with two other members of the division, Captain Nagaishi Masataka and Commander Terai Yoshimori, worked secretly on rearmament plans at night or during spare time

¹Yoshida Eizo, "The Process of Rearmament Planning by the Organization Undertaking Residual Navy Functions," April, 1953. I am indebted to VADM Yoshida, JMSDF (Ret.) for providing me a copy of this article; interview with Yoshida, December 25, 1970.

from their primary duties of negotiating with U.S. authorities on liquidation and of collecting data on demobilized naval personnel. Like the officers engaged in minesweeping operations, these men were also subsequently exempt from purge restrictions. Although the size of the demobilization organization was reduced from time to time, the studies always continued.² Table V-1 shows the progress of reduction along with positions of some key personnel.

Consulting with Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, who himself collaterally headed the Material Liquidation Division for about five months in late 1946-1947, with Captain Nagasawa Ko, who had been an Imperial Navy specialist in personnel affairs and kept personnel records and lists during the demobilization period, and with other qualified officers within the demobilization organization, Yoshida, Nagaishi, and Terai developed plans for navies of various sizes.

Outside the demobilization organization many former officers kept an interest in naval affairs and

²Interviews with Vice Admirals Yoshida, December 25, 1970, and Terai, November 26, 1970.

TABLE V-1

NAVAL DEMOBILIZATION ORGANIZATION 1945-1951

Commencement Date	Organization Name	Selected Personnel (As of Commencement Date)
Dec. 1, 1945	Second Demobilization Ministry (- <u>sho</u>)	RADM YAMAMOTO (General Affairs Bur) CAPT NAGASAWA (Gen. Aff. Div) Liquidation Bureau CAPT YOSHIDA (Documents Div)
June 15, 1946	Second Bureau (- <u>kiroku</u>) Demobilization Board (- <u>cho</u>) [Army & Navy combined]	RADM YAMAMOTO (General Affairs Div) CAPT NAGASAWA (Gen. Aff. Sec) Material Liquidation Division CAPT YOSHIDA (Documents Sec)
Oct. 15, 1947	Second Demobilization Bureau (- <u>kiroku</u>) of P.M. Office [Army & Navy separate]	RADM YAMAMOTO (General Affairs Div) CAPT NAGASAWA (Gen. Aff. Sec) CAPT YOSHIDA (Material Liq. Div)
Jan. 1, 1948	Second Demobilization Liquidation Division of Demobilization Bureau, Welfare Ministry	CAPT NAGASAWA (General Affairs Sec) CAPT YOSHIDA (Material liq. Sec)
May 31, 1948	Second Demobilization Liquidation Bureau Liquidation Division, Repatriation Relief Agency, Welfare Ministry	CAPT NAGASAWA (General Affairs) CAPT YOSHIDA (Material Liquidation)

Source: Hikiage-Engo-no Koroku (The Record of Demobilization).

acted as advisors.³ The senior advisor and spiritual father of the program, however, was Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo.

His closest American friend was Admiral William V. Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations during the Japanese Training Squadron visit to the United States in 1932. Rear Admiral D. W. Beary, assigned as the first naval representative of SCAP, had been Admiral Pratt's aide at that time.⁴ Beary and other active and retired U.S. Navy admirals who visited occupied Japan often talked with Nomura and socially entertained him and Admirals Yonai, Yamanashi Katsunoshin, and Okada Keisuke; Yamamoto sometimes was invited to these gatherings also. Nomura and Yamamoto were invited to naval functions such as the Seventh Fleet change of command, and many senior officers of the Imperial Navy

³Retired Vice Admirals Fukutome Shigeru and Hoshina Zenshiro and retired Rear Admirals Tamioka Sadatoshi and Takada Toshitani are prominent examples of those outside who helped. Yoshida, "The Process of Rearmament Planning by the Organization Undertaking Residual Navy Functions"; interviews with Hoshina, November 4, 1970, and Yamamoto, December 28, 1970.

⁴Nomura Kichisaburo, "An Inside Story of the Establishment of the Defense Forces," Anzen Hosho Kenkyu Kai, Kaiyokoku Nihon no Shorai (The Future of Japan as a Maritime Nation), p. 408. Nomura had commanded the Training Squadron during the visit in question. He wrote this memoir in 1960 and died in 1964, but it was not published until this volume appeared in October, 1970.

who dealt with U.S. naval authorities and were invited to social activities were treated very respectfully.⁵

Whether this treatment resulted from personal friendships or from the fame and well-known moderation of men like Nomura, Yamanashi, and Yonai among U.S. Navy officers or just generally from the traditional comradery of internationally minded sea-going naval officers is unknown, but the U.S. Navy treatment of the Imperial Navy, which had attacked and beaten the U.S. badly at Pearl Harbor and which had fought it long and hard thereafter, even in the immediate postwar period, was generally friendly. The Navy's attitude was less vindictive than the Army's which was affected, no doubt, by the fact that it was on the scene to administer the Occupation and reform the "evil" elements of Japan. The Navy seemed to take the attitude that its ships and personnel were present as visiting fleet units and that its hosts should thus be treated well. This attitude and friendship was to continue and grow as time went on.

⁵Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970; Hoshina, November 4, 1970; and Captain Oi Atsushi, October 14, 1970.

Nomura explained his ideas about rearmament and mentioned some tentative plans, which were always discussed with and given to him by Captain Yoshida, to Rear Admiral Beary who, for obvious reasons, could not allow them to be implemented but who was very sympathetic to the ideas and to the eventual necessity. Other visiting admirals, such as retired Chief of Naval Operations William H. Standley, were similarly impressed and sympathetic.⁶

Because of his diplomatic career Nomura also had wide friendships in the Foreign Ministry, which in Japan occupied by English speakers, provided the immediate post-war prime ministers. Nomura knew Ashida Hitoshi well and through Admiral Yamanashi he had close contact with Yoshida Shigeru; with both Ashida and Yoshida and with Hatoyama Ichiro, Nomura found consensus that Japan would some day need a navy.⁷

⁶Nomura, "An Inside Story of the Establishment of the Defense Forces," pp. 408-409. Interview with Yoshida, December 25, 1970.

⁷Nomura, "An Inside Story of the Establishment of the Defense Forces," pp. 409-410. Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970; Yoshida, December 25, 1970; Nakayama Sadayoshi, October 28, 1970; and Oi, October 14, 1970. Regardless of Yoshida Shigeru's views, he still refused

The suddenness of the Korean War had caught both the United States and Japan unaware. Occupation forces were quickly pulled out, leaving Japan nearly defenseless. In these circumstances MacArthur wrote the letter to Yoshida concerning the National Police Reserve.

Despite the relations with Yamanashi and Nomura, Yoshida did not particularly like or trust military personnel in general. He had been jailed by the military near the end of the war and knew well about the extremes to which militarism could lead. He did, however, know and trust some close acquaintances who had been in the military. When faced with the situation of the National Police Reserve, which he suspected was intended to be more like an army than a police force, in addition to individuals such as Masuhara Keikichi, whom he selected to be civilian head of the force and who at first did not understand the true character of it, Yoshida also called

overtures from U.S. envoy John Foster Dulles who tried to encourage Japan's ground rearmament prior to the Korean War. Both Nomura and Yamanashi had served as President of the Peers College and thus had standing with the Imperial Household. Yamanashi personally was very close to the Emperor; interview with Oi, October 14, 1970.

former Imperial Army Lieutenant General Tatsumi Eiichi who had been Army attaché in London from 1936-1938 while Yoshida was ambassador. Yoshida sought Tatsumi's advice and twice sought to persuade him to become uniformed head of the National Police Reserve even though no officers above the grade of colonel were ever allowed to enter. Tatsumi agreed to help, saw the Prime Minister daily during the initial period, and served as military advisor throughout Yoshida's tenure, but refused personally to head the force, stating that the senior officers of the old military organization should take the blame for the last war, while younger but still experienced men should run the new organization.⁸

Tatsumi as military advisor discussed the needs of Japan in light of the American forces' rapid withdrawal.

⁸ Interview with Masuhara Keikichi, member of the House of Councillors, January 29, 1971; Interview with Lt. General Tatsumi, IJA (Ret.), December 9, 1970. General Tatsumi had never told anyone before this interview of Yoshida's offer which was made twice through Shirasu Jiro, head of the Central Liaison Office (Foreign Ministry). Shirasu could not even persuade Tatsumi to take the position for a short time until a more stable military organization, which after negotiations with Dulles and the Korean situation Yoshida knew would be necessary, could be set up.

By convincing Yoshida that the NPR was needed and to be more like a military organization than a police force, Tatsumi won his support for using former Army officers, first those up to the grade of lieutenant colonel and, after a bitter struggle with Masuhara and the new uniformed head, Hayashi Keizo, won permission for full colonels to be admitted.⁹ He also concurred with Yoshida that the need for a naval organization was not so urgent because of the existence of the Maritime Safety Agency which the American Navy apparently felt adequate. Nonetheless, he brought another military man whom Yoshida trusted to advise him concerning naval affairs. This turned out to be the assistant naval attaché during Yoshida's tour in London, Yamamoto Yoshio. Yamamoto told Yoshida of the weakness of the MSA to which he had been advisor for two years, particularly in ships which needed to be strengthened.¹⁰

⁹ Interview with Masuhara, January 29, 1971, General Tatsumi, December 9, 1970, and General Hayashi, JGSDF (Ret.), January 5, 1971. General Hayashi was appointed uniformed chief after Tatsumi's refusal.

¹⁰ Interviews with Tatsumi, December 9, 1970, and Yamamoto, December 28, 1970. Admiral Yamamoto could not

Nomura had been teaching Admiral Burke about Japanese, Korean, and Chinese history and character since October, 1950 and the two were becoming close friends. Burke thought that any great nation needed a suitable military force; and through Nomura's knowledge, consideration, and deep regard for people, Burke was becoming convinced Japan was a great nation. Following the Korean incident, when it looked as if it might be wise for Japan to start the development of a navy, Burke recommended to Nomura that, since the most important element of any navy was its officer corps and since the officer corps would reflect the attitude of the first officers for generations, he take ten of the very best officers from the old Imperial Navy to start a new one.¹¹ At about the same time, at a

remember how many times he met with Prime Minister Yoshida in 1950, but General Tatsumi thought Yamamoto attended at least three times.

¹¹I received a letter from Admiral Burke dated December 1, 1970, and interviewed him later in Washington. The letter contains a statement which moved me very much and has appeared to have had the same or a deeper effect on every Japanese naval officer to whom I have told the contents. Admiral Burke wrote, "When I went to Japan in 1950, I did not like Japanese. I had fought them too long and had been in too many battles against them to have any regard for them. At that time I did not know many Japanese. . . . I felt the need to know more about

cocktail party given by Prime Minister Yoshida, Joy told Nomura that there were eighteen frigates which had been returned to the U.S. by the Soviet Union but which remained in Yokosuka needing renovation before they could be placed in service. He indicated these frigates could be made available to Japan.¹²

oriental psychology, and so I asked my friend and classmate, Captain Eddie Pearce, to suggest a Japanese who could instruct me. He suggested Admiral Nomura. About once a week I had a meeting with Admiral Nomura who tried to teach me how the Japanese thought and the difference between the Japanese, the Koreans, and the Chinese and also their similarities. I came to have greater respect and admiration for Admiral Nomura than almost any other man I have ever known. . . . When Admiral Nomura died, I think he was one of the best friends I ever had." Although he had only arrived on September 1, 1950 he was scheduled for a permanent position in command of a cruiser division in October. When he finally left in mid-1951, his efforts in sending the minesweepers to Korea and his suggestions to Admiral Joy and to Washington laid the groundwork for the new Japanese naval organization. It is interesting to speculate on what would have happened had his original orders been carried out.

¹²Nomura, "An Inside Story of the Establishment of the Defense Forces," p. 409. These were the same frigates Admiral Burke had discussed with Mr. Okubo of the MSA in September. When the Korean operation made these frigates appear better suited for a new navy, Burke sent Okubo to Washington to negotiate for new construction of ships for the MSA and for reform of the law concerning the armament of vessels. He asked Mrs. Burke to look after Okubo in the capitol, and her graciousness convinced Okubo that American women did have merit after all. I am indebted to Admiral Burke who suggested I see Mr. Okubo in Japan and

With this encouragement Nomura accelerated his long-existing program for a Japanese navy. It was not difficult to gather a group as suggested by Burke. Nomura was at the apex of an organization that divided responsibilities but functioned smoothly and efficiently despite differences of opinion as to the nature and size of the organization to be planned and developed.¹³

Nomura himself attended to relations with Japanese and American government officials. Vice Admiral Tamioka, a historian, worked on international relations, studying the global political and military situation, particularly the military strength of foreign powers. Vice Admiral Fukutome, a former operational fleet commander, was assigned responsibility for studying operations and tactics. Vice Admiral Hoshina studied the structure for a munitions industry in Japan and was instrumental in the formation

and to Mr. Okubo, who because of the kindness showed to him by the Burkes, provided me regal treatment in Tokyo.

¹³In contrast to the situation with former Army officers where factions arose. One faction composed of a former Japanese colonel favored by an American general in GHQ took an anti-NPR attitude and made things very difficult for Tatsumi working with the Prime Minister. Interview with Tatsumi, December 9, 1970; "Rearmament and Ex-Soldiers," Tokyo Shimbun, April 21, 1952.

of the "Maritime Air Technical Association," the name being chosen since rearmament still could not be loudly proclaimed; Hoshina worked with Dr. Ishikawa Ichiro, President of the powerful Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and many former naval officers working in Japanese industry. Rear Admiral Yamamoto was responsible for studying the organization to create and develop the new navy; he and Tatsumi worked with Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki Katsuo as advisors to Yoshida and two of his young proteges, Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku.¹⁴

The then-designated Second Demobilization Liquidation Bureau swung into high gear although, because of the earlier decision to plan for just such a moment, it was not difficult to update its studies. Captain Nagasawa, using his detailed records on the numbers of demobilized personnel, authored projected studies as to how many would still be available.¹⁵ Captains Yoshida and Nagaishi and

¹⁴Interviews with Tatsumi, December 9, 1970; Hoshina, November 30, 1970; and Yamamoto, December 28, 1970.

¹⁵In addition to the studies commencing in 1946 which were made in strict secrecy, some informal discussion with American authorities had begun in 1949. In late 1948 the National Security Council had decided to secretly

Commander Terai, the special planner on aviation, began working to up-date the studies that had been prepared earlier and cleared various plans with Admirals Fukutome, Hoshina, Tomioka, Takada, and Yamamoto. Table V-2 lists the plans prepared by the bureau. These studies were often over 50 pages in length with detailed charts, maps, and organizational annexes. They were translated into flawless English and typed each night so they could be presented to intended American sources quickly.¹⁶

On January 21, 1951, Nomura visited Admiral Joy to discuss the loan of ships and presented him with a plan for a navy drawn up by Admiral Tamioka and Captain Yoshida

encourage the expansion of Japanese paramilitary capability. In 1949 a Japanese-born American civilian reported to the intelligence division of COMNAVFE and began meeting regularly twice a week with Captain Nagasawa to discuss intelligence matters and Japanese naval officers' ideas about rearmament. All conversations were in Japanese. Interview with U.S. Naval Intelligence official who participated.

¹⁶I am indebted to Admiral Uchida Kazutomi, Chief of the Maritime Staff, JMSDF, who gave me access to the Chief of Staff's personal copy of the Japanese language versions of the plans and to Commander Fukushima Tsutomu, IJN (Ret.) now of the JMSDF Staff College, Ichigaya, Tokyo, who was one of the translators of the plans and who presented me with several English language versions still retained by him. The only other known copies are held at the still-existing Second Demobilization Bureau of the Welfare Ministry.

TABLE V-2

REARMAMENT STUDIES PREPARED BY THE LIQUIDATION BUREAU
1950-1953

Reference Number	Completion Date	Title of Study
1	October, 1950	Study Materials
2	January 8, 1951	Additional Opinions on Study Materials
3	January 25, 1951	Personal Opinion on Japanese Security
4	January 25, 1951	Private Plan for Japanese Rearmament
5	March 6, 1951	Study Materials on the Person- nel Situation of Ex-Navy Men and their Remobilization
6	March 22, 1951	Comparison of the Maritime Safety Agency and the United States Coast Guard
7	April 10, 1951	Second Special Study Materials
8	May 8, 1951	Navy Organization Plan
9	August 29, 1951	Maritime and Air Self-Defense
10	December 3, 1951	Draft of the New Plan of Air and Sea Forces
11	January 2, 1952	Personal Opinion on Construc- tion of Air and Sea Forces
12	February 8, 1952	National Defense Ministry Organization Plan
13	February 25, 1952	Studies on Reconstruction of Air Power
14	- - - 1952	Studies on Strengthening Air and Sea Defense Capability
15	- - - 1952	Opinions and Miscellany

TABLE V-2--Continued

Reference Number	Completion Date	Title of Study
16	April, 1953	The Process of Rearmament Planning by the Organization Undertaking Residual Navy Functions

Source: Yoshida Eizo, "The Process of Rearmament Planning by the Organization Undertaking Residual Navy Functions," April, 1953, number 16 of Table.

(reference 1 of table). Joy recommended that one of Nomura's representatives meet with Admiral Burke in order to discuss details of planning. On January 23, Hoshina and Burke made the first formal contact that led eventually to the establishment of a naval organization. Burke offered Hoshina his ideas on what a Japanese navy should be like and commented on a Japanese draft policy (reference 2). Taking Burke's comments into account, the Japanese naval officers prepared a new draft (reference 3) which Hoshina presented to Burke on January 29, and which Burke termed "excellent."¹⁷

¹⁷The dates are mentioned by Admiral Nomura, who, while a member of the House of Councillors in 1960,

Throughout January and February, Burke kept Admiral Sherman in Washington informed of Japanese ideas on a new navy and sent copies of the former naval officers' plans submitted to him. He and Admiral Joy had been surprised by the size of the original plan submitted by Nomura but sent it forward anyway as an indication of what the Japanese felt necessary. After the revised plan that Burke and Hoshina cooperated on jointly was submitted as a U.S. Navy proposal, Sherman agreed to support it if the Japanese government officially adopted the plan. Even Nomura could not accomplish that; he talked with Yoshida on February 7, and gave him a copy of the plan. The Prime Minister told Nomura he had told Joy if American forces were to fight in defense of Japan in Kyushu or Hokkaido, Japan would not stand still. But America would have to provide the weapons.¹⁸ Money and who was going to provide

gathered twelve active or retired admirals to record their recollections of the early days of rearmament. Dates were often mentioned since at least several of the participants kept detailed diaries. The text, referred to below as "Recollections," was never published and I am indebted to Admiral Yamamoto who lent me his copy.

¹⁸Nomura, "Recollections." Interviews with Hoshina, November 4, 1970; and Burke, February 19, 1971.

it were to remain significant factors in rearmament.

U.S. special envoy John Foster Dulles was a guest at a cocktail party given by William J. Sebald in February, 1951; Admiral Nomura talked with Dulles and gave him his private plan on Japanese rearmament (reference 4), a proposal for a complete defense organization with a 200,000-man army and 50,000-man navy-air force with 200,000 tons of shipping and 700 aircraft. Dulles was very impressed with the plan, and he and Nomura began continuing discussions on rearmament.¹⁹

Both U.S. and Japanese interest in rearmament came more into the open by March. SCAP for the first time officially requested the Second Demobilization Liquidation Bureau to provide figures on the situation of former naval personnel and their potential for remobilization (reference 5). Although former Prime Minister Ashida began to speak out for rearmament so that Asahi Shimbun printed a cartoon of him in military uniform, the first man publicly to speak out was Dr. Watanabe Tetsuo, an economist, businessman, and university professor known

¹⁹Nomura, "Recollections." Interviews with Hoshina, November 4, 1970, and others.

for his strongly anti-communist sentiments. An old friend of Ashida and Yoshida and a neighbor of Nomura, Watanabe, in March, asked Nomura to recommend a reliable Navy man to work with him on a rearmament study. Watanabe formed a group of 30 military and business leaders including Admirals Fukutome and Hoshina. Through the Navy members, the ideas of the organization headed by Nomura strongly influenced Watanabe's group, which through a nine-month program of study developed the so-called 3-3-3 (San-San-San) Plan for a 300,000-man army, 300,000-ton navy, and 3000-plane air force.²⁰

Numerous plans for rearmament began coming forward but will not be mentioned since they follow similar patterns to those already mentioned; many of these reflected wishful thinking as to the political and psychological acceptability of rearmament, the then economic capability of Japan, or the generosity of the United States in providing materials.²¹

²⁰This study greatly impressed Dulles, but Yoshida was reluctant because of the cost and fear of the power of so large an army. Watanabe could not calm these fears, but Yoshida did give him 250,000 yen to continue his study. Interviews with Dr. Watanabe, now 85 and still a strong anti-communist, January 25, 1971, and Hoshina, November 4, 1970. Also Fukutome in Nomura, "Recollections."

²¹Many of the plans are listed in Doba Hajime, Nihon no Gunjiroku (Japan's Military Power: Inside the

What was needed was something that Japan could afford, that would be politically acceptable domestically, and that would be acceptable in principle to and bring assistance from the United States. Admiral Burke had been studying the Japanese situation intensively since the Korean mine-sweeping incident and requested a study of a Japanese naval force to be developed toward the goals of escort of shipping, coastal patrol, minesweeping, and protection of fishing boats. In March, during a visit to Washington, he had written Admiral Joy that he had discussed Japan's use of the patrol frigates returned from the Soviets with Admiral Arthur W. Radford, then Commander-in-Chief Atlantic; Burke stressed the need for an eventual Japanese navy (he was also attempting to get support for the South Korean Navy) and his belief that it should start with minesweepers and patrol craft. Radford indicated that the U.S. would probably need a large number of small combatants itself and suggested that it might be better to build naval craft in Japan.²²

Self-Defense Forces) Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1963.

²²From Admiral Burke's personal papers, 1951, U.S. Naval History Division, Washington.

Nomura's organization, carefully probing U.S. and Japanese political and military feelings, came up with a plan (reference 7) that went a long way in determining the events of the next year and set the way for the development of an autonomous naval force. This plan, presented by Nomura to Joy and by Hoshina to Burke on April 18, 1951, called for the establishment of a nucleus for a future air-sea force set up by a temporary loan of ships, aircraft, weapons, and ammunition from the United States but supported by personnel, pay, and non-munition logistics supplied by Japan.²³ It put forth three possible ways of forming the desired nucleus: a relatively large organization having the nature of an armed force (although not called one) set up autonomously within the government of Japan; a strengthened and improved organization of the

²³The plan for an air-sea force which persisted through 1952 was in line with the thinking of Admiral Inoue Shigemi, mentioned in Chapter I as the progressive president of the Naval Academy. Inoue, who can possibly be called Japan's Billy Mitchell, as a rear admiral in January, 1941, strongly attacked the then popular grand fleet encounter strategy. He strongly opposed war with the U.S. and ridiculed the way it was being planned. His plan for an air-sea force, although not adopted, drew great respect for its boldness at the time and drew even more praise as its predictions came true. I am indebted to Professor Tsunoda Jun for translating and explaining the plan to me.

Maritime Safety Agency set up initially as an autonomous organ of that same body; and an organization to perform the required naval activities having Japanese naval personnel under the command of the U.S. Navy Far East. Advantages and disadvantages of each plan were put forth; and although the first choice was definitely preferred, the study contended that the second was most likely an achievable plan, given the political conditions of the times. The third option was least preferred. Specific points that were subsequently realized, even though at times bitterly contested, in later negotiations within Japanese official circles were as follows:

a. A new organization that has the nature and structure of an armed force shall be built up under the Prime Minister. This organization shall be called the Maritime Safety Guard Reserve.

(1) It should not be in contradiction to the Constitution of Japan. For this purpose the nomenclature of an armed force should not be used, and the strength possessed by it should be that of a guarding force.

(2) It should be officially recognized by the foreign powers--at least by the countries of the Free World.

(3) It should be approved by the majority of the Japanese people, that is, by the Diet.

(4) It should be an independent and autonomous Japanese organization by all means. Specifically, personnel affairs, control, and operation of this organization should be able to be handled by the Japanese Government independently.

(5) It should be able to utilize for a while the able and excellent members of the demobilized Navy personnel.

(6) After the establishment and development of this organization the present Maritime Safety Agency and Second Demobilization Bureau Liquidation Division shall be dissolved; and the Fairway Safety Office, Patrol and Rescue Division, their affiliated organs, and other necessary branches of the Maritime Safety Agency shall be merged into this organization. [This provision was legislated in 1952 but never carried out completely, ie., the MSA was not abolished.]

b. In case the build-up of this organization is difficult or a long period of time is needed for its realization, an extra-agency bureau to take charge of the functions of escorting of shipping, patrolling, minesweeping, protection of fishing vessels, etc., shall be established within the Maritime Safety Agency.

(1) The new organization shall be made an entirely extra-agency bureau, and its structure, system, operation, etc. shall be so constructed as to sever all matters such as control, operation, supply, accounting, etc. from the agency, thereby making the bureau completely independent and preventing the infiltration of the basic defects of the agency such as lack of strong guiding spirit, internal bureaucratic friction, etc.

(2) The new organization shall include excellent former surface and air naval personnel with experience in command, discipline, and training in as great a number as possible while, except for specially excellent ones, employment of the present personnel of the Maritime Safety Agency devoid of necessary experience on the sea or in the air shall be avoided.

(3) So far as the system and organization of this extra-agency bureau, it should be established irrespective of the present organization of the Maritime Safety Agency and should be endowed with the nature of an armed force.

(4) The system of ranks shall be made clear among the personnel of the bureau and the chain of command shall be clearly established.

(5) Article 25 of the Maritime Safety Agency Law shall be abolished or revised, so that this extra-agency bureau alone may be absolved from the provision of the said article.

c. In order to maintain an especially close liaison between this organization and the U.S. forces--U.S. Naval Forces, Far East in particular, Japanese staff officers should be dispatched to work with the U.S. Forces or a Joint U.S.-Japanese Research Commission shall be created.

(1) The Joint U.S.-Japanese Research Commission shall be created as early as possible prior to the build-up of this organization and the commission shall be made to conduct a study and investigation of matters related to the creation of this organization and submit its findings and opinions, both to the U.S. and Japanese authorities concerned.

(2) As many ex-naval officers and men as possible who will become the key personnel of the Japanese Air-Sea Force in the future shall be dispatched to the U.S. Navy and instructed, guided, and trained in the usage of vessels, weapons, etc.²⁴

Admiral Burke was very impressed with this plan and on April 22, 1951, sent a seven-page letter accompanying the Japanese draft to Rear Admiral James H. Thach, Jr., Director of the International Affairs Division of Admiral Sherman's office, asking Thach to explain the key provisions of the letter and plan to Sherman. After noting the difficulties involved due to the Japanese Constitution,

²⁴"Second Special Study Materials, Study of the Organization and System to Play, Train, and Operate to Support the Functions of Escort of Shipping, Patrol, Mine-sweeping, and the Protection of Fishing Vessels," April 10, 1951; English copy provided by Commander Fukushima.

the unknown desires of the U.S. government with regard to a peace treaty, the hesitancy of SCAP to act, the uneasiness of the Japanese government to rearm, the lowly status of many former Japanese naval officers, the length of time to build proficiency in any sea force, and the need to reinforce the U.S. naval efforts in the defense of Japan, Burke set forth his ideas because, "I feel that the problem must be faced directly some day and that the sooner it is faced the greater the probable benefit to the United States." Corresponding to the three major points of the Japanese plan listed above Burke stated:

a. There is a need by the United States for the assistance of Japan in the defense of her own country and in defense of the high seas surrounding the Japanese archipelago. Even at the present, Japanese unarmed fishing boats are seized by Russians, Chinese and even our own ROK allies. There is an increasing need for a sea patrol around HOKKAIDO to discourage possible agent landings by the Soviets in HOKKAIDO, to ascertain whether any of the Japanese fishing ships in that area are trading with the Russians or are in the pay of the Russians and to detect Soviet operations against HOKKAIDO. In the event of a general emergency situation, the need for sonar equipped anti-submarine patrol ships of small size around Japan and for the protection of Japanese harbors would be acute.

b. I personally believe that the solution to this quandary lies in the formation of a small group of United States Naval Officers to study, plan, and direct the initiation of a small Japanese Navy.

This Japanese Navy need not be called a Navy. It can be called a Coast Guard or a sea police force or anything else. I think that four or five really good officers could handle the job.

c. I should think it might be desirable to augment this group of United States sailors with about ten Japanese ex-naval officers. This Japanese contingent would become the nucleus of the Japanese Navy Department. This joint group, at that stage, could then, as a first step, establish a small seagoing force perhaps of not over a half dozen patrol craft and a small officer and enlisted man training school.²⁵

While Burke was working with Nomura and Hoshina, Captain Gordon McGowan, the successor of Captain Meals as U.S. Coast Guard representative with SCAP, was working with the Maritime Safety Agency. Okubo Takeo had been replaced as Director General by Yanagisawa Yonekichi in May, 1951, and he and McGowan continued to strive to improve the caliber of the MSA. From its beginning, however, the agency had been plagued by bureaucratic in-fighting. Since it was put together from many unrelated groups, control was disputed, the Finance Ministry trying to have maritime safety under its domain as was the case at the time in the United States, the Coast Guard being under the Treasury Department. Even within the Transportation Ministry the

²⁵Excerpts of letter from Burke to Thach, with enclosure, of April 22, 1951; Burke papers, 1951.

MSA had been kept as an outside agency by Okubo who desired it to have a pure start. Yanagisawa naturally desired to see the MSA prosper under him, and Captain McGowan supported Yanagisawa, feeling that a coast guard organization was possibly all that Japan at the time could afford and that the MSA was the organization felt to be adequate for Japan by the GHQ of SCAP.²⁶

The former naval officers, on the other hand, had not been accustomed to a separate coast guard organization and felt the MSA to be inefficient and devoid of spirit necessary for a military force. They prepared a study (reference 6) which purported to show how the MSA was "totally" different from the United States Coast Guard; but other than pointing out that the MSA was self-declared nonmilitary in Article 25 of its founding statute while the American counterpart was declared to be military in the United States Code, they did not succeed in putting forth an impressive case. It appeared they feared that there would only be one organization, coast guard or navy; and

²⁶Letter to this writer from Captain Gordon McGowan, USCG (Ret.), December 29, 1970. Interviews with Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971, and Okubo, December 17, 1970.

of course they wanted the latter and tried to legislate the MSA out of existence.

In August, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida called Itoh Chubei, 83-year-old board chairman of a steel company who was soon going to the United States on an electric utilities survey mission; the following conversation between the two reportedly took place:

Yoshida: What do you think of armament?

Itoh: There is the problem of the Constitution, but Japan is like wearing a flannel kimono with only a small belt around it; she is almost bare. She must wear more so she can endure the wind and rain.

Yoshida: Come to the point a little bit more.

Itoh: I mean that without a single destroyer or a cruiser, Japan cannot expect to protect even one fishing boat.

Yoshida: That's right. In the past, Japan did some crazy things. That's true. But even so, it can't be that Japan cannot even have a "pencil sharpening knife." A country having no guns or cannons is helpless. When the right time comes, Japan is ready to have arms to defend the country. Japan should go hand in hand with the friendly nations of the Western bloc and while not invading other countries, it is necessary that steps be taken so that we will not be invaded. While you're in America, convey my true intentions when you meet the military authorities, bank presidents, and other leaders. Tell them that is the thought of the highest responsible person in government.

Itoh: You mean "the baby" was born despite the no, no.

Yoshida: That's just about it.²⁷

²⁷Quoted from "Japan's Peace and Security," Part III: The Security Treaty, number 6, "Birth of a

Although Itoh was supposedly too busy with other matters to convey Yoshida's message on rearmament, Burke's letter received attention in Washington. Nomura did much talking to friends like then CINCPAC, Admiral Radford; and after the signing of the Peace Treaty, the United States finally decided in early October to offer Japan the 18 patrol frigates returned by the Soviet Union, then still in Yokosuka harbor, and 50 landing craft which were in the United States.²⁸ The directive of President Truman did not clearly resolve the issue of the recipient organization of the vessels, a new navy or a new coast guard or the already existing Maritime Safety Agency. As SCAP transmitted the directive to COMNAVFE, the U.S. Navy was instructed that:

The Senior U.S. Naval Advisor, Maritime Safety Agency, shall keep SCAP informed of all action taken and obtain SCAP approval on all matters involving policy. Training the Japanese in American ways and techniques is the one most important item

Small Navy," The Mainichi Daily News, November 12, 1968.

²⁸Prior to leaving for the peace conference, Yoshida called Yamamoto and requested a naval rearmament plan. Yamamoto gave him a big navy plan which surprised Yoshida and the outline of an educational training system. Interview with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970.

connected with the entire program. The training given will determine the usefulness and dependability of the Japanese Security Force as a member of the United Nations team.²⁹

The new SCAP, General Matthew B. Ridgway, however, allowed COMNAVFE relatively free rein in naval matters; and Admiral Joy had no doubts as to what was to be done with the ships for Japan. As he and Nomura had discussed in January, as the latter's group had planned in April, as Burke had suggested to Washington later the same month, a new naval organization was to be created. It would grow up within and draw on some resources of the MSA; but this new force, the Coastal Security Force (Kaijo Keibitai) would be prepared to separate at any time as an independent naval nucleus.³⁰

The formal offer of ships was made by Ridgway to Yoshida on October 19, 1951. The SCAP told the Prime

²⁹ Copy provided by Captain Noble W. Abrahams, USN (Ret.). Captain Abrahams was the senior naval officer appointed to head the first MSA Advisory Group. I am indebted to him for providing me use of his advisory group files.

³⁰ Kaijo Keibitai literally translates to English as "maritime guard," the name referred to by the Japanese plan and Burke's letter in April. The English translations, however, as in the case of MSB(A) were often picked somewhat independently of the Japanese words to ease opposition within U.S. circles.

Minister that a force of 68 vessels--18 patrol frigates (PF's) and 50 large support landing ships (LSSL's)--could be made available to Japan if he desired, although legislation would be required. Yoshida accepted the offer.³¹

Nomura's actions had also resulted in Japanese agreement to the idea of a joint U.S.-Japanese research commission, the Japanese side of which, to ease political fears and for bureaucratic-financial reasons, would be organized within the Maritime Safety Agency. The Japanese contingent would be jointly headed by Director General Yanagisawa of MSA and one former naval officer. One day after the Ridgway-Yoshida meeting, Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki called in Yamamoto to tell him the Prime Minister desired that he head the group.

Okazaki told Yamamoto he would like him to organize a committee of ten members including Yanagisawa and one other member of MSA and eight former naval officers to study the use of vessels the United States had recently offered Japan. Yamamoto told him he would have to consider the offer; he immediately went to see Nomura who, to

³¹Nomura, "Recollections." Radford, Joy, and Nomura had in fact concluded the agreement; Ridgway and Yoshida made it official.

Yamamoto's surprise, knew all about the plan. Yamamoto thought that a senior officer such as Vice Admiral Hoshina or Fukutome should head the commission, but Nomura told Yamamoto to accept and that he and others would help in the background. Yamamoto accepted the offer with the words, "If you say build a small navy, I will undertake the job. But if it's a coast guard I will refuse." Privately, Okazaki agreed that such would be the case.³²

Yamamoto's choices of the seven other naval officers, a rear admiral and a captain who were purged and four captains and a commander from the Second Demobilization Liquidation Bureau including Nagasawa, Yoshida, and Teraï were all approved by Okazaki. Yanagisawa picked his operations chief, Mita and as an outside temporary committeeman, his deputy director, Yamazaki Kogoro, who, together with Captain Meals, had formally drafted the MSB law in 1947. The U.S. side of the organization was temporarily made up of two naval officers, two coast guard officers, and two civilians including the intelligence official who had been working with Captain Nagasawa since

³²Nomura, "Recollections." Interview with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970.

1949. Chief of the American side was Rear Admiral Ralph A. Oftsie, Chief of Staff for COMNAVFE. In December, 1951, the U.S. side was formalized as the MSA Advisory Group of four officers, two captains and two commanders--one of each group from the Navy and Coast Guard, headed by Navy Captain Noble W. Abrahams.

Although the new organization did not meet formally until November 2, on October 26, Admiral Oftsie summoned the two MSA members, Yamamoto and the other former rear admiral, Akishige Jitsue, and Captain Nagasawa to COMNAVFE headquarters. The American was very friendly and offered maximum cooperation but set the tone of how the U.S. Navy viewed the organization. All remarks concerning cooperation and assistance were directed to Yamamoto. Captain Abrahams stated that he was told immediately upon reporting for duty that a new navy was being born as an autonomous organization which, for political and financial reasons, had to be temporarily included under MSA in the Transportation Ministry.³³

³³ Interviews with Rear Admiral Akishige Jitsue, IJN (Ret.), October 31, 1970; Captain Abrahams, February 11, 1971; Yamamoto, December 28, 1970; and Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971.

The name "Y Committee" for the Japanese group was taken from the abbreviations used by the military before the end of the war, the Army as "A," the Navy as "B," and others (civilians) as "C." By reversing the alphabet the members came up with the Navy as "Y"; for anyone who might have objected in official circles was the easy explanation that "Y" stood for Yamamoto and Yanagisawa.³⁴

Formal meetings of the committee were held once each week and were pleasant and non-controversial. Subcommittees composed of regular members and their assistants met continuously. Both groups were primarily concerned with formulating lists of personnel to be admitted to the new organization to be created and in designing and implementing an educational curriculum for the new trainees.³⁵ The real problems were handled primarily behind the scenes by the four people on no subcommittees, Yamamoto and Nagasawa for

³⁴Interview with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970; Yoshida Eizo, December 25, 1970.

³⁵The only complete set of "Y Committee" proceedings known to exist is in the safe of the Chief of Maritime Staff JMSDF; individual members have partial proceedings. I am indebted to Admiral Uchida for providing access to the complete holdings and to RADM Yamamoto and Captain Abrahams for the loan of individual papers.

the Navy and Yanagisawa and Mita for the MSA.³⁶ Yamazaki also was a participant although theoretically not even a regular committee member.

The MSA had begun construction of new ships in 1949 and had serious doubts about the need of a new organization to handle the new frigates. The first proposal from the MSA side even before the "Y Committee" met was an idea to distribute the frigates and landing craft among the ten MSA districts. This was not agreeable to COMNAVFE or the Japanese Navy officers, and such a plan would have violated the assurance that Okazaki had given Yamamoto. The position of Yanagisawa then became that of treating the ships as a separate unit but keeping them organized much like one separate district under the centralized administration of MSA.³⁷ Yamamoto and Nagasawa strongly opposed this and there was even some sensitivity on the Japanese Navy side that there was a split between the U.S.

³⁶ Ibid., Interviews with Admiral Yamazaki Kogoro, JMSDF (Ret.) January 6, 1971; Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971, and Mita, December 7, 1970.


³⁷ Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970, Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971, and Yamazaki, January 6, 1971.

Navy and Coast Guard over what kind of an organization was going to be established.³⁸

The former naval officers had been planning for this since April, however, and were prepared with their own design. This was the plan for an extra-agency-bureau with completely autonomous administration and operation which could be separated from MSA at any time. Yamamoto's plan was as indicated in Chart V-3. To gain acceptance of the

³⁸Yamamoto reported in a memoir written in 1968 that the representatives of the MSA had a document from Captain McGowan which stated that the MSA would increase its capabilities with the help of the U.S. Coast Guard and which Yanagisawa and Mita would not show to the former Navy members of the committee. Captain McGowan who had been transferred as he personally requested from SCAP, officials of which might have felt a coast guard was sufficient, to COMNAVFE, which was very committed to a navy concept, stated he only was in favor of what was best and possible for the Japanese. Captain Abrahams similarly denied any U.S. Navy-Coast Guard misunderstanding. An MSA Advisory Group remained after the Keibitai split off in August, 1952, the U.S. Navy group then taking the formal name of the Naval Advisory Group. It seems that the Japanese assumed a Coast Guard-Navy friction among the U.S. organizations which has never been characteristic, as was developing among themselves and which has remained characteristic to the present day, at least on the bureaucratic level between the Japan Defense Agency and the MSA. Yamamoto's memoir is in Kaijo Jieitai Hatten no Omoide (Remembrances of the Development of the Maritime Self-Defense Force), Tokyo: Shiraume-kai, 1968. This volume had a limited circulation and was not sold. I am indebted to RADM Kikuchi Yoshinaga, Inspector-General of JMSDF and Secretary of Shiraume-kai, for providing me a copy.

ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN OF COASTAL SECURITY FORCE (KAIJO KEIBITAI)
(Implemented April 26, 1952)



Source:
Defense Agency,
Jieitai Jyunenshi
(Ten Year History of
the Self-Defense
Forces) Tokyo: Print-
ing Bureau, Ministry of
Finance, 1961.

idea he agreed to Yanagisawa's verdicts on key personnel. The first organization thus consisted of MSA men in the position of commandant, namely Yamazaki, and in the roles of division chiefs in three of the four headquarters divisions. Only Nagasawa as Chief of Operations was ex-Navy; and the MSA controlled all administration and, therefore, personnel; and all supply and accounts, and, therefore, livelihood.³⁹ Yanagisawa accepted this, first hoping to head the organization himself but then changing to Yamazaki for even higher personal goals. Yamamoto accepted this because he got the organization he wanted and because he felt the Coastal Security Force would break off from MSA and would eventually be controlled by former Navy men. This could be done by recruiting most of the new officers from ex-naval personnel and by eventually getting the high leadership positions.⁴⁰

³⁹Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970; Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971; Yamazaki, January 6, 1971; Mita, November 19, 1970, and Yoshida Eizo, December 25, 1970.

⁴⁰Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970; Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971, and others. In order to try to insure the top leadership would not stay among MSA personnel very long, at a joint meeting of key U.S. and Japanese officers, it was arranged that U.S. Navy

The Coastal Security Force, as planned by the "Y Committee" and the MSA Advisory Group, was designed to consist of 6038 personnel and to date from April 26, 1952. Training of 30 prospective officer instructors of future trainees by U.S. Navy instructors using one of the frigates to be loaned subsequently began quietly in Yokosuka on January 19, 1952, under most austere conditions.⁴¹ Its organization, as indicated by Chart V-3, was brought into

officers would express their real fears over the well being of their substantial investment of loaned vessels because of selection of key MSA personnel with little naval experience. The U.S. officers, who were willing to accept Yamazaki as a temporary political expedient, then asked who would someday succeed him. To this question came the reply that it would certainly be ex-Imperial Navy Captain Nagasawa. The Navy "Y Committee" members had wanted Yamamoto from the beginning but, like Tatsumi in the NPR, he refused. Nagasawa did replace Yamazaki. Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970; and Yoshida, December 25, 1970. Some former Imperial Navy officers, not happy with the small scale of rearmament to begin with, were very critical of the outcome of the "Y Committee" proceedings but continued supporting the rearmament movement and the small force created. Interviews with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970, and Akishige, October 31, 1970. Both Yanagisawa and Yamazaki stated in interviews that they later realized the wisdom and necessity of the Navy viewpoint.

⁴¹Trainees were billeted across the bay in a barracks on Taura Point to and from which they travelled by open boat each winter morning and evening. The barracks itself had many broken windows which were inconvenient during periods of snow. One wonders if the conditions were not

being as scheduled; but before the formal beginning, achieved by a Diet-passed amendment to the MSA law, a new problem had arisen, Japan's defense structure post-independence.

Prime Minister Yoshida was committed to America's "expectation that Japan will increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression" in the preamble to the first Security Treaty but had actually made a commitment to Dulles as early as January, 1951.⁴² When Ohashi Takeo took over Okazaki's role working on rearmament the same month, discussion soon came up as to what nature a Japanese defense force would take. Civilian chief Masuhara and uniformed chief Hayashi of the National Police Reserve honestly felt that the Imperial Army and Navy were each others' worst enemies, that any postwar organization should have a unified headquarters, and that personnel should perform tasks on the

better in 1855 in Nagasaki when Dutch officers trained the nucleus crews for the Tokugawa Navy.

⁴²Testimony of Okazaki Katsuo before the Commission on the Constitution, in Kempo Chosakai, Kempo Chosakai, Kempo Chosakai Dai 3 Jinkai Dai 30-kai Sokai Gijiroku, Tokyo: 1959, p. 8.

land and sea under the one staff. Several groups of former Army officers who felt they could control such a unified organization also supported this idea. Admiral Nomura and the former naval officers were strongly opposed, and Admiral Burke spoke to Prime Minister Yoshida about the matter, telling him of the unification difficulties and operational difficulties that the United States, Britain, and France were undergoing at the time.⁴³ Nomura, Hoshina, Yamamoto, and others lobbied strenuously among politicians and business leaders for a separate command and administration structure, stressing the danger of a unified command controlled by Army elements and pleading the necessity of a system of checks and balances.⁴⁴ State Minister Ohashi was won over to the Navy cause and eventually so was Yoshida, whom Masuhara and Hayashi had felt was originally leaning their way.⁴⁵ Yanagisawa yearned for the position

⁴³Nomura, "Recollections"; letter to this writer from Burke, December 1, 1970.

⁴⁴Nomura, "Recollections"; interviews with Hoshina, November 4, 1970, and Yamamoto, December 28, 1970.

⁴⁵Interviews with Masuhara, January 29, 1971, and Hayashi, January 5, 1971. It was rumored that both men would resign, but they indicated in interviews that they

as chief of the maritime side of a separate organization and thus agreed to including the MSA under the new security organization. The Navy won the battle to the extent that two separate uniformed offices were created for command, but a joint civilian administration along the lines of the idea of the United States Department of Defense was created rather than the separate uniformed administrations under the civilian Prime Minister as the naval officers favored. The contest of personalities was so strong that Prime Minister Yoshida stepped in as first Director General of the National Safety Force, a job that Ohashi had hoped for, and Yanagisawa remained in the MSA which was supposed to join the new body later.⁴⁶ The new

never seriously considered going that far. Hayashi, who headed the First Staff Office (ground) of the new National Safety Agency, was first Joint Staff Council Chairman of the Self-Defense Forces, and who remained in that position for ten years, stated that he later became convinced the Navy was right--with a unified command, the specialized functions of sea and air would suffer.

⁴⁶ Interview with Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971. Yoshida, of course, also took the position to ease the public's fears, much as Shidehara had done with the Demobilization Ministries. Mr. Kimura Tokutaru took over from Yoshida in October, 1952 and rejected the idea of MSA joining the National Safety Force. Yamazaki remained as naval chief. Interview with Mr. Kimura, December 17, 1970.

organization as of August 1, 1952, was as indicated in Chart V-4. The new Maritime Safety Force Keibitai (the English name continued to change more than the Japanese) had an authorized personnel increase to 7828 which was taken up primarily by the transfer of Tamura's minesweepers from the MSA at that time, thus giving the new Navy its first real ships. The minesweepers kept working at the same tasks occupying them from before the war; however, the U.S. Navy transferred two frigates and one landing craft to the Japanese under an official "inactive status in reserve" title so that operational training of larger groups of Japanese personnel could continue.⁴⁷


The former Navy officers' plan of April, 1951 had reached its goal. A nucleus Navy had been set up and split off from its parent body, the Maritime Safety Agency. The great majority of new officer personnel coming in were ex-Navy, and their experience was gaining them positions of responsibility. The only question remaining was, what was the Maritime Safety Force allowed to do.

The National Safety Agency's mission was spelled out in only the most general terms, to maintain peace and

⁴⁷ Interview with Abrahams, February 11, 1971.

CHART V-4

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF MARITIME SAFETY FORCE (KEIBITAI)
(Implemented August 1, 1952)



Source: Defense Agency, Jieitai Jyunenshi (Ten Year History of the Self-Defense Forces).

stability, to defend the citizenry, and to administer and supervise its forces. There was no mention of any duty or even authorization to repel external attack; and, of course, as far as the naval element was concerned, there were really no forces with which to do anything but mine-sweep or train. Even patrol was still done only by the Maritime Safety Agency.

From a standpoint of capability neither the Coastal Security Force (Kaijo Keibitai) nor the Maritime Safety Force (Keibitai) added anything to Japan's defense. The former had no operational forces at all, and the latter temporarily had only the minesweepers which were military but certainly were nothing new. What final points can be made then from the events of this period as to Japan's willingness or potential to defend itself? The following observations are offered for consideration. First, naval rearmament, which was supposedly begun with the 1952 forces, was not conceptually or operationally originated in 1952 nor solely resulted from the Korean War. Planning began in 1946; and Japanese politicians including Ashida, Hatoyama, and Yoshida early expressed their belief in the eventual necessity to have a naval force. Although more of

a case might be made that the American side was more influenced by the Korean War, it has been noted that the National Security Council decision on paramilitary activity was reached in 1948 and the U.S. Navy Liaison with the Demobilization Liquidation Bureau began regularly in 1949. Second, the only reason ever considered by the Japanese or American civilian and military officials for having a Japanese naval force was because of threats external to Japan. Both organizations created in 1952 were considered something more than the Maritime Safety Agency which was already externally oriented and was performing its own military operations. Both were further removed from the water police. Both were designed for the primary tasks of escort of shipping, patrol, minesweeping, and protection of fishing vessels. Any internal revolution or uprising on the sea seems never to have been contemplated. If only internal security had been the concern, it seems that a Navy would never have been organized. Third, planning for a naval force was mutual on both military and civilian levels. The inter-relationships between Nomura, Burke, Joy, and Hoshina were pointed out. Nomura conditioned Dulles' view of the size of forces Japan should have, and Burke conditioned Yoshida's

feelings about unification of forces. Dulles encouraged Nomura about U.S. support for Japan's rearmament, and Yoshida influenced Burke's thinking that Japanese armed forces must start small to be politically acceptable.⁴⁸ Ridgway asked Yoshida orally in 1951 if Japan wanted 68 United States Ships; Yoshida replied in the affirmative. Yoshida asked the United States in writing in 1952 if Japan could have United States ships; the United States replied in the affirmative. Fourth, despite intentions, planning, willingness, potential, continuing operations, and several naval organizations, no known defense policy or naval strategy for Japan existed through 1952 on the part of the United States or Japan. Although there was in the course of time and these steps a nucleus Navy recognized as such, it still had no forces that could realistically defend the country. There was no explicit authorization for Japanese forces to provide defense against external attack; there was no obligation on the part of the United States to provide that defense. United States Naval Forces remained in Japan throughout and

⁴⁸Dulles sent a special note of appreciation to Nomura when he left Japan for the last time in 1951; interview with Yamamoto, December 28, 1970.

after the Occupation; but there was no promise or commitment, other than physical presence as hostages, which was subject to change at any moment as it did early in the Korean War, although then U.S. ships did not go far away. But the Japanese nation had not been free to act while the Occupation was in effect. Thus the wisdom of Japan's policies cannot be criticized fairly during that period. What Japan did after regaining sovereignty was more of its own responsibility.⁴⁹

⁴⁹The story told in this chapter is true in every respect as far as my knowledge allows; however, because of possible sensitivities of persons still living and a few small details that remain classified, some opinions and viewpoints were not specifically identified and several events were not treated. In no case do I believe that the essential truth has been obscured by these deletions; I have prepared a personal memorandum for possible future release to cover these facts.

PART III

THE ROLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPAN MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

The naval events of the Occupation period were treated in great detail in Part II because the events of 1953-1971 are direct continuations of the aims, restraints, and organizational procedures of that period. Since the Peace Treaty, naval rearmament has proceeded slowly and continuously while Japan's maritime commerce has accelerated quickly and dynamically. During the period, United States aid provided the weapons Prime Minister Yoshida said would be necessary before Japan could ever defend itself. An explicit authorization and mission to repel external aggression was given to the defense forces. A nominal national defense policy was decided upon but has never been implemented with a definite strategy although the policy itself has remained in effect. And defense power was built up using some of Japan's own resources. These last

four occurrences are the subjects of Part III. Each will be studied chronologically from its inception to the end of the period; for with the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, it can be said that a new period of independence will begin in Japan. The last large issue remaining from the Second World War will have been settled; Japan has already been recognized as having arrived as an economic power. And the United States has served notice on its allies, including Japan, that they must provide the greatest share of their conventional defense. A study of what will happen next is speculation; the period now ending can hopefully be examined more precisely.

CHAPTER VI

UNITED STATES AID: THE FIRST POINT OF DEPARTURE, JANUARY 14, 1953

The United States assumed no obligation to defend Japan under the Security Treaty which went into effect on April 28, 1952, on the grounds that under the Vandenberg Resolution of May 19, 1948, the U.S. was prohibited from entering into collective security agreements with countries which did not provide for their own "continuous and effective self-help." Formally Japan had expressed only an "expectation" to assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression in the preamble to the Security Treaty.

Similarly, uncommitted to defending itself from external aggression, Japan could not qualify for aid under the Mutual Security Act assistance program which had commenced in October, 1951. Thus the loan of ships which had been discussed by Burke, Joy, Radford, Ridgway, Nomura, and

Yoshida had to be accomplished by some other vehicle. It was decided that the exchange would be accomplished by an executive agreement, but each government first gained the approval of its legislature. Diet approval came in late April, and the request was submitted to the United States just prior to the end of the Occupation.¹ Final U.S. Congressional action came on July 8, 1952; and the executive agreement was signed in Tokyo on November 12 of the

¹The question was raised in Diet interpellations as to the qualification of the ships as "war potential" which was forbidden by Article 9 of the Constitution. The government maintained the ships would not provide the ability to wage modern war and therefore would not constitute war potential. One opposition member suggested allowing a troop of boy scouts inspect the vessels and trusting their evaluation as to the true character. Final passage was obtained on April 24, 1952. Captain Nagasawa Ko had prepared a formal note of request for the Prime Minister; but having SCAP forward it before the treaty was effective was important, since after that SCAP could not originate any policy. Yoshida sent the request over Saturday morning at 10 AM and a U.S. Navy member of the advisory group wrote the message to Washington requesting the ships for the Army duty officer. The message was approved in principle and legislation could thus begin. Interview with RADM F. E. Fleck, USN (Ret.), February 23, 1971. Then Commander Fleck was a member of the advisory group and drafted the message.

same year.² The so-called Charter Party Agreement went into effect on December 27, 1952; and on January 14, 1953, the first six frigates and three landing craft were formally transferred to Japan.³ Admiral Nomura wept at the ceremony; Japan again had a Navy.

From February 16-December 23 the remainder of the frigates and landing craft were consigned to Japan as they were renovated and arrived from the United States. The total cost of the vessels when new was 73 million

²Similar to the Diet attitude, Congressional viewpoints looked to domestic U.S. considerations: "Mr. Speaker, the bill really boils down to just one issue. Unless we pass this bill and authorize the loan of these vessels, thus permitting the Japanese naval and coast guard forces to make security patrols of their own coasts, then our own naval forces from Korea or elsewhere will have to be assigned to carry out that security task which is so vital to our own defense. . . . The question is whether the Members of the House would prefer to have this coastal security job done by members of the Japanese Navy or . . . by American boys. . . ." House of Representatives, "Loan of Certain Naval Vessels to Government of Japan," Report Number 2195, Congressional Record 82D Congress, p. 8984. There was little further discussion.

³U.S. Department of State, "Charter for Lease of U.S. Vessels," United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS 2714, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958.

dollars. Additionally each frigate was given an approximately 250,000-dollar overhaul prior to being transferred.⁴ Under terms of the Charter Party Agreement, the vessels were loaned on a five year basis subject to renewal for another five years upon Japan's request.⁵ U.S. naval aid had just begun.

The United States hinted at much greater aid if Japan would assume military responsibilities. The primary American interest was the building up of Japan's land forces, and the primary Japanese desire was for economic aid. Protracted negotiations took place from July, 1953 to March, 1954, finally resulting in the signing of the "U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement" on March 8, 1954, whereby Japan, in return for American aid, promised to "make, consistent with the political and economic stability of Japan, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength . . ." and to "take all

⁴Interview with Captain Noble W. Abrahams, USN (Ret.), first Chief Naval Advisory Group, February 11, 1971.

⁵Article 6, Charter Party Agreement.

reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities. . . ."⁶

On March 14, a separate agreement for the loan of United States naval vessels under the provisions of the March 8th act was concluded in Tokyo. Under this agreement the United States loaned Japan 159 ships valued at nearly 80 million dollars. Included were eight destroyer-types, one submarine, four tank landing ships, numerous minecraft, and other combatant and support vessels.⁷ Before the expiration of the loans, correspondence has frequently resulted in the Secretary of the Navy declaring the ships excess to the needs of the United States and authorizing their transfer to Japan as "Grant Aid," a status under which the ships still belong to the United States but are transferred without stipulation of return date.

⁶Article 8, "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America 8 March 1954," in Headquarters United States Forces Japan, United States-Japan Treaties Agreements and Other Documents, Tokyo: USFJ, 1961, p. 50.

⁷Data provided by Mutual Defense Assistance Office, U.S. Government Tokyo; Jieitai (Self-Defense Forces), Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1968, pp. 271-74, 276.

In 1960, two new modern destroyers built in Japan by domestic industry funded as "Grant Aid--offshore procurement" (OSP) were transferred under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). As late as 1967 over 40 per cent of the tonnage of the Japanese Navy was made up of U.S.-owned ships.⁸

In addition to providing vessels, other forms of aid became authorized by and under the Military Assistance Program. The advisory group became the Navy Section, Military Assistance and Advisory Group, Japan (MAAG-J). Personnel expanded from the initial small group of officers to 20 officers and 27 enlisted men of the U.S. Navy. Navy Section reviewed the operations and administration of the newly designated Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) from its annual fleet exercises down to the costs of its band instruments. Japanese-speaking officers were assigned as available and insured that the warm relationship of Japanese and American naval officers of the past

⁸ Jieitai, p. 273; interview with Aso Shigeru, National Diet Library, December 14, 1960. Aso, as a Defense Agency lawyer, negotiated the arrangements for the OSP destroyers in 1957. Since 1969 the percentage of U.S.-owned ships in the MSDF has been reduced considerably with the completion of ships built in Japan.

and Occupation periods was brought into the new Navy.⁹

Continued close relationship was aided by the situation that developed with regard to naval aviation. Using arguments like Admiral Inoue had in 1941, former naval officers in 1951 put forth the case that control of the sea was of little value without control of the air; like those of Admiral Inoue, their arguments were not well received. Partially because of economic reasons which they themselves had pushed in 1951-1952 in support of ground and maritime air arms rather than favoring a separate air force organization, they almost lost any air arm at all in 1954. The U.S. Navy's prejudice in arguing for a separate Japanese Navy in 1952 was no different from the U.S. Air Force's support of a separate Japanese Air Force in 1954. Reflecting a debate that was going on in the

⁹Particularly valuable were Lieutenant Scribner McCoy, who was born and raised in Japan and who was later chosen as the only foreign member of a society founded by the first 30 trainees of Kaijo Keibitai, and Rear Admiral Redfield Mason, the first Chief of Navy Section, MAAG-J, whose Japanese-speaking knowledge was commendable for a foreign-born speaker. McCoy, now of Grumman International, Tokyo, still remembers Admiral Mason questioning why the piccolo case cost more than the piccolo; interview with McCoy, November 17, 1970.

United States itself, the American Air Force suggested that all aircraft be in the separate Air Self-Defense Force.

Certain former Japanese Navy officers who had been recruited to work on the new organization also supported this concept, including one who had been working with the group under Admiral Nomura.¹⁰

The civilian-run Japan Defense Agency did not have much experience in military planning and thus its officials were impressed mostly by the economic arguments. Through the impetus of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Prime Minister Yoshida, however, the JMSDF's chances improved.¹¹ Finally the matter came to a head during a

¹⁰Interview with Vice Admiral Terai Yoshimroi, JMSDF (Ret.), November 26, 1970. An ex-naval officer, Commander, later ASDF Lieutenant General, Okumia Masatake, supported the one service concept and still holds to it today. Interview with Okumia, December 7, 1970; see also Okumia, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December, 1965, pp. 27-35. Two former naval pilots, who planned and executed the Pearl Harbor attack, General Genda Minoru, ASDF (Ret.) and Captain Fuchida Mitsuo, IJN (Ret.), who was offered the position as first Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defense Force, both expressed their views that the MSDF should have a strong, independent air arm; interviews with Genda and Fuchida January 11, 1971 and December 5, 1970, respectively.

¹¹The Air Force had only sent a letter to the Director General of the Defense Agency. Interview with Kaihara Osamu, December 11, 1970.

conference between Kaihara Osamu of the Defense Section of the Defense Bureau, the strategic policy making organ of the Defense Agency, and Rear Admiral Terai Yoshimori, Chief of the Operations Division of the Maritime Staff Office (MSO). Kaihara asked Terai if the Navy would accept joint training of pilots if it got authorization to have its own anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Terai accepted, knowing that if he consulted with the Chief of Maritime Staff there would necessarily be numerous lengthy staff meetings which would result in the justification of a much larger force which would almost certainly be turned down and leave the MSDF with no aircraft at all.¹² The United States Navy subsequently provided the MSDF with 217 aircraft costing nearly 100 million dollars. Long-range ASW patrol aircraft built in Japan were partially funded by the United States to the extent of over 44 million dollars. By 1968 figures, the naval air strength was still made up of nearly 40 per cent U.S.-owned aircraft.¹³

¹²Interviews with Kaihara December 11, 1970, and Terai, November 26, 1970.

¹³Mutual Defense Assistance Office; Jieitai, pp. 274, 276. Unlike the case with ships, a significant percentage of MSDF aircraft today remains U.S.-owned.

Friendship was reinforced with the training of Japanese naval pilots by American officers in the United States and in Japan itself. With U.S. Navy support, the JMSDF finally got its own independent training program in 1969 which had been the goal from the outset, Terai only reluctantly having agreed to joint training, which subsequently proved inefficient, to save the naval air concept. The MSDF's training command became modeled on the U.S. Navy concept, and the "brown shoes" of the two navies drew very close in spirit and organization.¹⁴

Officers and enlisted men were sent to the United States for training in various operations and weapons systems. Training manuals, which had been supplied for the first recruits for the Kaijo Keibitai, were made available in greater quantities and scope along with

¹⁴Even after Terai accepted, the U.S. Navy balked at giving planes to be used by Air Force instructors and threatened the Defense Agency by letter with not providing training aircraft; thus only initial training was joint and very few U.S. Navy planes were ever used. Interviews with Mr. Raymond Y. Aka, Mutual Defense Assistance Office, August 19, 1970, Vice Admiral Samejima Hiroshi, Operations Division Chief MSDF, January 9, 1970, and Kaihara, December 11, 1970. Admiral Samejima, as a captain, was the first postwar naval attaché to Washington and promoted the cause of MSDF naval air among U.S. Navy officers there.

training aids, training ammunition, and other miscellaneous support items totalling over 115 million dollars. Before military assistance to Japan was concluded in 1967, over 320 million dollars had been provided to the MSDF.¹⁵ The total of annual Japanese Navy budgets, including salaries, from the beginning of Kaijo Keibitai in 1952 through the first six years amounted to less than this.¹⁶

In 1969 the name of MAAG-Japan was changed to the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO) by then a much

¹⁵ Interview with McCoy, November 17, 1970; Jieitai, p. 276.

¹⁶ Navy budget figures provided by Japan Defense Agency. Japan was also given economic aid in some invisible ways that are not often taken into account. One good example of such aid is the introduction of Japanese electronic, optical, and camera industries throughout the United States by returning American military men. Tests run by military electronic technicians and stereo and camera buffs testified to the improving quality of Japanese equipments; and free demonstrations soon were given in living rooms, dens, in photography contests, etc. across the United States. This kind of aid has continued unabated and, indeed, has grown despite the cutoff of direct U.S. military aid. For example, the U.S. Navy Exchange, Yokosuka division alone, did 19.6 million dollars worth of business in 1970; 51 per cent of that business was in Japanese goods, largely acoustic and optical equipment. The mail order division of the Army-Air Force Pacific Exchange System in Tachikawa, whose business is almost exclusively Japanese merchandise, averaged nine million dollars per month volume last year. Interview with Lieutenant Al Guild, U.S. Navy, Retail Sales Officer, Yokosuka Navy Exchange, April 14, 1971.

smaller organization of four civilian and six military personnel to provide liaison in technical research and development, an idea put forth in 1965 by an ASDF general. This office, headed by a U.S. military officer working under the direction of both the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific, provides assistance in foreign military sales including equipment and training and monitors the industrial security of U.S.-designed Japanese military equipment being co-produced by Japanese firms under license.¹⁷ The military assistance program is thus prepared for the new era of Japanese independence.

¹⁷Interviews with LCDR Charles A. Gertner, Jr. USN, Navy representative, MDAO, April 23, 1971, and Raymond Y. Aka, Interpreter Liaison/Security Officer, MDAO, April 30, 1971. Aka was a member of Government Section during the Occupation and interpreter for the Chief of MAAG-J, through its entire existence. He was recently honored for twenty years service to Japan's defense forces, the first American so decorated by the Japan Defense Agency Director General.

CHAPTER VII

DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION: THE

SECOND POINT OF DEPARTURE, JULY 1, 1954,

[PART 1:] SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE

JMSDF AND A NAVY

When I am asked whether Japan has an Army, a Navy, and an Air Force, I am obliged to answer that we do not, but that we have Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces.¹

In order to be eligible for large-scale U.S. aid, it was necessary that Japan commit itself to a detailed defense plan, but the National Safety Agency's mission did not even provide for defending the nation from external aggression. In 1952, Prime Minister Yoshida had insisted, "We will not rearm. To rearm we must ask the consent of the people and revise the Constitution."² Regardless, the

¹The opening sentence of Okumia Masatake, "Japan's Self-Defense Forces," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, p. 27.

²Quoted in "Kokkai Rongi no Naka no Jieitai" (The Self-Defense Forces in Diet Discussions), Keizai Orai,

Prime Minister did not choose that method in 1953 but instead maintained that Article 9 applied to war potential used as a means of settling international disputes and did not prohibit military power for self-defense. Rather than calling for new elections on the issue of revision of the Constitution, he sought the cooperation of the opposition for a more limited solution to the problem. On September 27, 1953, Yoshida and Shigemitsu Mamoru, President of the Progressive Party concluded an agreement stating that:

In consideration of the present international situation and the spirit of national independence which is arising within our country, we will clarify the policy of increasing our self-defense strength and establish a long-range defense plan in response to the gradual reduction of U.S. armed forces stationed in our country and in proportion to our national power. Together with this measure, as a first step, we will amend the Safety Agency Law in order to reorganize the Safety Forces into the Self-Defense Forces and to add the mission of defense of our country against direct aggression to the former's mission.³

June, 1967, p. 119.

³The Japan Liberal Party also agreed in principle to the communiqué. Text provided by Aso Shigeru, National Diet Library. Aso was formerly Chief of the Safety Agency's and Defense Agency's Legislative Bureau, drafted the founding laws of both organizations, and remains intimately familiar with the guidelines provided.

A committee of twelve members of the Safety Agency headed by Director General Kimura Tokutaro and including the Vice Ministers, ground and maritime Chiefs of Staff and their deputies, and several important civilian Bureau Chiefs was formed to amend the law of the Safety Agency.⁴ Based on the Yoshida-Shigemitsu memorandum, the Liberal, Progressive, and Japan Liberal Parties began negotiations to decide the essentials of the amendment. The Progressive Party at first maintained that a new basic law for national defense should be formulated; the party formed a Defense Special Committee headed by former Prime Minister Ashida Hitoshi and organized into three subcommittees to study the legal, constitutional, and economic problems related to defense; the other parties conducted similar investigations. On December 5, 1953, the three parties met together for the first time for negotiations on the new defense organization; they met eighteen times thereafter before two defense bills were produced by the Safety Agency committee. These were submitted to the Diet on March 11, 1954. In accordance with the Yoshida-Shigemitsu

⁴ Interview with Aso, April 10, 1971.

memorandum, the laws took the form of amendments to the Safety Agency Law; but, as was the case with the new Constitution, the amendments were in effect new laws. The Progressive Party was satisfied; the key points of the twin defense bills followed an outline most of which was proposed by its Defense Special Committee.⁵

On June 9, 1954, the Defense Agency Establishment Law totally amending the National Safety Agency Law of 1952 was passed; and on the same date, the Self-Defense Forces Law prescribing the mission, structure, organization, operation, and status of the armed forces was also passed. Both laws went into effect July 1, 1954. These laws have remained in effect to the present day; however, as during the Occupation, the nature of Japan's sea forces remains ambiguous. Despite the fact that the Constitution has never been revised, Japan has continued to maintain sea forces; and those sea forces have taken on more characteristics generally associated with a navy. But there remain

⁵"The Progressive Party's Defense Special Committee Five Year Defense Draft Program" (unpublished), May, 1954, pp. 31-35. English copy provided by Mr. R. Y. Aka, MDAO Tokyo.

great differences in the nature of the defense organization and in defense policy and, thus, ambiguity. These similarities and differences will now be explored.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE JAPAN MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE AND A NAVY

A. MISSION

The Progressive Party's Defense Special Committee had listed the chief objectives of prospective self-defense forces as follows:

1. To counter blockade of coastal waters by naval and air forces;
2. To resist the occupation of the coast lines, especially ports and harbors;
3. To defend the country against air raids or invasion by airborne troops;
4. To maintain domestic security.⁶

The Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 3, stated only the following:

The primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces shall be to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression for the purpose of preserving peace and the independence of the nation, and maintaining the national security and, if necessary, shall take charge of maintaining public order.

⁶Ibid., p. 3.

2. It shall be the mission of the Ground Self-Defense Force to conduct operations chiefly on the ground, and of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to conduct operations chiefly at sea, and of the Air Self-Defense Force to conduct operations chiefly in the air.⁷

More specific missions have been listed in MSDF public information brochures and have been heard in association with the types of weapons procured in future defense buildup plans; these will be discussed later; the missions stated in Article 3 remain the only ones ever legislatively authorized. Although containing no great detail, the missions listed in the basic law would not seem inconceivable for the defense organizations of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, etc.

B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

According to the Defense Agency Establishment Law the highest command is invested in the Prime Minister who is necessarily a civilian and is responsible to the Diet.⁸

⁷Self Defense Forces Law, Law No. 165, June 9, 1954. Article quoted is from Japan Defense Agency English translation (unpublished), p. 3.

⁸Defense Agency Establishment Law, Law No. 164, June 9, 1954.

Although ordinarily he must seek the consent of the Diet to order the Self-Defense Forces into action, in case of emergency he can order them directly, seeking Diet approval after the fact.


The National Defense Council was delayed in establishment because of political quarreling over the size and nature of Japan's defense buildup. In the interim the Cabinet Minister Defense Discussion Group was established in 1955. On June 3, 1956, The National Defense Council Establishment Bill was passed by the Diet and the Council came into existence on July 1, 1956. According to law, the National Defense Council is the highest advisory group available to the Prime Minister on defense matters and includes as statutory members the Prime Minister (as President), the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, the Director General of the Defense Agency, and the Director General of the Economic Planning Agency.

The Defense Agency (JDA) itself is the Prime Minister's executive organ for defense matters. It is an outside office of the Prime Minister but is headed by a Minister of State who is a member of the Cabinet and therefore necessarily a civilian. The Director General's two

deputies, the Parliamentary Vice Minister, responsible for political matters, and the Administrative Vice Minister, responsible for administering the agency, are both likewise required to be civilians. The Defense Agency organization also includes: nine civilian counsellors who assist the Director General in the formulation of basic policy concerning the specific functions of the agency; six internal subdivisions, all headed by civilians and known in toto as the Internal Bureau; the four member; all-uniformed Joint Staff Council, which advises the Director General on coordinated defense matters; the Ground, Maritime, and Air Staff Offices whose Chiefs of Staff are the Director General's highest professional advisors on matters pertaining to their respective forces and who carry out the Director General's orders as to operation and administration of their forces; and four affiliated organs all headed by civilians: the National Defense College, a high level research college providing education to senior uniformed and civilian officials and conducting research and study of war history; the Technical Research and Development Institute which conducts basic and applied research, development, test, and evaluation of weapons

and weapons systems; the Central Procurement Office which provides economical centralized procurement for the three forces; and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency which handles the real estate, maintenance, and construction needs of Japanese and U.S. forces and attempts to minimize the annoyances that the forces cause to people living near airports, to fishermen whose operating areas are restricted, etc. An organizational outline of the Defense Agency is shown in Chart VII-1.⁹

⁹The organization facts and data for charts used in this chapter are drawn from public information and documentary material prepared by units of the Japan Defense Agency, interviews, and personal knowledge. By virtue of Article 80 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, all or part of the Maritime Safety Agency can be placed under the command of the Director General of the Defense Agency if directed by the Prime Minister in times when the defense forces are ordered into operation. Placing the MSA under the Director General instead of under the MSDF resulted from the earlier resentment between MSA officials and former naval officers. Reportedly the MSA did not want to be subject to the organ it felt it mothered and the compromise wording of Article 80 resulted; interview with Yamaoka Ryohei, U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Tokyo, January 12, 1971; Yamaoka has worked with MSDF and MSA personnel for the U.S. Navy for 17 years. Of course the Defense Agency Director General could conceivably place MSA units under MSDF commanders if he had control of them and so desired.



Source: Japan Defense Agency


The Maritime Self-Defense Force within the Defense Agency is made up of the Maritime Staff Office and units and installations supervised by the Chief of Maritime Staff. Orders to operating units are transmitted by the Prime Minister through the Director General to individual units through the Chief of Maritime Staff. Upon commencement in 1954, the organization of the MSDF was as indicated in Chart VII-2.

The Maritime Staff Office (MSO) consists of six divisions, which serve as the Chief of Staff's organs for command and supervision of the MSDF. The basic organization and subdivisions of the MSO are as indicated in Chart VII-3.

The MSDF's major units are made up of the Self-Defense Fleet, Regional Districts, the Training Squadron, units directly under the Director General, and miscellaneous units such as schools, hospitals, etc. The Self-Defense Fleet contains the primary mobile operating forces of the MSDF which are engaged in training. It includes the Fleet Escort (destroyer) Force, Fleet Air Force, Minesweeping and Submarine Flotillas, and the Fleet

CHART VII-2


Organization of Maritime Self-Defense Force As of July 1, 1954



Source: Japan Defense Agency, Jieitai Junenshi (Ten Year History of the Self-Defense Forces), Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance, 1961, p. 153

CHART VII-3

Organization of Maritime Staff Office As of April 1, 1971



Source: Japan Defense Agency

Training Command.¹⁰ The sea around Japan is divided into five Regional Districts, each containing: a headquarters; coastal defense units such as destroyers, torpedo boats, subchasers, minesweepers and landing craft; and support units such as local bases, air stations, recruit training centers, etc. The Training Squadron, continuing directly the practice of the Imperial Navy, makes an overseas cruise each year, culminating a year of Officer Candidate School for prospective MSDF ensigns.¹¹ The units under the Director General are those called out for operations

¹⁰The designation of force, flotilla, division, etc. has been evolutionary with the expansion of the MSDF, i.e., when enough units of a particular type of ship are obtained the next higher command unit is created, e.g., more than two destroyers form an "escort division" while more than four can result in two divisions then organized into an "escort flotilla." In addition to new names additional command staffs are thus created. Compare, for example, Charts VII-2 and VII-4. The Fleet Training Command includes shore based training units assigned to fleet headquarters units to conduct training ashore and provides ship-riders for training and evaluation of underway units.

¹¹For the history of the Training Squadron from its beginning in 1875 through the 1970 cruise see Commander Seno Sadao, JMSDF, Enyo Kokai Yowa (Episodes of the Training Squadron), Tokyo: Daiwa Associates, 1971. The first cruise of the Imperial Navy was to Hawaii (then the Sandwich Islands), as was the first of the MSDF in 1957.


other than training, such as those engaged in disaster relief; until 1969 included in this category was a squadron still sweeping the mines laid in the seas surrounding Japan in World War II.¹² The organization as it existed in 1971 is as indicated in Chart VII-4.

Judging by the organizations prescribed by the basic laws and as pictured in the usual organizational block diagrams, it would again seem not unusual to expect this was a navy within a defense organization in a progressive country where the civilian government runs the military. Some of the names sound a little unusual but are more politically and publicly acceptable equivalents of U.S. organizations and units on which their designs are based. Table VII-5 lists some of the commonly used terms.

¹²Although all mines were still not completely swept upon the transfer of the minesweepers to the Self-Defense Fleet in 1969, those remaining were in very shallow water where conventional minesweepers were not able to sweep. This transfer signaled an end to the special mission for regular minesweepers begun in 1945 and administered and carried out thereafter by the Navy Ministry, Second Demobilization Ministry, Second Demobilization Bureau of Demobilization Board, Second Bureau of Prime Minister's Office, Second Demobilization Bureau Liquidation Division of Demobilization Bureau of Welfare Ministry, Maritime Safety Agency of Transportation Ministry, Maritime Safety Force of National Safety Agency, and Maritime Self-Defense Force of Defense Agency.

CHART VII-4

ORGANIZATION OF THE MARITIME SELF DEFENSE FORCE
AS OF APRIL 1, 1971



- 1st Minesweeper Flotilla
 - Minsweeper Divisions
 - 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla
 - Minesweeper Divisions
 - 1st Submarine Flotilla (Kure)
 - Fleet Training Command (Yokosuka)
 - Fleet Training Groups
 - Other Units under Direct Command
 - Yokosuka Regional District
 - Kure Regional District
 - Sasebo Regional District
 - Maizuru Regional District
 - Ominato Regional District
- Typical Regional Districts includes:
- Headquarters
 - Escort Units
 - Patrol Units
 - Subchaser Units
 - Minesweeper Units
 - Torpedo Boat Units
 - Landing Craft Units
 - Local Bases
 - Air Stations
 - Recruit Training Center
 - Communications Station
 - Base Oper. and Activ.
 - Base Activ. Unit
 - Base Oper. Unit
- Air
 - Training Command
 - Headquarters, Air Training Command (Utsunomiya)
 - Kanoya Air Training Group
 - Utsunomiya Air Training Group
 - Ozuki Air Training Group (Shimonoseki)
 - Other Units under Direct Command
 - MSDF Staff College (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)
 - MSDF Officer Candidate School (Etajima Town, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture)

- MSDF 1st Service School (Etajima Town, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture)
- MSDF 2nd Service School (Yokosuka)
- MSDF 3rd Service School (Shonan Town, Higashi-Katsushika-Gun, Chiba Prefecture)
- MSDF Youth Basic Service School (Etajima Town, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture)
- MSDF Yokosuka Hospital (Yokosuka)
- MSDF Etajima Hospital (Etajima Town, Aki-Gun, Hiroshima Prefecture)
- MSDF Maizuru Hospital (Maizuru)
- MSDF Ominato Hospital (Mutsu)
- Other Units under the Director General's Direct Command

Miscellaneous Units including:

Central Communications Center

Oceanographic Unit

Print Supply Unit

MSDF Intelligence Service Unit

Operational Development Group

MSDF Shore Police Command

Supply Demand Control Point

MSDF Tokyo Band

MSDF Tokyo Service Activity

TABLE VII-5

EQUIVALENT ENGLISH ORGANIZATIONAL TERMS

JAPANESE ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT	U.S. ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT
National Security Organization	
NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL (NDC)	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)
JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA)	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)
INTERNAL BUREAUS	OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD)
	OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF ARMY
	OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF NAVY
	OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF AIR FORCE
CENTRAL PROCUREMENT AGENCY	DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY (DSA)
NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE	NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
DEFENSE ACADEMY	U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY (USMA)
	U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY (USNA)
	U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY (USAF)
Joint Uniformed Command Organization	
JOINT STAFF COUNCIL (JSC)	JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)
JOINT SERVICE STAFF COLLEGE	ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
Sea Force Organization	
JAPAN MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE (JMSDF)	UNITED STATES NAVY (USN)

TABLE VII-5--Continued

JAPANESE ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT	U.S. ORGANIZATIONAL UNIT
<u>Sea Force Organization--Continued</u>	
CHIEF OF THE MARITIME STAFF (CMS)	CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (CNO)
MARITIME STAFF OFFICE (MSO)	OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OPNAV)
SELF-DEFENSE FLEET	ATLANTIC FLEET (LANTFLT)
REGIONAL DISTRICT	PACIFIC FLEET (PACFLT)
	SEA FRONTIER
	NAVAL DISTRICT
JAPAN DEFENSE SHIP MAKIGUMO	UNITED STATES SHIP DEHAVEN
ESCORT SHIP 114	DESTROYER 727
JDS MAKIGUMO (DDK 114)	USS DEHAVEN (DD 727)
MARITIME STAFF COLLEGE	NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
ESCORT FLOTILLA	DESTROYER FLOTILLA (DESFLT)
ESCORT DIVISION	DESTROYER DIVISION (DESDIV)
FLEET AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR FORCE ATLANTIC (NAVAIRLANT)
	NAVAL AIR FORCE PACIFIC (NAVAIRPAC)

Source: Japan Defense Agency.

C. EQUIPMENT

The equipment of the MSDF is not atypical of what a modern navy would be expected to have. Starting out with a few old minesweeping craft and the patrol frigates and landing craft loaned by the United States, the MSDF grew with further loans from the United States and the domestic production of both ships and aircraft. Destroyers, escort destroyers, and a guided-missile destroyer are now included in the anti-submarine forces of the Self-Defense Fleet; construction has already begun on a manned helicopter-carrying frigate; drone helicopters are already in service on some ships. The present minesweeping force has already been mentioned as among the best in the world; the designs of the most recent models are regarded as the most advanced known to any navy. Patrol craft include standard types as well as new torpedo boats and hydrofoils. Landing craft of large and small variety, although now generally old, are still available as is the world's largest and most modern merchant fleet replete with tankers and large fast ferries suitable for transporting tanks, troops, and heavy equipment, if converted, which could possibly be made available

with emergency legislation in time of crisis. Present support vessels also include an oiler (tanker), ice-breaker, and hydrographic research vessels. Aircraft are almost exclusively oriented towards anti-submarine warfare with long and short-range ASW search and attack fixed wing craft, anti-submarine helicopters, and, recently, a new ASW and rescue flying boat (PS 1), regarded as the most capable craft of its type ever built.

In these general ways, the MSDF seems very much like a navy. There are some unusual aspects, however, that make it unlike the sea forces of other nations.

CHAPTER VIII

[PART 2:] DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE AND A NAVY

A. NO SYSTEM OF MILITARY LAW

In addition to Article 9, other provisions of the Japan's postwar Constitution have, at least by interpretation, hindered the establishment of essential elements of most national military systems. Military justice, characteristic to most national forces, is one element absent in the Self-Defense Forces.

Article 76 of the Constitution states:

The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.

No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial power.

All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws.¹

¹From "The Constitution of Japan" as contained in The National Diet Japan, official English edition published by the National Diet, Tokyo: 1967, p. 19.

This article is interpreted as preventing any system of court martial, and thus no provisions for a system of justice were inserted in the Self-Defense Forces Law. Any defendant who is accused of a crime is brought before a civil court and is represented by personal counsel. This lawyer must be given access to classified information and material necessary for the defense of his client, complicating the security problem for the uniformed forces.

Articles 118 through 122 of the Self-Defense Forces Law do call for prison sentences up to seven years or fines up to 50,000 yen (138 dollars) for violating security requirements, engaging in private enterprise illegally, using weapons illegally, forming a union, destroying weapons, or failing to follow orders in defense or police operations; however, these provisions have only rarely been exercised as it is feared such practice will provide an opportunity for challenge of the legality of the law.²

²Self-Defense Forces Law, Defense Agency translation, pp. 39-41. Such a challenge took place in 1967 when the law was used to indict two Hokkaido brothers

There is room for administrative punishment in the MSDF based on Article 46 of the Self-Defense Forces Law:

Dismissal, demotion, suspension, forfeiture of pay, or reprimand shall be enacted against Self-Defense Force personnel coming under the following categories:

1. In the event of violation or negligence of duty;
2. In the event of conduct unbecoming a member of the Self-Defense Forces;
3. In the event of violating this law or any order based on this law.³

Thus to take care of violations of procedures such as reporting late, fighting, drunkenness on duty, etc., commanding officers of ships and unit commanders ashore are authorized to take administrative measures such as oral and written warnings, suspension from duty, reduction in salary, and dismissal from the MSDF. A guidebook for standards to be applied and appropriate measures to be taken is put out by the Maritime Staff Office; fines are recommended only for the most serious cases of negligence in a command status and then do not reach three months

charged with violation of Article 121 of the SDF Law for cutting communication wires near a firing range after being irritated by the noise of a training exercise. For details of the challenge see below.

³Ibid., p. 17.

salary.⁴ Dismissal is the most severe measure authorized, and its exercise is allowed only by a Regional District Commandant in the case of an enlisted man and by the Chief of Maritime Staff in the case of an officer.

B. NO NATIONAL SECURITY LAW

Although no attempt has ever been made to enact a national security law, there is no political party known to be willing or interested in passing one because of anticipated accusations of violating Chapter III of the Constitution which covers rights and duties of the people. Article 21 of that chapter states:

Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.

No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.⁵

This has led to problems with the United States because of Article 3 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement

⁴Chokai Shobun To no Kijun ni Kansuru Tatsu (Order Concerning the Standard of Punishment), Tokyo: Maritime Self-Defense Force, Defense Agency, 1961.

⁵"The Constitution of Japan," p. 30.

which states in part that:

Each Government will take such security measures as agreed upon between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified articles, services, or information furnished by the other Government pursuant to the present agreement.⁶

Loans of classified U.S. equipment made such assurances desired; a MSA secrets protection law does theoretically bind all Japanese citizens, but the law has never been used in a conviction, and; because of doubts that it will be enforced, the American Navy has been limited in the amount of information it has been willing to give and in the types of cooperation it might otherwise seek with Japan. Although, as of October 1968, 4700 items were designated as classified under the provisions of Article 3, only one person has ever been charged with violating the MSA secrets protection law which allows for confinement at hard labor for up to five years or fines of up to 50,000 yen; the individual case charged did not result in an indictment.⁷ For the future, sharing of information with regard

⁶"Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America 8 March 1954," p. 54.

⁷"Protection of Secrets" in the series "Japan's Peace and Security," Mainichi Daily News, November 30, 1968.

to nuclear propulsion looms as a big problem for the United States and the JMSDF if Japan is to continue the present security practices and any sharing or cooperation is desired.

The Self-Defense Forces Law does provide for the protection of information among its own forces in Article 59:

Self-Defense Force personnel shall not divulge any secret which may have come to their knowledge in the performance of their duties. This shall also apply even after personnel have been separated from the service.

2. In the event Self-Defense Force personnel are required to make a statement concerning any secret in line with their duties as witnesses as prescribed by law, they shall be required to obtain the permission of the Director General. This shall also apply even after personnel have been separated from service.⁸

This law has been exercised once, by the Tokyo District Court in the case of an Air Self-Defense Force colonel convicted of providing plans for an electronic air raid alert system to an employee of an American aircraft company. The officer was sentenced to six months at hard labor, suspended for two years.⁹ But the great mass of the

⁸Self Defense Forces Law, translation, p. 19.

⁹The Japan Times, January 24, 1971. The January, 1971 conviction which will be appealed was for an offense

populace is free from obligations with regard to all but U.S.-MSA-classified information; thus, newspapers feel an incentive to learn information classified by the Self-Defense Forces in order to publish "scoops" which the Japanese press thrive on. One recent example involving the MSDF was the joint training exercise held by MSDF destroyers and an American nuclear submarine; the story appeared as a headline in the morning edition of Asahi-Shimbun and necessitated a statement later in the day by the Defense Agency Director General that such training had in fact taken place.¹⁰ Opposition parties also have no hesitation about revealing classified information for their own benefit; a so-called "Three Arrows" plan was exposed by Socialist Diet members in 1968 and exaggerated beyond its actual content to indicate that firm plans for Japanese deployment to Korea with the United States in case of aggression were in effect.¹¹ By finally admitting

that occurred over five years previous and took over two years in court alone.

¹⁰ Interview with Taoka Shunji, Asahi Shimbun, March 18, 1971, the night before the "scoop" appeared. The scoop belonged to Taoka.

¹¹ "In Case of Emergency," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, December 3, 1968.

that a "Three Arrows" study did exist, the government gave credibility to the exaggerated story.

C. CONSCRIPTION DOES NOT EXIST

Conscription is not specifically forbidden by the Constitution although Article 18 does prohibit involuntary servitude. At the time the Self-Defense Forces Law was written, no thought was given to a draft system. The forces were to be small; there were no immediate problems in obtaining the necessary volunteers; and there was a natural and strong sentiment against conscription.¹² Recently, however, SDF recruits have been becoming increasingly more scarce; a smaller youthful population, an expanding economy, and the Japanese tendency of "my homeism" are starting to plague the MSDF (and the other military services) whose ships are increasingly achieving ability to serve sustained periods at sea. Volunteers who once averaged almost twenty for each vacancy over an annual period have fallen to almost a one to one ratio with

¹²Interview with Aso Shigeru, April 10, 1971.

requirements recently.¹³ There are no provisions for a draft, even in time of emergency; and under normal circumstances any member is free to resign at any time. Article 40 of the Self-Defense Forces Law does provide the Director General an option of freezing the present strength in a crisis situation:

When the Director General, or an individual designated by him, deems that the accomplishment of the missions of the Self-Defense Forces is greatly impeded by the approval of a resignation tendered by any Self-Defense Force member, except in cases where there are specific reasons for resignation as prescribed by Cabinet Order, he may disapprove the resignation for a period as stated within the previously fixed term of enlistment in case of Leading Privates and below, Leading Seamen and below, and Airmen First Class and below, and for the minimum period required to accomplish the mission of the Self-Defense Forces in the case of other personnel.¹⁴

This provision has never been exercised.

Recently, talk about conscription has been heard associated with the first white paper on defense issued in late 1970. Since the Self-Defense Forces are already lacking personnel and a large increase in defense spending is

¹³Official Defense Agency figures show a ratio of 19.7:1 for the MSDF in 1958. The one to one figures first appeared in 1969. For more detailed figures, see Chapter XI.

¹⁴Self-Defense Forces Law, translation, p. 15.

programed for fiscal years 1972-1976, some fears about a movement for a draft system have been heard. Reportedly, handsome and personable Defense Agency Director General Nakasone Yasuhiro, known to have ambitions of becoming Prime Minister in the 1970's, wanted a brief statement inserted in the white paper in the section entitled "Fundamentals of National Defense" that "A conscription system will not be adopted." This statement was supposedly removed at the last moment because of objections by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau since "it was not necessary to mention this" and since there exists a minority opinion that "conscription is not unconstitutional."¹⁵ The same statement on conscription then appeared in a message issued on the occasion of the publishing of the white paper by Minister Nakasone; this message was printed in the same volume, immediately prior to the basic text, which was translated, published, and distributed by the Defense Agency.¹⁶ Some adverse foreign reaction based

¹⁵ Murata Kyoaki, "The Spector of Conscription," The Japan Times, November 6, 1970.

¹⁶ The Defense of Japan, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1970, p. ii.

on fears of resurgent Japanese militarism was heard, however, because of the fact that conscription was not specifically banned in the basic text itself. Such reaction only serves to increase the political unacceptability of any type of conscription system in the future.

D. INCOMPLETE EMERGENCY MEASURES

From the above description it is obvious that one problem in an emergency could be personnel. The MSDF presently has a reserve force of 300 and hoped to expand it to 3000 in 1971; GSDF and ASDF reserves are also proportionately small; there are no adequate reserve training programs and equipments; and there is nothing that would prevent a reservist from quitting if he thought a dangerous situation was approaching. In order to augment the regular forces adequately to meet an emergency, former Defense Agency Director General and presently Speaker of the House of Representatives, Funada Naka, in 1969 proposed the formation of a one-million-man "local defense corps" to be composed of volunteers who would receive training and be subject to call in times of emergency,

somewhat in the way in which Switzerland and Sweden provide for their security. Cartoons appeared of Funada in military uniform just as Ashida Hitoshi had been pictured in the early 1950's. Although he feels the time was not right when he originally proposed it, Funada feels such a system might be more acceptable than conscription at some future date.¹⁷

In addition to personnel inadequacies, there are no measures to provide for special controls over and administration of public utilities and services in time of crisis. With the meager amount of support craft possessed by the MSDF some kind of additional augmentation would certainly be necessary if it were required to ferry troops, ammunition and fuel even around the Japanese islands. Whereas, in the time of the Imperial Navy, shipbuilding companies were augmented in the construction of ships specifically so that they might become utilized by the Navy in time of war, there is presently no such system. Although it is hard to imagine that MSDF leaders would be so irresponsible as to not have done some thinking

¹⁷ Interview with Speaker Funada, January 23, 1971.

about which types of Japanese merchant ships might be useful, any authorization to utilize such shipping would most likely have to be the result of emergency legislation in time of crisis. In the present situation, there can be no effective planning for a Naval Control of Shipping organization, and there has never been even a coordinated emergency exercise of cooperation between the MSDF and the MSA which are authorized possible emergency joint operations. Rail and air transportation, communications, oil stockpiles and other logistic items similarly lack any emergency administrative authorization.

E. UNIQUE CIVILIAN CONTROL

Although civilian control is not unusual among the military forces of many nations, the situation in Japan is unusual and generally poorly understood; therefore the status and history of civilian control will be described in some detail.

The "safety officials" for the Maritime Safety Agency's key Patrol and Rescue and Fairway Safety Divisions were, of necessity, drawn from former Imperial

Navy personnel, while the key positions within the central administration were drawn generally persons from the Transportation Ministry and other agencies that had been involved in maritime safety functions. Because of small numbers involved and the personalities of Okubo Takeo and Yamamoto Yoshio there were no serious problems.

Civilian control and supremacy were the foundation stones of the Japanese ground armed forces organized in 1950; the American Occupation authorities insisted upon the concept and the Japanese government eagerly agreed in the belief that lack of control over the Imperial Army and Navy had led to the adventures in China in the 1930's, World War II, and finally occupation by a foreign army. Some officers for the National Police Reserve were, as those for the naval forces started earlier, picked from former Army personnel; but key permanent positions within what was to become the National Safety Agency in 1952 and the Defense Agency in 1954 were generally filled by civil officials from the National Police Agency and the old Home Ministry, which in prewar times had authority over the police, elections, and local government; a very few Transportation Ministry officials were also admitted.

In contrast to cases such as the United States and Britain, the problems of national defense and of military affairs were almost completely absent from the concerns of civil leaders in prewar Japan; even broad national strategy considerations were monopolized by the military. Public discussions of military affairs and defense strategy were discouraged, if not suppressed; in the Diet little explanation was given to military-originated legislation and military appropriations bills. Military topics covered in civilian universities and in the press were superficial; public officials were either exempted from military service or given insignificant positions. With this lack of experience in mind, the first hasty solution to the problem of exercising civilian control of the post-Korean War forces was to bring over the police officials and bureaucrats from the old Home Ministry. Their strength was their administrative ability and experience, buttressed by the fact that many of the brightest graduates of the nation's best schools, then as now, were attracted to police careers. Their weakness was their ignorance of military matters.

Another feature of the solution, again hasty, was to bring in selected officials from other government ministries such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the Finance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the Health and Welfare Ministry to take charge of those positions requiring specific expertise in fields such as procurement, budget, liaison with foreign countries, and military medicine. These "other-ministry" people took over many areas in the Internal Bureau which holds much of the real power in the Defense Agency today. Because of government hesitancy in defense matters, the Finance Ministry, particularly, has almost a power monopoly. Thus many key men, bureau directors and their section chiefs, are not of the Defense Agency itself; their bureaucratic loyalties lie elsewhere; and their interests are temporary, inasmuch as they stay at the Defense Agency only two to three years and then return to their own ministries or retire.

To avoid having to rely so heavily on outsiders, in 1955 the Defense Agency began recruiting high-caliber university graduates from the Law Faculties of Tokyo and Kyoto Universities, the traditional training grounds for

Japan's bureaucratic elite. An average of slightly more than three persons have been hired each year since the program began; so far all are moving up into responsible positions in accordance with their abilities, but only one, in April, 1971, has reached the section chief level and several more are near. Some opposition from the "other ministries" is expected as new section heads are appointed as the bureaucratic battle will determine how the political power structure exercises civilian control over the military in the future.

Presently the Internal Bureau constitutes the center of power within the Defense Agency and is the main instrument whereby civilian control is exercised. The bureau directors, who also hold the title of Defense Agency Counsellors, meet once or twice each week with four other counsellors, the Administrative Vice Minister, and the Director General as the Counsellors' Council. Uniformed officers from the Joint Staff Council attend some meetings but only in the role of technical experts to be called upon for answers to specific questions. The make-up of the Counsellors' Council is as listed in Table VIII-1.

TABLE VIII-1

MEMBERS OF THE COUNSELLORS COUNCIL (SANJIKAN KAIGI)
APRIL, 1971

Title	Name	Original Ministry
Director General Japan Defense Agency	Nakasone Yasuhiro	Career Politician
Administrative Vice Minister	Utsumi Hitoshi	Police
Deputy Admini- strative Vice Minister and Chief of the Di- rector General's Secretariate	Shishido Motoo	Police
Director, Defense Bureau	Kubo Takuya	Police
Director, Person- nel and Education Bureau	Eto Juno	Home Ministry
Director, Health and Medical Bureau	Suzuki Kazuo	Health and Welfare Ministry*
Director, Finance Bureau	Tashiro Kazumasa	Finance Ministry*
Director, Equip- ment Bureau	Kabaya Tomoyoshi	Ministry of Inter- national Trade and Industry*
Counsellor for Research and Development	Natsumura Shigeo	Tokyo University

TABLE VIII-1--Continued

Title	Name	Original Ministry
Counsellor for Training	Takase Tadao	Home Ministry
Counsellor for Installations and Facilities	Tsurusaki Satoshi	Private Industry
Counsellor for Foreign Liaison	Suzuki Tateo	Foreign Ministry*

Source: Japan Defense Agency

*Indicates incumbent's assignment is short term.

The predominance of former police officials and bureaucrats from the old Home Ministry has often extended to three of the four major auxiliary organs of the Defense Agency: the Defense Academy, the National Defense College, and the Central Procurement Office. In 1971 the National Defense College and the Central Procurement Office were headed by former police; revealingly, Yamada Masao, the President of the former was also a retired Chief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force, a position that is usually

rotated between a former Imperial Army officer and an ex-police official.

On the controlled or military side, the highest organ is the Joint Staff Council (JSC) composed of the Chairman and Chiefs of Staff from each of the uniformed services. The first Chairman, General Hayashi Keizo of the GSDF, held the position for ten years; not surprisingly, General Hayashi was a former Home Ministry official. Since 1964, former military officers have held the position, usually for two years. As of April, 1971, the chairman was Admiral Itaya Takaichi of the MSDF.

Although the concept of civilian control is welcomed by an overwhelming majority of MSDF officers, many of them today have a rather low opinion of the present system and of some of their civilian superiors. This has partially resulted from the arrogant attitude and open contempt of some of the civilian officials toward the military and the use of senior military men in menial messenger jobs as collectors of statistics and data. Another reason the present system is disliked is the small degree of voice uniformed officers have even in matters directly affecting them and their equipment.

Only one uniformed member, General Genda Minoru of the ASDF who was asked to explain about the F-104 jet aircraft, has ever appeared before the Diet. If the Director General, who has usually been a short-term political appointee with no military expertise, disagrees with the unanimous position of the Joint Staff Council, there is no institutionalized channel whereby any of the chiefs can gain access to the Diet or the Prime Minister. The Prime Ministers have scarcely known uniformed leaders and have met with them very infrequently.¹⁸

Director General Nakasone has often said that civilian control should be "improved" and "perfected." When asked if that meant increasing the power of the civilians over the military or giving the military more control over their own affairs, he replied, "both."¹⁹

¹⁸A revealing but amusing example of the extremely low profile of the uniformed Chiefs of Staff is provided by the invitation of Joint Staff Council Chairman Itaya, then Chief of Maritime Staff, to a garden party given by Prime Minister Sato in 1968. Admiral Itaya, in dress uniform, was approached by the Prime Minister's protocol officer and asked in English what country he came from. The good natured Itaya, a fluent English speaker who studied at the U.S. Naval War College, reportedly replied in English, "I come from a small island country by the name of Japan." Interview with General Okumia, December 7, 1970.

¹⁹Interview with Minister Nakasone, January 18, 1971.

Personal relations among Japanese are at best well-defined, with great emphasis on who is junior and who is senior. It is very clear that the civilians today are senior in most aspects and that civilian-military relations within the Defense Agency are today very rigid.

The former policemen and outside-ministry people naturally have an interest in continuing civilian control in its present form, and it seems probable that the shape of the system is bound up with the bureaucratic fortunes of the new professional Defense Agency civilians. The views of uniformed personnel will seemingly have little immediate influence on any evolution in the system. The Finance Ministry can help the Defense Agency civilians by cooperating with them on budgetary matters as those with Finance Ministry support can influence key decisions in Japan; however, the Finance Ministry is part of the outside power group within the Defense Agency and may resist any move which might endanger its own predominant position there. One possible outcome is an arrangement whereby the new civilians and outside ministry people unite to squeeze out the police, all groups continuing to restrain the uniformed services. If the Defense Agency

can finally make its long-desired jump to full Ministry status, there would be bureaucratic and financial expansion and experts feel that the new Defense Agency civilians would then probably triumph over all other groups.

F. WAR POTENTIAL IS PROHIBITED

One of the greatest contributors to attacks on the legitimacy of the Self-Defense Forces has been the inconsistent Japanese government effort to maintain that "war potential," which the government states is forbidden by Article 9, can be differentiated from "defense potential." Initially Prime Minister Yoshida maintained that the forerunners of the Self-Defense Forces were not unconstitutional because they had no capability to wage modern warfare and were thus no threat to anyone. In 1952 Director General Kimura of the Safety Agency maintained in the Diet that "defense potential" allowed a weapon such as a howitzer which he was defending against criticism at the time; when asked to give an example of war potential which was not allowed, he said a jet airplane would be such an example.²⁰ Of course today jet airplanes

²⁰Interview with former Director General Kimura, December 17, 1970.

are a front-line item in Japan's defense arsenal, but the war potential ban is still given considerable attention in political arguments.

The Supreme Court has not clarified the situation with regard to war potential. In the so-called "Sunakawa Case" the court's decision of December 16, 1959, stated that self-defense was not denied to Japan as an inherent sovereign right but scrupulously avoided the issue of the possibility of maintaining war potential for self-defense. It is interesting to note that despite the fact that "war potential" is still denied legitimacy and in doubt constitutionally, the primary orientation of the MSDF in equipment and training is toward anti-submarine warfare; this is not merely an argument in semantics--to fight a modern nuclear submarine defensively from a stationary position is questionably effective. The question of an "offensive defense" will be addressed in the next chapter.

G. THE RIGHT OF BELLIGERENCY IS DENIED

Denial of "the right of belligerency" was written into Article 9 of the Constitution, and Dr. Kanamori

Tokujiro who explained the document before the Diet interpreted this to mean that Japan was denied the rights given to a belligerent in time of war by international law. Apparently neither the U.S. Occupation authorities instrumental in writing the Constitution nor Dr. Kanamori realized at the time that the term "right of belligerency" was meaningless in international law.²¹ In his explanation Dr. Kanamori used three examples of the kind of actions prohibited to Japan by the denial of the right of belligerency. Of primary interest to the MSDF are the first two examples; Japan could not, according to Kanamori, check neutral ships for contraband goods during wartime nor

²¹For example, Dr. Kanamori to the Special Committee, House of Peers, September 13, 1946. Shimizu Shin, Kempo to Jieitai (The Constitution and the Self-Defense Forces), compiled from minutes of the Diet, Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbun, 1969, p. 344. The respected Japan Society of International Law adopted a report by Professor Miebara Mitsuo of Keio University at its annual conference in 1951. Professor Miebara's report concluded that after an exhaustive search of international law treatises, a search which it noted was not made in 1946, there was no precedent for the term "right of belligerency" and recommended that the term be regarded as meaningless. Miebara, "Renunciation of Belligerency," Kokusai Ho Gaiko Zasshi (The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy), Volume 51, Number 2, January, 1951, pp. 4ff. Regardless, the government has never officially shifted from the Kanamori position.

could it blockade enemy territory.²² Actually, according to a reliable source:

As international law recognizes the status of war and its effects as regards rights and duties between the belligerents on the one hand, and between belligerents and neutral states on the other, the question arises what kind of States are legally qualified to make war, and thereby to become belligerents. According to the Law of Nations, full sovereign states alone possess the legal qualification to become belligerents; half and partially sovereign States are not legally qualified to become belligerents. Since neutral States, such as Switzerland, are full sovereign States, they are legally qualified to become belligerents, although their neutrality binds them not to make use of that capacity, except for defense. If they become belligerents because they are attacked, they do not lose their character as neutral States; but if they become belligerents for offensive purposes, they ipso facto lose the character.²³

It would thus appear that Japan has domestically renounced, even in defensive warfare, the rights it is allowed as a belligerent under international law; it would also appear, however, that such a renunciation has no effect in

²²Nakamura Kikuo, "The Interpretation of Article 9," in Nakamura and Hayashi Shuzo, editor, Jieitai to Kempo no Kaishaku (The Self-Defense Forces and the Interpretation of the Constitution), Tokyo: Yushindo, 1967, p. 259.

²³L. Oppenheim, International Law A Treatise, Volume II: Disputes War and Neutrality, London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1963, p. 248.

international law. If Japan were attacked and the government were to change its official position to that of its legal scholars who maintain that denial of the right of belligerency is a meaningless term, Japan would have no domestic or international legal obstacles to exercising the rights given a belligerent in time of warfare. If the Kanamori position were rigidly maintained, the MSDF, again particularly in the field of anti-nuclear-submarine warfare, would be presented with some severely limiting obstacles to complicate an already most difficult game which can be easily won or lost depending on small advantages or disadvantages.

H. OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT IS PROHIBITED

Despite the official sanctions that have been given to the right of self-defense by Japanese government leaders, even they have consistently maintained that overseas deployment of the armed forces is unconstitutional; such a declaration was passed as a resolution by the House of Councillors at the time of the passage of the Self-Defense Forces Law in 1954. The only relaxation as to interpretation of the prohibition has been to allow overseas

deployment for training, although even this was attacked at the time of the first MSDF training cruise to Hawaii in 1957. The Training Squadron now deploys annually and has visited North and South America, Europe, and Australia; the MSDF icebreaker FUJI since 1965 has replaced a Maritime Safety Agency vessel in the role of transporting Japan's annual survey mission to the Antarctic; and MSDF submarines and aircraft regularly exercise in Hawaii with American units. Combat deployment is rigidly denied, however; and many feel that this prohibition affects Japan's ability to fulfill the obligations of collective security assumed with the signing of the Peace Treaty and the United Nations Charter. Since one of the explicit principles of Japan's "National Defense Policy" is to support the United Nations, this question has caused a great deal of debate and will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter IX. Here it is interesting to note that very few Japanese realize even today that their forces have deployed overseas in combat since the war and that that deployment was in direct support of United Nations' operations.

I. CONSTITUTIONALITY IS DENIED OR QUESTIONED BY A
SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF THE POPULACE

In no other country in the world, regardless of ideology, have the armed forces been questioned and/or attacked by as large and vocal a segment of the population as in postwar Japan. The Supreme Court has evaded the issue of constitutionality. The Communist and Socialist Parties have maintained from the beginning that the Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional. Public opinion as to the necessity of the forces has risen to nearly 80 per cent in recent years but a direct question of constitutionality has rarely been able to achieve 60 per cent in the affirmative.

Opposition party credibility and public doubt have seemingly been aided by the inconsistency of the successive stands of ruling conservative governments. To exemplify:

a. June 28, 1946 (Yoshida Cabinet at the time of discussion of the Constitution):

Most wars have been fought in the cause of self-defense so that it is better to wage no war at all in any cases. To acknowledge and justify a war in self-defense would only serve to invite another war and would be harmful and unprofitable.

b. November 21, 1949 (Yoshida Cabinet prior to hostilities in Korea):

There remains the rights of self-defense without arms, the right to defend one's country through diplomatic measures and other such means.

c. March 10, 1952 (Prime Minister Yoshida, to Budget Committee, House of Councillors):

To maintain war potential, even for the purpose of self-defense, would mean rearmament. This would necessitate revision of the Constitution.

d. November 25, 1952 (The government's official interpretation of war potential in reply to Socialist accusations that the National Safety Force is unconstitutional):

Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Constitution prohibits the maintaining of a war potential whether for aggression or for self-defense.

"War potential" means a force with the equipment and strength capable of conducting modern warfare.

.
The Security Force and the Maritime Safety Force are not "war potential." Objectively speaking, the equipment and strength of these forces are not capable of effectively conducting modern warfare and hence are not to be considered "war potential" mentioned in the Constitution.

e. June 16, 1955 (Hatoyama Cabinet, official interpretation):

The Constitution, while denouncing war, has not denounced war for self-defense. . . .

To check armed attack in event of such an attack from an outside nation is self-defense itself, and is entirely different from settling international disputes. Hence, the use of military power as a means of defending the nation when the nation has been attacked by military power is not counter to the Constitution.

f. March 12, 1959 (Prime Minister Kishi to Cabinet Committee, House of Councillors):

The Government intends to maintain no nuclear weapons, but speaking in terms of legal interpretation of the Constitution, there is nothing to prevent the maintaining of the minimum amount of nuclear weapons for the purposes of self-defense.

g. March 19, 1959 (Kishi Cabinet official interpretation):

In the event that an attack is waged with guided missiles and there are no other means of defense, counter attacks on enemy bases are within the scope of self-defense. With the right of self-defense retained as an independent nation, the Constitution does not mean for the nation to sit and do nothing and await its death.

h. June 25, 1963 (Prime Minister Ikeda to the Cabinet Committee, House of Councillors):

The Self-Defense Forces are not to be determined conceptually or numerically, but the strength should be determined according to the national situation, world affairs, and the development of scientific techniques.

i. November, 1965 (Prime Minister Sato answering the question, "Where is the Constitutional limit to the expansion of self-defense power?"):

The defense power needed for self-defense, of course. We would have equipment appropriate to our national power and circumstances. Thus new conditions will always be added. Therefore, it would be difficult to show where the limit is in concrete terms.²⁴

As it did with respect to war potential, the Supreme Court in the landmark Sunakawa case refused to pass on the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces in 1959. Over 300 lawyers were mobilized to support a case in 1969 in which two farmers sought to absolve their guilt from destroying government property as charged under the Self-Defense Forces Law by maintaining that the law was unconstitutional. The district court found them guilty of crime but failed to fit the crime to the

²⁴ Statements "a" through "g" quoted from Masuhara Keikichi, Chairman, Nihon no Boei (Japan's Defense) Tokyo: Nihon no Boei Kanko (Japan's Defense Publishing Company), 1961, pp. 57-59. Prime Minister Ikeda's statement contained in Asahi Shimin Kyoshitsu Volume 8, Nihon no Jieiryoku (Self-Defense Strength of Japan), Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1967, p. 182. Prime Minister Sato's statement quoted in "Under the Peace Constitution," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, January 24, 1969.

definition of the law and thus avoided the issue of constitutionality of the forces.²⁵ In 1970 an ASDF corporal accused of violating the SDF law by instigating sabotage through antiwar activities mounted another test questioning the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces; this case was still pending in July, 1971 and the firm legal status remains unaddressed by the courts.²⁶

The Socialists have held that both the preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution make it clear that "military forces" are illegal; they have claimed that if this were not true there would be provisions for declarations of war and peace, military law, etc. While they have not denied that there is an inherent right of self-defense, they have maintained that Article 9 clearly denies any military force or war potential even for self-defense. The pre-Korean War statements of Prime Minister Yoshida supported this view. The Socialists have been the only political party in Japan to advocate "unarmed

²⁵The court decision is contained in Jurisuto (Jurist) Number 370, May 15, 1967, pp. 53-55.

²⁶"Constitutionality of Defense Forces Attacked In Trial," The Daily Yomiuri, January 31, 1971.

neutrality" although they have sometimes spoken of the need for a "National Construction Corps," ironically reminiscent of Vice Admiral Hoshina's idea of 1945 or a "People's Police Corps," which sounds like Funada's recent proposal. In the 1969 national election they took a strong position that the Self-Defense Forces should be gradually abolished.

The Japan Communist Party has claimed that the Self-Defense Forces were created as servants to the United States Far Eastern strategy and has maintained that they are in violation of the Constitution. The Communists' arguments have been no more consistent than those of the conservatives, however, in that they maintain that once a "democratic, neutralist, independent" state as defined by them is formed, armed force might be necessary. Their official position as of June 11, 1968, was that:

As a future problem, we have to consider that developments both within and without the country may produce a situation in which, in order to defend the independence and sovereignty of the country, some defense measures of a military nature may be required. Over the future, to declare the rigid principle of "unarmed neutrality" is not the right way to defend successfully Japan's sovereignty and independence in every situation. However, this

is a problem which the Japanese people themselves, facing a new domestic and international situation in the future, and considering the application of the Constitution, must decide on the basis of the will of the people.²⁷

The early Yoshida statements would not agree with this position, but the later conservative governments do not seem in fundamental opposition to it.

The two late comers to present opposition ranks have two different positions of their own. The Democratic Socialists who split off from the right wing of the JSP claim the Self-Defense Forces are constitutional but call for a reversal of the present primary U.S. and secondary Japanese roles in the nation's security; their ideas sound much like some of the views expressed in the defense white paper of October, 1970. The rapidly growing Clean Government Party (Komeito), like many of the people, listening to what is regarded as inconsistent government and Communist positions and the unrealistic Socialist position, seem in doubt. A Komeito leader listed some of these doubts: the stated purpose of the Self-Defense

²⁷Quoted from Akahata (Reg Flag) in Kyosan-To-Seiken-Ka no Anzen Hosho (Security under a Communist Party Government), Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1969, p. 242.

Forces as given in establishment law, the modern equipment such as jet aircraft and guided missiles, and the lack of independence of the Self-Defense Forces from the United States.²⁸ Komeito does not believe that the Self-Defense Forces should immediately be abolished but favors a National Guard that can eventually join in a United Nations Police Force, a proposal that also sounds reminiscent of Speaker Funada's.

The general public has increasingly supported the Self-Defense Forces but the legal status is still unsure. A Liberal Democratic Party-sponsored poll of September, 1969 sampling 3000 people of twenty years of age and older living throughout Japan found that while 75 per cent of the sample felt that the Self-Defense Forces "had better exist" and only 15 per cent answered "Don't know," only 60 per cent of the same sample would say "the exercise of armed force may be permitted if it is for the self-defense of Japan" while 23 per cent said they didn't know whether it was legal.²⁹

²⁸ Komeito-Seiken-Ka no Anzen Hoshō (Security under a Clean Government Party Government), Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1969, p. 168.

²⁹ "Public Opinion Poll Concerning the SDF," in Seisaku Geppo (Organ magazine of the Liberal-Democratic

Despite the fact that it is doubtful that any opposition party, if it gained power, would actually abolish the Self-Defense Forces, it would be reasonable to expect that lack of consistent support from the government, opposition from major political parties, and doubt caused by the opinions of the Supreme Court and expressed by a large segment of the public would, first, greatly affect the morale of the forces, and would, second, cause an unsettled situation in a case of an attack, particularly an indirect one such as on a Japanese merchant ship on the high seas.³⁰ The MSDF, operating almost exclusively in international waters to defend Japan, probably faces even more questions than the other two forces which are operating on or over the same terra firma they are defending.

Party), April, 1970, U.S. Embassy translation, pp. 25, 29.

³⁰Privately, even Socialist leaders have advised SDF senior officers that they shouldn't worry, i.e., the gradual abolition Socialists have publicly advocated could be explained away and any change as far as decreasing size is unlikely. Socialist Party officials who are graduates of the former Naval Academy avoid daytime activities of class reunions but quietly come to evening festivities. Interviews with a U.S. Embassy official and former Japanese naval officers.

J. THE HEAD OF STATE HAS NO DIRECT RELATION TO THE FORCES

One of the most impressive pictures in Japanese naval history is that of the Emperor Meiji in an admiral's uniform reviewing the Imperial Navy Fleet with Admiral Togo. The present Emperor has not donned a uniform since the war and is not the supreme commander of the Self-Defense Forces in theory or in fact. To avoid controversy, the Emperor has never even visited a ship or unit of the MSDF or any other of the other forces. On August 26, 1954, the Emperor and Empress did present wooden cups and cigarettes to some MSDF unit commanders and crew members in appreciation for security measures provided during the royal couple's tour of Hokkaido.³¹ Also, annually, the highest level admirals of MSDF are presented to the Emperor by the Chief of Maritime Staff, but these are the only types of contacts that take place. Despite the respect of the majority of Cabinet members for the Emperor, they would not dare risk giving him the honorary title of commander or desire to have him appear at a Naval Review

³¹Jieitai Nenpyo Kaijo Jieitai (Chronological Table of the Maritime Self-Defense Force) Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1962, p. 150.

in or out of uniform. Bitter attacks by Mainland Chinese press on the person of the Emperor in 1971 made any change in such past policy unlikely in the near future.

K. MEMBERS OF THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ARE THEORETICALLY
"CIVILIANS"

Despite destroyers equipped with nuclear depth bomb launchers, anti-submarine warfare patrol planes, and a guided missile frigate in their arsenal, members of the Maritime Self-Defense Force are civilians according to Japanese law; and the government has refused to change this status even though it is recognized as a positive detriment to morale.

According to the "Law Governing National Servants" of 1947 there are two kinds of government employees, normal and special. Normal civil servants include classifications such as policemen, bureaucrats, etc. Special civil servants include categories such as the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, government advisors, judges, Members of the Diet, etc. Presently category sixteen of a total of eighteen classifications is "Members of the Defense

Agency."³² Because of fear of opposition and public reaction, there is no move to change this status. Prime Minister Sato told a harsh critic in the House of Councilors in 1967 that, "Now and in the future we will not call the Self-Defense Forces military (guntai)."³³ A year later, pressed in the House of Representatives, he mentioned his rejection of any change in status again, this time dashing the hopes of the Self-Defense Forces for change through revision of the Constitution, an idea endorsed by his brother, former Prime Minister Kishi; Sato stated, "I have no intention of revising the Constitution . . . especially the pacificism of Article 9. . . . This is the flesh and blood of the Japanese people now. I will carry through this pacificism."³³ As a fitting close to the list of differences between the Maritime Self-Defense Force and a typical navy, this domestic legal status gives the final touch of accuracy to the statement of General Okumia

³²Law No. 120 of 1947, as amended, quoted in Kokka Komuin Ho, Kaijo Jieitai Kaikei Hokiruishu (2) (MSDF Disbursing Laws (2)), Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1962, p. 6.

³³"Detailed Reports on 'Nuclear-Security' Diet Debates, House of Representatives," Yomiuri Shimbum, January 31, 1968, U.S. Embassy translation.

given at the opening of Chapter VII. As a young MSDF officer told this writer on their first of many meetings, "You will have difficulty understanding us because you are a Navy officer; Japan does not have a navy--we only have a Maritime Self-Defense Force."³⁴

³⁴Interview with Lieutenant Nagasawa Kazunami, JMSDF, August 30, 1970.

CHAPTER IX

A NATIONAL DEFENSE "POLICY": THE THIRD POINT OF DEPARTURE, MAY 20, 1957

The first Japanese postwar sea forces, the former Imperial Navy minesweepers did not suffer from the lack of firm policy as to how their mission should be carried out. The forces of the Maritime Safety Agency had a vague mission, but their duties were relatively clear. After Japan's recovery of sovereignty, however, the role of the Coastal Security Force, two days old when independence was regained, was not settled. No precise duties were specified in the founding law nor spelled out in government policy. The mission of the Safety Agency was very vague; and policy for the initial sea forces was easy: the minesweepers kept sweeping the World War II mines. In anticipation of the new defense organization in 1954, no new mission was immediately assigned because of the new ships received from the United States in 1953. The number was still

pitifully small so there was really no problem: the first frigates and landing craft were used for training; the minesweepers kept sweeping.

The mission of the Maritime Self-Defense Force within the new Defense Agency was very vague and open to interpretation. For almost three years no explicit duties were spelled out in a public policy; thus, the JMSDF forces of U.S. and Japanese-made ships and aircraft kept training for various roles and the minesweepers kept sweeping, the latter being the only group within the organization which really knew definitely what it was supposed to do.

With the organization of the National Defense Council finally established in mid-1956, the definition of a national defense policy was undertaken. Under the new civilian control system incorporated in the Defense Agency organization, the highest level input to the Council from the defense organization for such a policy came not from the Joint Staff Council, as one might expect in another country, but from the Defense Bureau of the Defense Agency, which was made up of bureaucrats from the prewar and post-war police organizations.¹ On May 20, 1957, a Cabinet

¹As has been noted, at this same time the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council was General Hayashi Keizo, a

meeting approved the "Basic National Defense Policy" as recommended by the National Defense Council; the statement has ever since remained in effect. Basic Policy was defined as follows:

The purpose of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and, once invaded, to repel it in order to preserve the independence and peace of Japan for the blessings of democracy.

To achieve this purpose, the government of Japan adopted the following principles:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations and its promotion of international cooperation, thereby contributing to the cause of world peace.

2. To promote the national welfare and enhance the spirit of patriotism, thereby laying a sound basis for national security.

3. To develop gradually an effective defensive power within the bounds of national capabilities to the extent necessary for self-defense.

4. To cope with aggression by recourse to the joint security system with the United States of America, pending effective functioning of the United Nations in preventing and removing aggression.²

This statement did not include the specific missions listed by the former naval officers and recommended

former Home Ministry official; the Chief of Maritime Staff was Admiral Nagasawa Ko of Imperial Navy and Second Demobilization Ministry, the only postwar chief of staff at the time to come from former military ranks.

²Defense of Japan 1970, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1970, p. 2.

by Admiral Burke but also did not necessarily exclude them from being undertaken. Since the policy has never been changed and has been strongly defended by many, including Prime Minister Sato, as having no need of being changed, its provisions will be examined individually.

A. TO SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE

The United Nations has always been popular in post-war Japan, but how much it has contributed to the cause of world peace is largely speculative. Although the number of wars it has prevented cannot be accurately estimated, it has not seemed able to resolve the largest armed encounters that the postwar international scene has experienced; Vietnam is only the most recent example.

Since the Japanese were formally admitted in 1956, they have been in favor of ideas such as the proposal for a United Nations' University which many would like to see constructed in Japan; but they have been unwilling so far to participate in any type of military peacekeeping or observer force in which they were almost forced to

participate in 1950. Many claim that such participation would be unconstitutional. Professor Kotani Hidejiro of Kyoto Industrial College strongly maintains that participation of the Self-Defense Forces in a peacekeeping mission of the United Nations would not necessitate revision of the Constitution but merely a minor change to the Self-Defense Forces Law such as that which took place in 1964 to allow participation in the activities associated with the Olympic Games.³ Unfortunately for the cause he espouses, Kotani, who is probably the greatest authority on this particular subject, was involved in an incident resulting in the publication of his picture in a U.S. Air Force fighter plane in which he had just ridden as a passenger on a Vietnam combat mission; the matter attracted enough controversy in the "progressive" Japanese press that Kotani had to resign from his position at the National Defense College. More recently Japanese observers have speculated that if at some future date Japanese armed forces are authorized to deploy abroad as part of a United Nations' Force, their use for anything more than something

³Interview with Professor Kotani, July 23, 1970.

like multinational border monitoring, and that most likely only in a non-Asian area in a conflict not involving a great power, would not be domestically acceptable. One official further suggested that in such a role the Japanese participants probably would be given concurrent diplomatic status, as is the case with Japanese military attachés abroad today, so that they would be directly responsible to diplomatic rather than military authority.⁴ For the present, the government of Japan seems content to support the first principle of the National Defense Policy by attending U.N. meetings and hoping for more effectiveness of the organization and of Japanese participation in the future.

B. TO PROMOTE THE NATIONAL WELFARE AND ENHANCE THE SPIRIT OF PATRIOTISM, THEREBY LAYING A SOUND BASIS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

To compare the situation of occupied Japan with the present day with regard to national welfare and patriotism would lead to the conclusion that this principle

⁴William Beecher, "Japan, 25 Years After Surrender, Builds Protective Might," The New York Times, August 15, 1970.

has been achieved to a very great degree. Having experienced the great physical and emotional sufferings of defeat, having received a shock that only the Japanese can rightfully claim as having experienced as a nation in the instantaneous death and destruction from two atomic bombs, and having experienced physical and psychological disarmament by a foreign Occupation, Japan was in physical, emotional, and economic ruins.

Japan's economic recovery is beyond dispute; and while government leaders and opposition spokesmen alike deny that such resurgence should in any way be related to military growth, the economic miracle seems to have necessarily effected the national security question also. The first reason for this contention has already been explored in Chapter II: Japan's economic activities including the import of critically-needed natural resources and the export of finished products has made its relations with other countries interdependent to an unprecedented degree. Japan and the other East Asian countries seems inseparable economically.

Secondly, although Japan has consistently spent approximately one per cent or less of its gross national

product for defense, this GNP figure has become so large that security expenditures continue to rise annually in total amount. Although some maximum figure could be set rather than continuing aggregate increases while maintaining a fairly stable percentage of GNP, even only such a continuance in the future would probably not impede economic development and, depending on the rate of economic expansion, could result in very large future defense expenditures.⁵

Thirdly, economic success is helping Japanese nationalism to re-emerge. Starting with Yoshida Shigeru, Japanese postwar prime ministers have chosen economic development as the national priority, and success in this field has restored confidence to politicians and to the people, confidence which has spilled over into psychological

⁵For one prediction of conditions under such a continuation see Chapter XIII concerning the economic predictions of Herman Kahn. Although the Japanese government has reportedly been disturbed with Kahn's predictions, Finance Minister Fukuda Takeo, a leading candidate to succeed Prime Minister Sato, has actually predicted greater gains for the Japanese economy than Kahn percentage-wise. Unlike Kahn, few other people seem to realize what their predictions mean when arithmetical calculations are performed based on their percentage growth rate figures; interview with Kahn, July 2, 1971.

and social realms as well.⁶ Pride in the nation as an equal in the world community after years as an inferior member has returned, and the hosted Olympics of 1964 and the Osaka Exposition in 1970 are spectacular examples.

This does not mean that Japan has returned to militarization; on the contrary, some uniformed leaders even doubt that a "sound basis for national security" has been built in spite of progress to date. Evidences that the return of nationalism is healthy yet responsible which should please both government and military leaders are beginning to appear. Two recent annual public opinion surveys by a national newspaper concerning public reaction to the nuclear armament of Mainland China produced the

⁶ Shortly before his death in 1967, Yoshida wrote his former military advisor, General Tatsumi Eiichi, that, had he any idea of how dramatically the Japanese economy would recover, he would have certainly applied more efforts to defense. Even more than fiscal efforts, one wonders if he would have had the political courage to call for new elections on the issue of revision of the Constitution as seems to have been the proper measure at the time of the creation of the Self-Defense Forces. Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, Yoshida's naval advisor, thinks he should have. General Tatsumi only said it is hard to criticize Yoshida's sincerity in wanting what he thought best for Japan. Interviews with Tatsumi, December 8, 1970, and Yamamoto, December 28, 1970. Tatsumi told me he had never revealed the fact of Yoshida's letter before.

following results:⁷

The nuclear armament of China is:

	April, 1969		March, 1970	School Graduates		
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Total</u>		<u>Middle School</u>	<u>High School</u>	<u>Univ/ College</u>
Very frightening	43%	46%		47%	45%	44%
Slightly frightening	35	32		30	34	33
Not so frightening	15	14		12	15	21
Not frightening at all	3	3		3	4	2

Concerning the Self-Defense Forces themselves, a government poll of 1967 found that 24 per cent of the sample surveyed stated that the reason for the need of the present forces was for "ensuring the security of our country" while 33 per cent thought "dispatch in the case of disasters" was the more proper role; in 1969, a similar sample found 50 per cent registering for "ensuring the security of our country" and only 13 per cent for the disaster role.⁸

⁷Mainichi Shimbun, May 12, 29, 1969; April 30, 1970.

⁸"Public Opinion Poll Concerning the SDF," Seisaku Geppo.

Some civilian leaders who have talked about defense among the people of varied political and economic groups claim that a healthy consciousness of the necessity to defend Japan from outside aggression is growing as reflected in polls such as these.

The unusual legal situation of the nation's armed forces and how it effects national security may come under more serious examination if national self-confidence and economic growth continue in the 1970's. As 1972 approaches, sentiments that Okinawans do not want the Self-Defense Forces stationed there have been heard from some opposition politicians and in the press. Plans to station SDF units throughout the islands and a reduced U.S. military presence have been formulated. No one doubts the patriotism of the Japanese people, but the insistence of the mainland public to provide for the defense of Okinawa and the willingness of the Ryukuan Japanese to accept the Self-Defense Forces there may provide another barometer for the soundness of the national security base.

C. TO DEVELOP GRADUALLY AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE POWER
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF NATIONAL CAPABILITIES TO THE
EXTENT NECESSARY FOR SELF-DEFENSE

Of all the principles of the Basic National Defense Policy, this is the most loaded and most significant one, particularly for the Maritime Self-Defense Force. Since the gradual buildup of defense power is the subject of the next chapter, this discussion will deal with the most controversial issue in this principle, "within the bounds of national capabilities to the extent necessary for self-defense."

Four key questions can be raised: Is there a difference between offensive and defensive warfare and can certain strategies and certain armaments exclusively for one type be selected? Can a sea strategy for an ocean-going navy be "purely defensive"? What is the role of a navy with a mission of defending its country from direct and indirect aggression on the sea? Should Japan, taking into account its geographical position, natural resource allocations, political, economic, and psychological conditions, and pledging itself only to self-defense, have an ocean-going navy or a limited, anti-invasion,

anti-infiltration coastal guard force?

These questions have been argued for the entire history of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to date and as yet, regardless of the theoretical existence of a "defense policy," have not been finally answered. Because they and other important policy questions have not been decided, it is difficult to say that such a policy or a maritime defense strategy exists. Generally speaking it can be said that the civilian defense planners of the Defense Agency have argued that there is a difference between offensive and defensive warfare and defensive armaments can be distinguished; they have held that defensive naval strategy can be distinguished; they have argued that to defend its country the MSDF should be oriented against invading enemy ships and planes as well as against infiltration, sabotage, mining, and other indirect attacks harmful to the territory and coastal security; and they have indicated that this force should essentially be a limited coastal guard force. On the other hand, the leaders of the MSDF have questioned whether there is a difference, other than one of intention, between offensive and defensive warfare, particularly in the tactical sense at sea, and

have felt that naval weapons cannot be readily distinguished as being offensive or defensive; they have argued that a maritime strategy for an ocean-going navy cannot be "exclusively defensive," particularly in the sense that a navy can fix its position on the sea and wait to be attacked; they have felt that to defend its country the MSDF should guard against direct and indirect attacks on its territories from the sea and should insure Japan's vital necessity to use the sea and coasts freely; and they have held that because of Japan's nature as a maritime nation and extensive and necessary involvement on the sea, an ocean-going navy is required.

Since failure to resolve this controversy is indicative of the lack of a defense policy, it is important to understand how completely lacking any effort to resolve it has been. In order to describe the objectives of the planners of the Defense Bureau as compared to those of the leadership of the MSDF, this writer will elaborate two positions called for purposes of identification "The Kaihara Vision" and "The Sekino Vision." The first is named after Kaihara Osamu, former head and long a member of the Defense Bureau who has on occasion been called

"Emperor Kaihara," in recognition of his strong will and powerful approaches to controversial issues, or "Rikuhara" (Army-hara), in view of his supposedly anti-Navy attitudes. Kaihara presently heads the Secretariat of the National Defense Council, and a former subordinate and close confidant now heads the Defense Bureau. "The Sekino Vision" is named after Sekino Hideo, retired commander in the Imperial Navy, a close associate of many former naval officers, an advisor to the Foreign Ministry on security matters, and a prominent writer on national security affairs. Both men have written extensively on their views as to the authorized and practical roles of the MSDF. Both have elaborated their ideas in interviews with this writer; however, they have not named their views as is being done here.⁹ While not all members of the Defense Bureau

⁹Both Mr. Kaihara and Commander Sekino have read and acceded to English copies of the respective vision as representative of their views. Kaihara's views were obtained from three personal interviews, an unpublished speech in English entitled, "The Defense of Japan and U.S. Military Bases," and especially from his recent article, "Kare o Shiri Onore o Shiru" (We Should Know Ourselves as well as Knowing Them), Kokubo (The National Defense), April, 1971. Sekino's ideas were obtained from three personal interviews, an English article, "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

necessarily support Kaihara and the leading officers of the MSDF may well have ideas more up-to-date tactically and technologically than Sekino's, the ideas of these authorities are believed fairly typical of leading Defense-Bureau-civilian and MSDF points of view, respectively.

"The Kaihara Vision" purports to learn from the mistakes of Japanese failure in World War II.¹⁰ Pointing out that on the Navy side the great defeat suffered was resultant from an unrealistic strategy of one decisive fleet encounter and speed-and-surprise attack, from flamboyant spirit which was more concerned with spectacular successes and style than with final outcome, and from optimistic thinking that some kind of "Divine Wind" would always come to aid Japan, i.e., generally from planning a strategy that did not take into account the harsh realities of what a Pacific War against the United States would

May, 1971, and especially from his article, "A Diagnosis of Our Maritime Self-Defense Force," Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World), November, 1970.

¹⁰ Kaihara has written one book specifically on this subject, Senshi ni Manabu (Lessons from World War II), Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1970.

entail and as a result never having any real chance of victory. Kaihara praises the plan of Admiral Inoue Shigemi submitted in early 1941 as the one brilliant piece of realistic thinking that came forth from the prewar Navy. The plan was, of course, rejected; and Kaihara fears that today Japan may again be rejecting a realistic Inoue-type plan for unachievable and dangerous dreams.

"The Kaihara Vision" posits that the small island country of Japan can never wage a major war with a super-power because of the twin damaging characteristics of its geography and natural resource allocation; i.e., the narrow islands dictate that Japan cannot retreat and regroup but must always fight from one front line, and with scant resources Japan must always import basic raw materials and export finished goods in order to sustain a vibrant economy. Particularly in the nuclear age, despite how much destruction Japan might be able to inflict on another country, geography dictates that there will be no second-strike capability and that Japan will be among the sure losers in any nuclear exchange with a big power. Kaihara feels that those individuals such as Sekino who advocate a Japanese nuclear deterrent force are "beautiful dreamers"

such as existed in Japan before the war. Ticking off statistics of Soviet missile strength in the manner reminiscent of an American like former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara or National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Kaihara argues: "If we started from nothing in nuclear armament (whatever amount of weapons were built by Japan) would be tiny fireworks compared with the Soviet stock-piles."¹¹ Rather than deterring any attack upon Japan or effectively providing for national security, possession of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or nuclear submarines carrying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) would serve an opposite purpose by causing fears from other parts of the world which have observed Japan's erratic behavior in the past. Strategic nuclear deterrence can be and is willingly provided for Japan by the United States which is capable of credibly deterring the Soviet Union at the present and China in the future, something Japan could never do now or then.

¹¹Kaihara, "Nonnuclear is not a Myth," Shokun, December, 1970. See also Kaihara, "The Nonnuclear Myth Has Vanished," Shokun, October, 1970.

Another "unrealistic dream" of today, attacked by Kaihara, this one caused by a guilty conscience of failure in World War II, is the desire of Japanese naval officers represented by Sekino to secure Japan's commercial sea lanes against "invisible enemies," i.e., against unidentified submarines which are usually assumed to be Soviet or Chinese. According to Kaihara, such a role for the MSDF is unauthorized, unrealistic, and impossible.

The role is unauthorized because Japan's sea lanes minimally extend throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and attacks on Japanese merchantmen in these far distant areas are not the narrowly-defined types of direct and indirect aggressions against "the nation" spelled out in the missions of the Self-Defense Forces.

The role is unrealistic because these sea lanes do not extend over narrow fixed paths which can be somehow "secured" but instead are of infinite number depending on the destinations to be sought, types of shipping employed, weather conditions encountered, etc. Further, it is unrealistic because the equipment with which to perform such a task is, first, unavailable and, second, if it were available, it would be unattainable in sufficient

quantity ever to be effective. To illustrate, Kaihara treats the problem of ship sonars and torpedoes. Despite the best sound and navigational ranging (SONAR) system available, detection of a submarine is by no means assured; he recounts some of the difficulties experienced by the U.S. Navy in this field. Torpedoes, he adds, have trouble catching fast nuclear submarines even if they are equipped with homing devices and can be delivered near to their target; again he talks about the great problems experienced by the United States Navy and the great expenditures it has put forth in this regard. He often asks the MSDF pointed questions as to the capabilities of its present stock of torpedoes to operate in areas like the shallow Malacca Straits or the straits near Japan. If reliable equipment were available, Kaihara asks, how could the MSDF be in enough positions to help attacked ships which might be located anywhere in the Pacific or Indian Oceans? He questions whether "the invisible enemy" could be distinguished as "the" enemy; and, positing himself as that enemy, he picks only the weakly defended areas or gaps to make his attacks. Quoting figures given in studies by groups favoring ideas like Sekino's as to the number of

escort ships that would be necessary to sustain a supply of twenty vessels per day into Japan, Kaihara questions the ability to sustain this amount, even with the large number of escort ships required; as a critic, again citing his opposition's sources and admissions of weakness on this point, he, as a potential enemy, attacks on the seventh day, the tenth day, or whenever the limited Japanese forces are at their weakest. He even questions the ability of Japan to provide sufficient manpower greatly to expand the MSDF, noting the recent recruiting difficulties and projecting meager fruits from even a highly unlikely two-year conscription system.

Finally the mission is impossible because it is oriented against the Soviet Union which Japan has no capability to fight. He believes even the present oft-mentioned strategy of trying to block Soviet submarines from passing through the Soya Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin enroute to the Pacific from their base in Vladivostok is offensively oriented. Citing the fact that just the Soviet Pacific Fleet of 120 submarines, twenty of which are nuclear, is three times larger than the entire U.S. Navy submarine fleet at the beginning of World War II, a fleet that


subsequently destroyed Japanese maritime commerce, Kaihara points out that, despite a claim that the 1967-1971 defense buildup program was supposed to provide the MSDF with monitoring capability in the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido, where Soviet submarines can pass unbothered in peacetime, the buildup program, which has been declared 97.5 per cent completed by the Defense Agency, has not provided effective monitoring capability in this area. By concentrating solely on anti-submarine warfare, Kaihara feels the MSDF is trying again to fight the Second World War. Despite the fact that its priorities are now different, he feels the results in any such conflict would inevitably be the same.

"The Kaihara Vision" is persuaded, however, that there is a proper authorized, and necessary role for the MSDF. The role comes directly from the stated mission, to defend Japan against direct and indirect invasion. Since Japan is surrounded by water on four sides, an invading enemy must come over or through the water. He feels that instead of using undefinable terms like "securing sea lanes" and "securing command of the sea" the MSDF should discuss the neglected but legal role of "repelling enemy

invasion." The latter, he feels, naval officers do not want to do because they feel the threat of direct invasion is very small; and they would rather concentrate on larger goals on the open sea. Kaihara also feels that the danger is very small; but that even if it is only one or two per cent, it must be protected against because one invasion is enough to take from Japan her independence. Also and very important, this danger of direct or indirect territorial invasion is the only kind of threat authorized for Japan's Self-Defense Forces to resist. Realistically Kaihara believes that the Soviet Union might well be the enemy, and he thinks that resistance must be offered. He states that the most favorable outcome is not spectacular victory but is to delay conquest until diplomacy can solve the crisis or outside help from the United States or the United Nations can be enlisted.

Although ideal or maximum figures for aggregate tonnage and number of ships are left unspecified and are determined by the relative threat, specifically "The Kaihara Vision" would do several things immediately. First, it would dissolve the Self-Defense Fleet which is headquartered in Yokosuka and put its front-line ships in

the Ominato and Maizuru Regional Districts (see map following page) which are oriented towards the most likely direction of invasion. Secondly, it would unite the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Maritime Safety Agency into one anti-invasion, anti-infiltration, and rescue force oriented toward the authorized and only reasonable missions a Japanese sea force can support. It would employ destroyers (seemingly the English name of escort ships should change), minesweepers, coastal patrol and rescue ships and aircraft in a role of coping with an invading amphibious force, a covertly-laid minefield, an infiltration of saboteurs or insurgents, and of aiding ships in distress; it would employ submarines mainly as targets to train destroyers against attacks they might receive while resisting an enemy invasion force. Third, it would reallocate budgetary resources to stop merely buying ship platforms and fancy weapons which support "beautiful dreams" rather than providing a balance of ships, aircraft, ammunition, and fuel which provide an effective, limited capability against invasion. Fourth, it would frankly state the capabilities of Japan and its dependence on the United States, allowing the latter to operate out of



and completely control the Pacific-oriented bases of Yokosuka and Sasebo, realizing that to compensate the United States for its support of Japan, the latter must allow the United States to use these bases in its own interests.

"The Sekino Vision" would agree that Japan made a drastic mistake in attempting to fight a Pacific War with the United States but would maintain that Japan's geography and natural resource allocation require that the nation be a Pacific power, politically, economically, and also in a military sense. Hopefully, from the Pacific War and the subsequent friendly treatment by the United States, particularly from the United States Navy to the Japanese Navy, Japan has learned that it has nothing to fear from and has common interests with the United States in the Pacific and that the relationship between the two navies will always remain friendly as it has for the past 25 years.

Sekino feels that there exists a stable balance of strategic nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union, neither being willing to strike first because of fears of the loss of 100 million lives and the destruction of the greater part of its industry. Since

neither is willing to strike, their pledges of nuclear protection for their allies do not have as large a deterrent effect for those individual countries. He does not believe either the United States or the Soviet Union will wage a nuclear war resulting in its own destruction to protect an ally against foreign attack. For this reason, he believes, America's European allies in NATO have armed themselves with tactical nuclear weapons. These can hopefully succeed in deterring or checking a large-scale enemy invasion with credibility short of forcing the United States to engage in strategic nuclear warfare with the Soviet Union; the tactical nuclears are reinforced with the pledge of U.S. strategic support behind them. Sekino believes that such kind of tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed in Okinawa and effectively shelter Taiwan, South Korea and Japan and seriously, doubts, as do many U.S. military authorities, how credible Japan's security will be if these weapons are removed with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.¹² Since Mainland China has already developed and

¹²For example see views of Lt. General Paul W. Caraway, USA (Ret.), former High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands and Commanding General of the U.S. Army

is continuing a buildup of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and progressing toward the possession of an ICBM system, unless tactical nuclear weapons are definitely pledged in support by the United States, possessed by Japan under some kind of bilateral sharing arrangement, or possessed outright by Japan, a blackmail situation could develop. In the future Sekino believes that Japanese nationalism will not tolerate such a situation and that a cooperative arrangement with the United States is therefore best from the standpoint of dealing with the threat and of easing the fears of U.S. and friendly Pacific countries as to Japan's intentions. To objections that such weapons are not credible because of the lack of a second-strike capability by Japan stemming from geography, he would maintain that ballistic missile submarines possessed by Japan would be able to threaten minimum unacceptable damage to China and, when backed by the United States, to the Soviet Union. Since these missiles could be delivered even though Japan's territory

Ryukyu Islands from 1961-1965 in United States-Japanese Relations, Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1968, p. 25.

might be destroyed, they would hopefully deter an attack in the first place. This scenario he believes to be more realistic than the present potential blackmail situation.

As to the protection of maritime traffic, Sekino acknowledges its difficulty but not its impossibility. Citing the figure of Japan having to import 99 per cent of its oil to survive, he feels it is a "beautiful dream" not to be worried about the situation. Although he also worries about direct invasion, he argues that direct invasion is the one instance where the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security provides for assistance for Japan from the United States, while on the sea lanes the United States has no commitment in writing to help Japan. "Therefore, Japan cannot expect the cooperation of the powerful Seventh Fleet in protecting maritime traffic, although it can expect the Seventh Fleet's cooperation in case of direct invasion of Japan."¹³

Sekino cites figures similar to Kaihara's on the size of the Soviet submarine force and concedes the

¹³Seikno, quoted in "Japan and Her Maritime Defense."

great expanse of Japan's trade routes. He also agrees that the enemy would certainly attempt to attack the weak points in Japan's security posture. Thus he feels it is ridiculous that Japan, whose gross national product is second in the non-communist world and whose merchant fleet is the largest in the world, expects to get by in 1976 with an MSDF of 250,000 tons of ships and 250 aircraft. His summary of the strengths of Pacific navies and his estimate of required and officially projected Japanese sea force strength are listed in Table IX-1.

In wartime, "The Sekino Vision" posits Japan reducing its shipping to about half the normal peacetime level and limiting its operating areas to the seas north of Indonesia, between Australia and Japan, and between the United States and Japan, in order to maintain approximately 50 per cent of its present economic activity, enough to secure national life. Since the majority of crude oil now comes from the Persian Gulf, since Japan cannot control the Indian Ocean, and since, even if it could, oil could be shut off at the source in the politically sensitive Middle East, Japan would have to secure its oil in Indonesia, the United States including Alaska,

TABLE IX-1

STRENGTHS OF PACIFIC NAVIES AS TABULATED BY SEKINO HIDEO

Organization	Total Tonnage () # of Ships	Carriers () ASW	Cruisers & Destroyers	Submarine () Nucl'r	Air- Craft	Mine War Ships
U.S. SEVENTH FLEET	650,000 (150)	4 (1)	44	10-12 (conv or nuc)	550	0
USSR PACIFIC FLEET	700,000 (700)	0	57	100 (20)	200	70
MAINLAND CHINA NAVY	260,000 (1400)	0	27	33	500	50
TAIWANESE NAVY	145,000 (240)	0	12	0	0	12
SOUTH KOREAN NAVY	64,000 (180)	0	23	0	0	12
PHILIPPINE NAVY	29,000 (65)	0	10	0	0	2
NORTH KOREAN NAVY	24,000 (200)	0	0	4	0	30
JAPANESE MSDF (1971)	132,800 (200)	0	37	10	180	44
MSDF (1976-PROJ.)	250,000 (250) (maximum)	0	59	25	250	59
MSDF (SEKINO VISION)	565,000 (350) est.	0 (3)	112	9 (6)	570	64

Source: Sekino, "Japan and Her Maritime Defense," "A Diagnosis of Our Maritime Self-Defense Force."

and Australia, hopefully cooperating with the U.S. and Australian navies and keeping friendly relations with Indonesia, Malaysia, and other Southeast Asian countries. Even without the cooperation of the U.S. and Australia, which might be too busy to help, Japan, according to this plan, if it could secure the seas north of Indonesia, could load oil brought to Palau Island, a U.S. trust territory east of the Philippines, and other large ports from more distant sources by foreign ships and thus maintain the minimum necessary supply.

To answer charges that his plan is just a "beautiful dream" or impossible, Commander Sekino has posited what he calls a "Maritime Safety Zone" which he would establish during wartime between two chains of islands, an eastern one running from the Izu Islands south of Tokyo Bay to the Bonin Islands to Iwojima and then to the Marianas, and a western chain from Kyushu to Okinawa to the Philippines to Borneo. On appropriate islands of both chains sonar listening stations monitoring fixed sonar arrays and anti-submarine fixed-wing and helicopter patrol plane bases would be established. Hunter-killer groups of destroyers, aircraft and submarines would operate in the

zone and augment the direct escort forces which would convoy shipping through some portions of the zone where natural geographical features do not allow sufficient protection from other means. Such features include the sea bottom to the east of the eastern chain of islands which would allow arrays of hydrophones to be set at appropriate depths around the islands. Several high-power, very-low-frequency (VLF) active (i.e., positively-transmitting rather than passive-listening) sonar stations would be established on several appropriate islands; and by combining the use of active, passive, and semi-active sonars together with the hydrophones and VLF sonar stations, targets would be detected with a considerably high probability to ranges of 100 to 200 miles from the barrage line, allowing patrol planes and helicopters stationed on nearby islands to reach detection points within one hour in order to classify, localize, attack, and destroy enemy submarines or at the least discourage them from entering the safety zone where they would be subject to detection and attack. This theoretical model extends air defense over the "Maritime Safety Zone" with anti-air radars and vertical take-off and landing fighters (VTOL) stationed

on islands of the chains or by equipping jet ASW patrol planes with air-to-air missiles in order to provide effective interception against enemy land-based, large-size planes. Since the "Maritime Safety Zone" is south of Japan, Soviet submarines would become more inefficient as they operate further away from their bases. The conventionally-powered models are posited as being limited to the sea area north of Indonesia. Nuclear submarines would, if passing undetected through the partially-monitored Tsushima, Tsugaru, or Soya Straits, encounter various Japanese ASW measures including barriers, patrol groups, and nuclear attack submarine wolf packs so that even their operating freedom would be much restricted. "The Sekino Vision" does not predict a victory over the Soviet Union or any other country but is an attempt to keep open Japan's sea lanes until enemy submarine warfare becomes too costly and is discontinued.

Direct invasion is also seen as a threat, particularly from the Soviet Union. In such a case Sekino sees the ASDF as being occupied maintaining control of the air over the battle zone and nearby areas while the MSDF is attempting to destroy invading sea forces enroute to Japan

before they can land much as "The Kaihara Vision" would envision. He also concedes that with limited SDF and the strategic geographical narrow island structure, the destruction of such forces at their bases is necessary but is difficult without Japanese attack aircraft carriers. Sekino, like Kaihara, would thus delay the enemy until the arrival of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

Although aims such as cooperating with the United States, repelling direct invasion, having an effective capability in fields such as minewarfare and anti-infiltration patrol are similar, there are widely divergent goals for the MSDF under the two plans just described. Kaihara's ideas posit a limited and cautious Japan realizing its past mistakes, keeping a small, balanced, anti-invasion naval guard force; Sekino's see a resurgent Japan learning from the past but intent on maintaining its economic role in the Pacific with a larger, ocean-going naval force. Given the political and popular sentiment in Japan against large military establishments and the situation of civilian control already described, why then has not the position of Mr. Kaihara, described even by his strategic adversaries as a very able and articulate

bureaucrat, been realized?

Some observations based on interviews with military and civilian junior and senior personnel are offered.

First, it is a fact that this view has been resisted continuously by the leadership of the MSDF for many of the same reasons its seniors resisted a union with the Maritime Safety Agency at the time of the "Y Committee" in 1951; the naval leaders do not feel that a coastal guard force is adequate for an engaged, maritime nation. As military men it is difficult for them to be convinced that there are such things as offensive and defensive equipments. Although they feel that the Soviet Union or China might have offensive intentions toward Japan or other countries, it is the intention rather than the weaponry that determines such a classification. All MSDF leaders to date have been Imperial Navy officers who have been trained by the United States Navy. Civilian leaders claim Japan will not have "offensive weapons" but change the definitions to suit convenience and willingly accept protection from such weapons they call offensive which are owned by the United States. In fact the most defensive weapons the United States has, the MSDF and the U.S. Navy

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